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The Unexplored Option: Jewish Settlements
in a Palestinian State
David Morris Phillips*
I. Introduction
The withdrawal of Israeli settlers and soldiers from the Gaza Strip
in August and September 2005 inevitably focused both Israeli and world
attention upon the fate of Jewish settlements on the West Bank.' World
focus only intensified with formation of a new Israeli government led by
the Kadima party and its head, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert,2 following
Hamas' victory in the Palestinian National Authority elections.3 In
accord with prior campaign pledges,4 0 lmert announced his intention to
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1. See Steven Erlanger, The Gaza Withdrawal: The Evacuation; Tearfully but
Forcefully, Israel Removes Gaza Settlers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2005, at A1; Greg Myre,
Israel Lowers Its Flag in the Gaza Strip, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at A10; see, e.g.,
Editorial, The Battle for Israel's Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at A18 ("Now that
Mr. Sharon has demonstrated that he is able to carry out a territorial compromise, a
necessity if there will ever be any chance for peace, he needs to extend the principle from
Gaza to the crucially important West Bank."); Editorial, Not Good Enough, HAARETZ,
Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=690437 (urging
removal of West Bank settlements). As used currently, "West Bank" refers to the area of
the Palestinian Mandate west of the Jordan River that Jordan captured in 1948 and Israel
refers to as Judea and Samaria.
2. See Steven Erlanger & Greg Myre, Israeli Voters, by Thin Margin, Support
Parties Vowing Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at Al; Greg Myre, His Coalition in
Place, Olmert Turns to Setting Israeli Borders, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A6.
3. See Steven Erlanger, Palestinian Landslide: The Elections: Hamas Routs Ruling
Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at Al.
4. See, e.g., Aluf Benn & Yossi Verter, Olmert to Offer Settlers: Expand Blocs, Cut
Outposts, HAARETZ, Mar. 10, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=692632 (if Kadima forms next government, Olmert intends to
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withdraw most settlements from the West Bank, "converge" other
settlements into permanent settlement blocs, and move many displaced
settlers into the enlarged settlement blocs.5 Although the details of this
"convergence plan" remain obscure and indeed undecided,6 it calls for
most settlements, but not settlers, to be removed. The Israeli-Hezbollah
war in the summer of 2006 undermined support for Olmert's plan, but
debate about the feasibility and prospect of removing Jewish settlements
from the West Bank in order to achieve lasting peace between Israel and
the Palestinians continues within and outside of Israel.
remove settlements beyond certain boarder, but expand settlement blocs within area);
Mazal Mualem, Netanyahu: Poll Is Referendum on Olmert's Pullout Plan, HAARETZ,
Mar. 12, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=692852.
5. Speaking at a recent press conference following a meeting with President Bush,
Olmert stated Israel would "remove most of the settlements which are not part of the
major Israeli population centers in Judea and Samaria. The settlements within the
population centers would remain under Israeli control and become part of the State of
Israel, as part of the final status agreement." President George W. Bush, President Bush
and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel Participate in Joint Press Availability (May 23,
2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/print/20060523-9.html. Based
on most statements by Ohmert and Kadima, Olmert's convergence plan envisions
retention of settlements presently inhabited by 150,000 to 175,000 settlers, but removal
of the majority of settlements and movement of 70,000 to 100,000 settlers. See Yaakov
Katz, Mofaz Presents Israel's Final Borders, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 21, 2006,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 1139395650626&pagename=JPost%2FJPArti
cle%2FShowFull (Minister of Defense included Ma'ale Adumim, settlements in Jordan
Valley, Ariel, Kedumim-Karnei Shomron, Gush Etzion, Reihan-Shaked, and Ofarim-Beit
Aryeh within final border).
6. See Associated Press, Kadima: West Bank Withdrawal Will Take a Year to
Finalize, HAARETZ, Mar. 29, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=700253; Aluf Benn, Convergence Panel to Submit
Recommendations Soon, HAARETZ, May 15, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=715436 (although panel established to address convergence, it "was
not asked to draw the pullout line or determine which settlements will be evacuated");
David Horovitz & Tovah Lazaroff, Only 20-30 Settlements to Be Removed, JERUSALEM
POST, May 23, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=l148287843514&
pagename=JPosto2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (Uzi Keren, Olmert's adviser for
settlements, cast doubt on early estimates on number of settlements and settlers affected
by convergence). Exactly which settlements Israel will evacuate remains a matter of
disagreement as does whether evacuations will occur in stages or simultaneously. See
Aluf Benn, Olmert Favors West Bank Pullout in One Sweeping Operation, HAARETZ,
June 2, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=722026.
7. See, e.g., Uzi Benziman, Olmert's Paradox, HAARETZ, May 10, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=714122 (arguing convergence
plan is premised upon managing conflict with Palestinians rather than ending it and hence
will not bring peace or stability to Israel); Akiva Eldar, Out of Uniform and into the
Conflict, HAARETZ, May 14, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=715456 (describing substantial doubts of former head of Israeli
West Bank administration, Ilan Paz, on implementation of convergence plan). A recent
Israeli poll, released in June 2006, indicates a majority of Israelis oppose the plan. See
Yossi Verter, Aluf Benn & Jack Khoury, Poll: Most Israelis Oppose PM Olmert's
Convergence Plan, HAARETZ, June 9, 2006,
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Excluding small outposts constructed without the permission of
Israeli military administration 8 and neighborhoods within Jerusalem, 9
approximately 250,000 Israeli Jewish settlers presently live in nearly 150
settlements on the West Bank.'0 While the exact amount of territory
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=724788. Doubts exist about
the plan's feasibility not only among the Israeli public, but much of its leadership. See
Thanassis Cambanis, Israelis Reassess Territory Strategy, Pullouts Shelved After Violent
Year, BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 25, 2006, at Al. Whether the United States should support
the plan is also a subject of some debate. Compare Dennis Ross & David Makovsky,
Lending a Helping Hand, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 29, 2006,
http://www.usnews.comI/usnews/news/articles/060529/29essay.htm (moderately positive)
with R. James Woolsey, West Bank Terrorist State, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2006,
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/wsj/access/1040629651.html?dids= 1040629651:104062965
1 &FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=May+23%2C+2006&author-R.+James+Woolse
y&type=8_90&desc=West+Bank+Terrorist+State (former head of C.I.A. terms Gaza
pullout as utter failure that makes Israel and United States appear weak and urges Israel
not to make same mistake with West Bank). The official White House reaction has been
cautious and somewhat positive provided diplomatic channels are exhausted. See, e.g.,
Jim Rutenberg & Steven Erlanger, West Bank Pullout Gets a Nod from Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2006, at A6 ("The Americans have many questions[:] ... how many settlers will
go; where the barrier will run; what will happen to the Israeli development plans for an
area called El, which would cut off East Jerusalem from the West Bank; how the Israeli
Army would be deployed in the areas Israel abandons, or whether it would be withdrawn
entirely.").
8. See generally Talya Sason, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Summary of the
Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Summary+of+Opinion+Conceming+
Unauthorized+Outposts+-+Talya+Sason+Adv.htm.
9. A 2004 map prepared by the Washington Institute for Near Policy shows all
areas of Greater Jerusalem that fall outside the pre-1967 armistice lines, distinguishing
between those areas largely inhabited by Jews, those largely inhabited by Arabs, and
those with mixed populations. See Washington Institute, Map of Greater Jerusalem,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/maplmages/41de98e058452.jpg (last visited Aug. 5,
2006). One neighborhood that falls outside the pre-1967 lines is Gilo, which lies in the
direction of Bethlehem and has been the subject of many attacks. See Sheila MacVicar &
Michal Zippori, Bomb Kills 19 on Israeli Bus, CNN, June 19, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/06/18/mideast.violence/index.html. The
question of what areas of Jerusalem Israel should retain has now resurfaced, with talk of a
"unified Jerusalem" under Israeli sovereignty less current than it had been under the
Sharon government. See Nadav Shragai, No More Talk of Unified Jerusalem, HAARETZ,
Mar. 7, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=690895.
10. See Nadav Shragai, Peace Now: No New West Bank Outposts, but More Settlers
in 2005, HAARETZ, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=679476 (estimate of 250,000 at end of 2005); Mitchell Bard, Am.-
Isr. Cooperative Enterprise, Facts About Settlements, http://www.jewishvirtual
library.org/jsource/Peace/settlements.html (estimate of 246,000 as of August, 2005) (last
visited Aug. 5, 2006); B'Tselem, Land Expropriation & Settlements,
http://www.btselem.org/English/Settlements/Settlementpopulation.xls (estimate of
232,718 settlers at end of 2004) (last visited Aug. 5, 2006). Note that Palestinians, who
characterize many parts of present Jerusalem (e.g., Gilo) as settlements, state much
higher figures. See, e.g., EDWARD W. SAID, THE END OF THE PEACE PROCESS: OSLO AND
AFTER, at xiii (2001) ("[T]here are about 350,000 Israeli Jewish settlers on Palestinian
land.").
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occupied by settlements on the West Bank is debated, most authorities
place the area at less than two percent of its land mass.11 In addition to
Olmert's convergence plan, the agony caused by Israel's Gaza
withdrawal12 and the continued impetus to establish a Palestinian state
according to the "Roadmap"1 3 underscore the importance of addressing
whether Israel must remove West Bank settlements to resolve the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
To some, including not only Palestinians 14 and governments of
11. The percentage depends, to a large extent, upon whether the references are to the
designated municipal borders of a settlement or the built-up area and whether the
reference includes road construction ancillary to the settlement. See infra notes 266-70,
290 and accompanying text.
12. See Elie Wiesel, The Dispossessed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at D1I ("The
images of the evacuation itself are heart-rending. Some of them are unbearable. Angry
men, crying women. Children, led away on foot or in the arms of soldiers who are
sobbing themselves. Let's not forget: these men and women lived in Gaza for [thirty-
eight] years."); Paying the Price for Peace: The Human Cost of Disengagement (Isr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, Isr.), July 28, 2005, http://www.mfa.gov.il/
NR/rdonlyres/5233145C-7437-4F7A-A97F-4F7842362A5B/O/PriceforPeace.pdf; see,
e.g., Raffi Berg, Israel's 'Forgotten' Settlers, BBC NEWS, Nov. 17, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/world/middle east/4442106.stm; Dan Izenberg, MK
Eldad Demands Bassi Be Fired, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 7, 2006,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=l 139395557407&pagename=JPost%2FJPArti
cle%2FShowFull; Nadav Shragai, Abandoned Comrades, HAARETZ, Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.corn/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=657298 (describing the
unemployment, homelessness, illness and other social problems of the evacuees); see
also Anat Balint, Haaretz Photographer Wins 1st Prize in World Press Photo Contest,
HAARETZ, Feb. 12, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=681472; Pictorial, Series of Pictures Taken by Haaretz
Photographer Uriel Sinai, Winner of the World Press Photo Contest, HAARETZ, Feb. 11,
2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=681483 (presenting
pictorial of agony).
13. Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, Dep't of State, A Performance-Based
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Apr. 30,
2003), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm. The Roadmap called for the
creation of a Palestinian state in certain stages, beginning in Phase I with "Ending terror
and violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life and Building Palestinian Institutions." Id.
However, the Israeli and Palestinian authorities failed to implement Phase I by its May
2003 deadline, and it has yet to be accomplished. Since its inception, disagreements over
the various steps--e.g., whether the Palestinian Authority must disband various militant
groups before Israel has any obligation to cease settlement construction-have surfaced.
Nonetheless, the specifics of the Roadmap appear to have replaced the Oslo Accords.
See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993,
Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Oslo Accords]. The
Oslo Accords resulted from secret negotiations in Oslo between Israel and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization and became the primary reference with respect to the mutual
obligations of Israel and Palestinians. The Roadmap was adopted by the United States,
UN, EU, and Russia and accepted with reservations by the Palestinian Authority and
Israel. See Editorial, Israel's Road Map Reservations, HAARETZ, May 27, 2003,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=297230.
14. See Associated Press, Palestinian FM: Settlements Threaten Chance for
Palestinian State, HAARETZ, Nov. 30, 2005, available at
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other Arab nations, but also members of the EU,' 5 much of the American
press, 16 the UN General Assembly, 17 and occasionally even the U.S.
government,18 the question hardly merits serious review. Aside from the
security fence constructed by Israel and uncertainties surrounding the
Hamas victory, West Bank settlements constitute the major obstacle to a
peace settlement. Even commentators and scholars considered stalwart
defenders of Israel' 9 and pro-Israeli American Jewish groups 20 decry the
presence and expansion of Jewish settlements on the West Bank. Indeed,
liberal Israeli politicians blame the settlers for every offense imaginable,
including the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestinian Arabs. 2' In
contrast, some Israelis consider the settlements as not an obstacle but a
prerequisite for peace. These supporters believe the settlements serve as
the first line of defense against an Arab attack from the East and/or
http://www.christusrex.org/wwwI/news/haaretz- 11-30-05a.html; Glenn Kessler,
Palestinians Get Rare Bush Meeting, Policy Complaints Are Behind Session, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2005/lO/12/
palestiniansget rarebushmeeting?mode=PF.
15. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Europeans Rebuke Israeli Jerusalem Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at A18.
16. See, e.g., Editorial, Bush, Abbas Intentions, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2005, at
A16; Editorial, Gaza First, but Not Last, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2004, at A24; Editorial,
One Step Back in the Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005 at A22.
17. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/105 (Jan. 18, 2006), available
at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/
d28e6c316706c04385257106006ce8ca!OpenDocument. Other resolutions to the same
effect can be accessed at UN Information System on the Question of Palestine,
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/vGA!OpenView&Start=1 &Count=- 1 50&Expand= 1
21#121 (last visited Aug. 5, 2006); see also Associated Press, LN Slams Israeli
Settlements, E. Jerusalem Separation Fence, HAARETZ, Dec. 3, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=651888; Richard Schifter, The
First Word. Is the UN Improving?, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 15, 2005,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=l 134309585843&pagename=JPost%2FJPArti
cle%2FShowFull.
18. See, e.g., Press Release, Margaret Tutwiler, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State,
Daily Press Briefing #180 (Dec. 4, 1991), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/
briefing/daily briefings/1991/9112/180.html.
19. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR PEACE: HOW THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT CAN BE RESOLVED 13 (2005).
20. An organization called the Israel Policy Forum fits into this category. See Isr.
Policy Forum, Building a Bridge from Disengagement to Two States (Nov. 2005),
http://www.ipforum.org/display.cfm?id=6&Sub=-16&Dis=15; Letter from "Prominent
American Jewish Leaders" to Condoleezza Rice (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.cephas-
library.com/israel/israelletterby_prominent americanjewishleaders.html; see also
Shlomo Shamir, N.Y. Jewish Leaders Lobbied Rice on Gaza Border Deal, HAARETZ,
Nov. 18, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=646999.
21. See Akiva Eldar, Kadima Supporters and the Road Map, HAARETZ, Nov. 28,
2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=650612; Nehemia
Shtrasler, The Ashes on the Prophets' Eyes, HAARETZ, Mar. 22, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.comlhasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=696534.
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Palestinian terrorism, 22 and their growth provides the impetus for serious
peace overtures by Palestinian representatives.
23
This article takes a different tack. Israeli settlements, first and
foremost, need not be an obstacle to peace simply because, while
relevant, they do not have to determine the eventual borders between
Israel and a Palestinian state. Just as Palestinians live within the
predominantly Jewish State of Israel, Israeli Jews can live within a
predominantly Palestinian nation. If this conclusion is true, then much
of the agony that accompanied the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and
recent evacuations of some illegal outposts on the West Bank24 could be
avoided, and final settlement negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority eased.
It is useful to begin this discussion with an analogy. Imagine that
many African-American families moved into an area exclusively
inhabited by whites. Further, imagine the white community initiated a
terroristic campaign against the newcomers, labeled those who sold land
to African-Americans as "traitors and collaborators," and executed the
sellers without trial. Imagine, further, the "enlightened" liberal
community blamed the African-American families for their own plight
and repeated the mantra that if only the African-Americans would leave
the community, all would be peaceful in race relations. While tragically
such opinion was once widely held, it is totally unimaginable that it
22. See Editorial, Extra!: West Bank, CNN, Aug. 16, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/EDUCATION/08/14/extra.west.bank/index.html.
23. See Hillel Halkin, Why the Settlements Should Stay, COMMENTARY, June 1, 2002,
at 21, 23.
24. For example, there were difficulties in the recent evacuation of Amona on the
West Bank. See Bradley Burston, Brushfire Civil War: Israel, the New Enemy of the
True Jew, HAARETZ, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=677531 ("Increasingly, the language of hardline settlers has taken
on a note of estrangement, even divorce from institutions of the state, the police, the
Supreme Court, the army, the prime minister .... By no means are they representative of
settlers as a whole.... Theirs is a brushfire civil war. But brushfires can take directions
and forms which no one can control."); Jonathan Lis, Amos Harel, Gideon Alon, Lilach
Weissman & Nadav Shragai, B'Tselem to Mazuz: Investigate Police Violence During
Amona Evacuation, HAARETZ, Feb. 3, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=677685 (over 200 protesters and police injured in evacuation of
Amona); Jonathan Lis & Gideon Alon, Olmert Promises that Government will Maintain
Dialogue with Settlers, HAARETZ, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=678953 (reporting on a Jerusalem rally, "The speeches expressed
the growing feeling within the religiously observant camp that the justice system
discriminates against the right and the settlers."); Greg Myre, Settlers Battle Israel's
Police in West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at Al; Nadav Schragai, Why the Settler
Leaders Stood Silent, HAARETZ, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.haaretz.con/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=677705 (referring to the evacuation of Amona, "The 'consciousness
searing' that settler leaders spoke of so frequently in the months before the
disengagement [from Gaza] occurred yesterday, five months after the disengagement.").
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reflects liberal and enlightened thinking today.
But, the reader might protest, if the African-American hypothetical
intends to suggest that the nearly universal condemnation of Israeli
settlements is intellectually inconsistent, the analysis is false.25 Although
African-Americans, or Jews for that matter, have a domestic right to
freely settle in the United States, Jews do not have any collective right to
settle in Palestine.26 This article seeks to parse the assumptions which
underlie the liberal inclination to differentiate Israeli settlements from
typical minority settlers who desire to live among a majority group.
Subject to certain conditions, the right of Jews to live in historic
Palestine is a powerful imperative that cannot be dismissed simply
because some, or even substantially all, Palestinian Arabs do not want
Jewish communities in their midst-at least no more than the right of
African-Americans to settle in predominately white communities can be
abated by white opposition.
At the core of this position is a fundamental distinction almost
universally overlooked in discussions about Jewish settlements:
27
25. One such party who rejects this premise is W. Thomas Mallison, whose views
seem quite infected by a pronounced anti-Israel animus towards Israel as a Jewish state.
See SALLY V. MALLISON & W. THOMAS MALLISON, SETTLEMENTS AND THE LAW, A
JURIDICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 7
(1982); W. Thomas Mallison, Israeli West Bank Settlements, The Reagan
Administration's Policy Toward the Middle East and International Law, Remarks at
American Society of International Law Proceedings (Apr. 25-27, 1985), in 79 Am. Soc'y
Int'l L. Proc. 217, 226 (1987).
26. Id. In fact, Mallison disputes the whole concept of a Jewish people. See W.
Thomas Mallison, The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute "The Jewish People "
Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in It: Appraisal in Public International
Law, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 983, 987-93 (1964). That position contrasts with his
readiness to accept the Palestinian people, a recent Twentieth Century identity compared
to the several millennia concept of a Jewish people. See W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY
V. MALLISON, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION at 39-41, U.N. Doc.
ST/SG/SER.F/4, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.19 (1979); infra note 318 and accompanying text.
David Kretzmer made a more legitimate objection to this analogy based upon the power
relationship between the parties. But, of course, the question of power depends upon the
scope of the parties and relations considered. In the case of African-Americans, does one
consider simply them and their white neighbors or the power of the federal government?
In the case of Israelis and Arabs, does one consider not only the Palestinians but also
twenty-two Arab nations hostile to Israel's existence, or even more, a larger number of
other nations that seem to automatically vote for any resolution that would deny Jews a
sovereign state equal to those insisted upon by other peoples? See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3376
(XXX), U.N. Doc. A/2399 (Nov. 10, 1975), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/000/89/IMG/NR000089.pdfOpenElement (equating Zionism
and racism).
27. Seemingly, the sole published party taking exception to this view is the Israeli
novelist, Hillel Halkin. See Hillel Halkin, Beyond the Geneva Accord, COMMENTARY,
Jan. 2004, at 21 [hereinafter Halkin, Beyond the Geneva Accord]; Halkin, supra note 23,
at 21-27; Hillel Halkin, Op-Ed., Whose Land?, Why the Settlements Should Stay, Making
2006]
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settlements and sovereignty need not be coterminous. It is entirely
possible, at least theoretically, to have Arab sovereignty over the West
Bank and Jewish settlement within that sovereignty. Part II of this article
explores the distinction between sovereignty and settlements in the
context of an increasing and necessary realization of the incompatibility
of Israel sovereignty over the West Bank and its identity as a Jewish
democratic state.28 Part III outlines those arguments, particularly those
based upon liberal values, which support the continuation of Jewish
settlements on the West Bank even after the creation of a Palestinian
state. Part IV lays out the conditions that must be satisfied for this
resolution to occur. In effect, these conditions also respond to arguments
raised against Jewish settlements, including their legal status, and doubts
concerning the viability of settlements in a future Palestinian state.
II. Sovereignty and Settlements
It is almost universally assumed that Jewish settlements equate to
Israeli sovereignty. The nexus between settlements and sovereignty is
critically important from both Palestinian and Israeli perspectives. From
a Palestinian perspective, the continuation of Jewish settlements
connotes Israeli sovereignty over much of the West Bank as the
settlements are scattered over much of that area. 29 If interconnected or
joined to Israel, the settlements preclude a contiguous Palestinian state
with sensible borders; even if the settlements were disconnected, they
nonetheless represent a serious infringement on Palestinian sovereignty.
In either case, according to Palestinian sentiment, the settlements leave
little room for Palestinian sovereignty outside a Bantustan-type
Palestinian state or other self-governing entity. The issues of contiguity
and sovereignty will be discussed later in this article.3 °
From an Israeli perspective, if settlements remain and necessarily
implicate Israeli sovereignty, it will be impossible to distinguish a
meaningful border between Israel and a Palestinian state. The two
the West Bank Judenrein Is No Way to Bring Peace, OPINION J., May 29, 2002,
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id= 110001769.
28. Although Israel does not have a constitution, it has adopted certain "Basic
Laws," one of which "protect[s] human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a
Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state." See Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, S.H. 1391 (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.ii/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
29. The actual area covered by Jewish settlements constitutes approximately a
fiftieth of the West Bank. B'Tselem, Land Expropriation & Settlements,
http://www.btselem.org/englishlSettlements/LandTakeover.asp (last visited Aug. 5,
2006).
30. See infra notes 124-33 (discussing issue of contiguity); infra note 471 and
accompanying text (discussing issue of sovereignty).
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entities will become combined. Realistically, Israeli sovereignty over
settlements constitutes de jure or de facto Israeli sovereignty over the
West Bank. The inseparability of Israel from a Palestinian state will
spell the demise of a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that
is, predominantly Jewish and Arab states living side by side in the
territory west of the Jordan River. This result cannot possibly favor the
existence of Israel as a Jewish democratic state that adheres to the rule of
law. With the exception of fringe elements within the Israeli political
spectrum, 31 even former stalwarts of the settlement movement and a
Greater Israel now seemingly recognize this reality. 32 Thus, Olmert has
reiterated in various fora that Israel "must create a clear border that
reflects the demographic reality that has been created on the ground as
soon as possible. 33 In the words of Michael Oren, "[a] solid majority of
Israelis accept that they cannot continue to occupy the West Bank and
Gaza without endangering the moral and demographic foundations upon
which the Jewish state is built. 34  To understand this reality and
intelligently discuss the various options concerning Israeli settlements,
consider the various possibilities of Israeli sovereignty, either de jure or
31. See Nadav Shragai, Right-Wing Group Prepares to Build 15 New Illegal
Outposts, HAARETZ, Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=659860 (referring to group named, "Loyalists of the Land of
Israel," that intends to build additional illegal outposts on West Bank).
32. Belated recognition of this fact led even Ariel Sharon, the former prime minister
of Israel presently in a coma and one of the champions of the settlement movement
during the 1970s through the 1990s, to leave the Likud party, which he had helped to
found, and to establish a new party, Kadima, in November of 2005. Kadima 's platform
includes territorial compromise in order to ensure "a Jewish and democratic state." See
Mazal Mualem, Kadima Pla~form Calls for Jewish Majority, Territorial Concessions,
HAARETZ, Nov. 29, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=651003; see also Aluf Benn,
Olmert: We Must Set Borders in Line with Demographic Reality, HAARETZ, Jan. 25,
2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=673922; Steven
Erlanger, How Reality Cut Likud's Vision down to Size, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at
43.
33. See Aluf Benn, Managing the Conflict, HAARETZ, Feb. 1, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=677165; Aluf Benn & David
Ratner, Olmert: If Kadima Wins, We Will Not Invest in Territories, HAARETZ, Mar. 8,
2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=691448; Aluf Benn,
Olmert: Israel Will Separate from Most Palestinians, HAARETZ, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.j html?itemNo=680081 (reporting on
Olmert's first interview with media since assuming post as Acting Prime Minister, in
which Olmert said Israel "will separate from most of the Palestinian population that lives
in the West Bank, and that will obligate us to separate as well from territories where the
State of Israel currently is"); Benn, supra note 32; David Ratner, Olmert: We Will Freeze
Spending on West Bank Construction, HAARETZ, Mar. 7, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=691248; see also sources cited supra note 7.
34. Michael B. Oren, Hamas Has Won. What's Next?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2006, at
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de facto, over the West Bank.
One possibility involves granting Arabs west of the Jordan River
full Israeli citizenship including the right to vote. Over time, however,
due to vastly differential birth rates,35 the Palestinian population will
35. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics ("ICBS") reports an Arab Moslem birth
rate in Israel of between twice to one and one-half that of Jews during the ten-year period
from 1996 through 2005. See Table of Israeli Live Births by Population Group,
http://www.cbs.gov.il/yarhon/cl_e.xls (last visited Aug. 5, 2006). The Arab population
of Israel grew from 1,069,400 at the end of 1997 to 1,372,800 at the end of 2005, an
increase of 28.37 percent, while in the same time period the Jewish population of Israel
grew from 4,701,600 to 5,302,600, or an increase of 12.78 percent. Id. The latter
statistics may show some slight distortion given two factors that might affect the total
populations: increase in the Jewish population of Israel resulting from immigration from
other countries (a factor that would increase the Jewish population), and lack of
consistency in the territory of Israel covered by the statistic (a factor that would increase
the total Arab population). For example, Dr. Aziz Haider, a Hebrew University
sociologist, claims the ICBS statistics are distorted by including the Druze on the Golan
Heights and the Arabs of East Jerusalem, both of whom are not Israeli citizens. See Lily
Galili, We Are More Normal Than You Think, HAARETZ, Feb. 21, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=685199. Haider also believes
the aggregate birth rate reported by the ICBS is misleading because the Bedouin in the
south have much higher birth rates than Palestinian Israeli citizens who live in the north.
In any event, it is believed the birth rate of Palestinians on the West Bank exceeds the
current birth rate of Israeli Arab Muslims (three percent), but accurate figures with
respect to the Arab population on the West Bank and birth rates are more difficult to
establish and presently subject to enormous dispute among demographers. The
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics ("PCBS") conducted a West Bank and Gaza
census in 1997, deriving the figure of 2,895,683 Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and
Gaza. Making certain assumptions, including a birth rate of 4-5 percent, the PCBS
projected a Palestinian population (excluding the Arabs in Israel) of 3.83 million by mid-
2004. See Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid & Michael Wise, Arab Population in the
West Bank & Gaza: The Million and a Half Person Gap, Study Presented to the
American Enterprise Institute (Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.aei.org/events/eventlD.990/
event detail.asp (follow "Full Presentation" hyperlink under "Related Material"). If the
Palestinian projections had been correct, 2,685,474 Palestinians would have resided on
the West Bank by the end of mid-2004; if the Palestinian population of Jerusalem were
included, the comparable figure would be 2,895,683. B'Tselem estimated the West Bank
Palestinian population at two million. See Yehezkel Lein, Land Grab: Israel's Settlement
Policy in the West Bank, COMPREHENSIVE REP. (B'Tselem, Jerusalem, Isr.), May 2002, at
95, available at http://www.btselem.org/Download/200205_LandGrabEng.pdf. In
contrast, adjusting for lower actual birth rates, lower fertility rates, net emigration from
the West Bank rather than immigration, alternative counts for a resident population base
and internal migration of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel proper (within the
Green Line), the Zimmerman Study concluded that, as of mid-2004, the resident-only
population of West Bank Arabs (excluding Jerusalem) was 1,349,525. Taking into
account the number of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the same group recently concluded
there is at least a 1.4 million person gap between the PCBS projection and the true
Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. The Zimmerman Study also
concluded the gap between the Jewish population and the Arab population west of the
Jordan was narrowing more slowly than most had initially projected. The Zimmerman
Study has attracted some support. See, e.g., Nadav Shragai, Deal with the Demography,
HAARETZ, Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=690923. But other demographers dispute this claim. For example,
[Vol. 25:1
THE UNEXPLORED OPTION
surpass the number of the territory's Jews. Thus, Israel may remain
democratic, but will cease to exist as a Jewish state.36 Whether the
territory's name remains Israel or, more likely, changes to Palestine or
some other more palatable term is largely academic. An Arab political
majority would certainly repeal the Law of Return, 37 and Israel's core
identity as a haven for Jews in a still anti-Semitic world 38 would cease. In
fact, just as Israel's Jewish majority implemented its "affirmative action"
Jewish return policy, a dominant Arab population might adopt its own
law of return, favoring the return of Arabs claiming some connection to
"Palestine" and banning further Jewish immigration.
Alternatively, Israel may "transfer" Arabs from the land west of the
Jordan. There is historic precedent for such a move, to take but one
example, millions of people of German descent were "repatriated" to
Germany from Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of World War
11. 39 Numerous other population transfers have occurred in the twentieth
century.40 Despite prior "precedent," however, the "transfer" of Arabs to
maintain a Jewish majority in Israel would be morally repugnant and
clearly violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 4' Although
Sergio Della Pergola of Hebrew University states the Zimmerman Study "claim is based
on several additional assumptions, such as a drastic decline in the fertility rate of the
Palestinians, which has no basis in reality, and the anticipation of a large positive balance
of Jewish immigration, which is not in sight in the present circumstances." See Sergio
Della Pergola, A Question of Numbers, HAARETZ, Jan. 25, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=674640. He notes, while original estimates called for a
parity between the Jewish and Arab populations by 1910, "the trend of narrowing the
Jewish majority [of the population west of the Jordan] until it is lost by 2020 is common
to all the scenarios" and the Gaza withdrawal has merely delayed that reality by perhaps
another twenty years. Id.
36. See Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 453, 470 (2003) ("The Israeli government is not and cannot become sovereign over
the entire Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza without forfeiting the
expression of its own self-determination.").
37. The Law of Return gives every Jew the right to automatically acquire Israeli
citizenship. Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (lsr.), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.ilvMFAIMFAArchive/1950_1959/Law of Return 5710-1950.
38. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A Shameful Contagion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 7, 2002, at 34; Associated Press, Britain's Chief Rabbi: 'Tsunami of Anti-Semitism'
Sweeping the World, HAARETZ, Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=664887; U.S. Dep't of State, Excerpts: Anti-Semitism in Europe
Increases in Recent Years (Jan. 5, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Jan/05-
93928.html?chanlid=eur.
39. See Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16
HARV. INT'L L. J. 207, 228 (1975).
40. See Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the
Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 322-24 (1995)
(summarizing these exchanges).
41. See infra note 164. While this provision applies only in the case of belligerent
occupation, it would be a ruse for Israel to end its occupation by annexing the West Bank
and then forcibly to transfer its Palestinian residents.
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Israel's political fringe might comfortably expel Arabs from the West
Bank, it seems totally incongruous that Israel, as a matter of policy,
would, in aftermath of the Holocaust, engage in a tactic of the Germans
during World War II. Minimally, the "transfer" of Arabs from the West
Bank would solidify the notion that the Arab refugees of 1948 were
forced from Israel in a broad Zionist plan.42 While there were undoubted
instances of force against Palestinians during the 1948 war, none of them
seemly had the imprimatur of the Jewish Agency or, after the
42. Whether the Arab refugees voluntarily left Israel is heatedly debated among
historians. See BENNY MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS 1-48
(1994) (summarizing both views) [hereinafter MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER]. Morris
identifies himself, among other Israeli historians, as a "new historian" who disagrees with
the traditional Israeli view that refugees, answering calls of Arab leaders, departed Israel
to facilitate the dismantling of the nascent Jewish state. In this work, as well as his
earlier writing, BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM,
1947-1949 (reprint ed. 1989), Morris concludes "what occurred in 1948 lies somewhere
in between the Jewish 'robber state' and the 'Arab order' explanations." MORRIS, 1948
AND AFTER, supra, at 17. The work of Morris and other "new historians" has been
criticized. EFRAIM KARSH, Rewriting Israel's History, in RETHINKING THE MIDDLE EAST
169, 169-85 (2003). Morris' own views have evolved. Replying to an article by Henry
Siegman, see Henry Siegman, Israel: The Threat from Within, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb.
26, 2004, at 15, Morris commented:
In his article, Siegman repeatedly "cited" things I had said-with a
consistency of distortion that is truly mind-boggling. Just to give one key
example: I most emphatically never stated anywhere that "the dismantling of
Palestinian society ... and the expulsion of 700,000 Palestinians [were] a
deliberate and planned operation intended to 'cleanse' ... those parts of
Palestine assigned to the Jews." Quite the opposite. Had Siegman bothered to
read my books, he would have discovered that mainstream (Haganah-Jewish
Agency) Zionist policy, until the end of March 1948-meaning during the first
four months of the war-was to protect the Arab minority in the Jewish areas
and to try to maintain peaceful coexistence. Intentions changed only in April,
when the Yishuv was with its back to the wall, losing the battle for the roads
and facing potentially politicidal and genocidal pan-Arab invasion. And even
then, no systematic policy of expulsion was ever adopted or implemented
(hence Israel's one-million-strong Arab minority today). The Arabs have only
themselves to blame for the (unexpected) results of the war that they launched
with the aim of "ethnically cleansing" Palestine of the Jews. (Contemporary
Arab apologists, always full of righteous indignation, conveniently forget this.)
Benny Morris, 'Israel: The Threat from Within': An Exchange, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS,
April 8, 2004, at 77, 78 (emphasis added). More recently, reviewing a book by Salman
Abu-Sitta, see SALMAN H. ABU-SrIrA, ATLAS OF PALESTINE: 1948 (2004), Morris wrote:
From reading this Atlas, the reader will not know that it was the Palestinian
Arab onslaught on the Jewish community in Palestine in November to
December 1947 that provoked Jewish counter-violence, which then triggered
the Arab exodus; and that it was the follow-up invasion of the country by the
armies of the surrounding Arab states in May to June 1948 that turned what
might have been an ephemeral phenomenon into a still larger tragedy,
consolidating and finalizing, as it were, the refugee status of the fleeing
communities.
Benny Morris, Details and Lies, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 2005, at 31, 32 [hereinafter
Morris, Details and Lies].
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establishment of Israel, its government.43 It would be entirely academic
that a one-sided narrative concerning the birth of the Palestinian refugee
problem pertains to the events of a half-century ago.4 Further, "transfer"
would probably transform Israel into a pariah not only among other
nations, 45 but also among the overwhelming majority of diaspora
Jewry.
46
Nor do Arab and Muslim threats to "throw the Jews into the sea,
4 7
"wipe Israel off the map,, 48 or, according to one of the many references
to Israel and Jews in the Hamas Charter, "implement Allah's promise...
[to] fight the Jews (and kill them)' 49 negate or reduce the moral
repugnancy of forced population transfer. While moral systems are
frequently based upon the restraint "of self-interest in favor of promoting
43. See EFRAIM KARSH, The Palestinians and the Right of Return, in RETHINKING
THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 42, at 155, 155-68 [hereinafter KARSH, Right of Return];
EFRAIM KARSH, Were the Palestinians Expelled?, in RETHINKING THE MIDDLE EAST,
supra note 42, at 127, 127-54 [hereinafter KARSH, Palestinians Expelled?].
44. See KARSH, Palestinians Expelled?, supra note 43, at 127-54.
45. This is, at times, not an entirely outrageous overstatement of Israel's position as
a result of Arab antagonism and increasing world-wide anti-Semitism, often expressed in
the guise of anti-Zionism. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, Are Critics of Israel Anti-Semitic?, in
THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 208, 208-16 (2004); Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Graffiti on History's
Walls, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 3, 2003, at 44, 44-51.
46. With respect to American Jews, some indication of this may be surmised by
political affiliation. One survey listed fifty-four percent of American Jews as Democrats
and the vast majority of the remainder, twenty-nine percent, as independents. AMERICAN
JEWISH COMMITTEE, 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWISH OPINION (2005),
http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=846741 &ct=- 1740283
(follow "National Affairs" hyperlink). Thirty-four percent identified themselves as
liberal, twenty-nine percent as moderate, and only twenty-seven percent as conservative.
Id. (follow "National Affairs" hyperlink). Nearly one in four American Jews, twenty-
three percent, identified themselves as "distant" from Israel and over sixty percent of
respondents said Israel should dismantle all or some of the settlements as part of a
permanent agreement with Palestinians. Id. (follow "Israel" hyperlink). Given the
political affiliation of most American Jews and their preference for the dismantling of
settlements, the percentage of American Jews feeling "distant" from Israel probably
would rise appreciably, at least equal to the sixty percent favoring dismantled settlements
if Israel were to adopt a forcible transfer policy to retain the West Bank. Another
indication of some dissociation among American Jews from Israel is the sharp decline
(thirty percent) in registration for the upcoming World Zionist Congress. See Daphna
Berman, Drop in U.S. Voter Sign-Up for World Zionist Congress, HAARETZ, Feb. 10,
2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=681258.
47. See David Horowitz, Moment of Truth, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE, July 14, 2006,
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=23362.
48. Steven Erlanger, Israel Wants West to Deal More Urgently with Iran, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A8 (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, has recently
called for Israel to be "wiped off the map").
49. The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement art. 7
(Hamas) http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/charter.html (last visited Aug.
6, 2006); see also Itamar Marcus, Palestinian Media Watch, The Palestinian Authority's
Beliefs = Hamas' Charter (Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.pmw.org.il/specrep-27.html.
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a reciprocal recognition of rights and interests, '50 negative acts cannot be
justified on the basis of "reciprocal intentions," short of steps necessary
to save lives and perhaps property. Neither could one rationalize forced
population transfer by noting that continual pressure and persecution
forced over 800,000 Jewish refugees to flee Arab countries in the period
right before and after the creation of Israel, of which 580,000 were
absorbed by Israel.51  Again, this would reflect an attempt to use
reciprocity-an asserted population exchange-as the basis for a
negative act not necessary to save lives. Moreover, this justification
would be "double dipping": regardless of the circumstances many Arabs
fled Israel in 1948, Israel has already argued its numbers were far less
than the Jewish refugees forced to abandon Arab countries and flee to
Israel.52
A third possibility is equally unpalatable. To include the West Bank
within its sovereignty, Israel could simply deny citizenship, including the
right to vote, to Arabs. Outright denial of citizenship would place Israel
in the same camp as South Africa prior to the early 1990s, converting an
outrageous analogy, 53 considering the present divestment efforts on
college campuses and among certain Protestant church groups, 54 into anapt similarity.55 Again, it would not matter in the least that other
50. David M. Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228, 252
(1982).
51. MARTIN GILBERT, THE ROUTLEDGE ATLAS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 48
(Routledge 2005) (1974).
52. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, Did Israel Create the Arab Refugee Problem?, in THE
CASE FOR ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 78, 88-89.
53. The term apartheid is broadly and frequently applied to any measure Israel takes,
including those that are security-related. See, e.g., Greg Myre, Israel Considers Banning
Palestinians on West Bank's Main Roads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A10 (Saeb
Erekat, chief Palestinian negotiator, described possible Israeli road plan in response to
attacks on Jewish civilians on West Bank roads as "the official introduction of an
apartheid system"); Chris McGreal, Worlds Apart, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1703245,00.html ("There are few places in the
world where governments construct a web of nationality and residency laws designed for
use by one section of the population against another. Apartheid South Africa was one.
So is Israel."). But see Dennis Ross, Pretoria Calling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A27
("Yasir Arafat loved to equate the Palestinian struggle for statehood with the struggle of
South Africans against apartheid, but his was always a false analogy."); HonestReporting,
'Road Apartheid' Debunked, (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/
45884734/critiques/RoadApartheidDebunked.asp; HonestReporting, Guardian
Promotes Apartheid Slur (Feb. 12, 2006), http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/
45884734/critiques/GuardianPromotesApartheid Slur.asp.
54. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 19, at 154-55; see also Rosner's Blog, Divestment
Against Israel is Back in Town, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
rosnerBlog.jhtml?itemNo=680115&contrasslD=25&subContrasslD=0&sbSubContrassl
D=l&listSrc=Y&art=-l (Feb. 7, 2006, 20:36 EST).
55. See DENNIS Ross, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR
MIDDLE EAST PEACE 797 (2005) ("Olmert... declared in December 2003 that Israel
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countries have long employed a modified apartheid, e.g., Japan's
treatment of its Korean population 56 or even Lebanon's denial of
citizenship to its Palestinian population.
57
But could the problem be finessed if Israel adopted law-for
example, through a constitution-that guaranteed some modicum of
political control to Jews regardless of subsequent population changes?
To ensure its status as a Jewish safe haven, Israel would have to enshrine
the Law of Return as fundamental, unchangeable law and divide political
power so that, irrespective of whether Jews constituted the majority
population, they would have a sufficient number of parliamentary seats
to retain or significantly share power. Dictatorships, with or without the
semblance of a Parliament, do just that. For example, the Alaouites, a
small dissident sect originally derived from Shi'ite Islam, control Syria
by retaining substantially all key military and political positions despite
the overwhelming majority of Sunni Muslims. 58 Prior to the recent Iraq
War, Sunni Arabs, and a smaller clan among them, the Tikriti, to which
Saddam Hussein belongs, ruled Iraq to the disadvantage of Shi'a and
Kurds who constituted over three-fourths of the population. 59  Even
Lebanon, which purports to be an Arab democracy, has weighted its
political structure so a Maronite is always President and, despite their
dwindling numbers, Maronites retain significant political and economic
powers over the country, a majority of whose citizens belong to other
groups: Sunni Muslims, Shi'ites, and Druze.6° Indeed, much of the
could not remain in the territories lest it lose its moral grounding and find its Jewish
supporters internationally unable to defend an apartheid reality.").
56. Hideki Tarumoto, Multiculturalism in Japan: Citizenship Policy for Immigrants,
5 INT'L J. ON MULTICULTURAL Soc'Y 88, 91 (2003), available at http://www.unesco.org/
shs/ijms/vol5/issuel/art6 ("[T]he myth of homogeneity has long been challenged by the
presence of ethnic and national minorities, including ethnic Koreans and Chinese.
Ironically, the idea has denied basic human rights to the "Oldcomers" who were Japanese
subjects before 1947 and are now permanent non-national residents in Japan, where they
were born and educated.").
57. See UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Lebanon: Palestinian
Refugees Complain They Are Second Class Citizens (Oct. 2, 2005),
http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportlD=49326.
58. See Anthony Shadid, Death of Syrian Minister Leaves a Sect Adrift in Time of
Strife, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2005, at Al; Mordechai Nisan, Alawi Tribal Politics and
Syria's Future, JERUSALEM' POST, Dec. 22, 2005, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/
Satellite?cid= 1134309631221 &pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (describing
degree of control, various personalities, and ministries controlled).
59. See Editorial, Confrontation in the Gulf; for the Iraqi Ruler, Variations on a
Name, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1990, § 1, at 6.
60. See Library of Congress Country Studies, Lebanon, Government and Politics,
http://www.presidency.gov.lb/presidency/history/after/after.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2006); U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Lebanon (Aug. 2005),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm (President is Maronite; prior to 1990,
Christians and Muslims shared parliamentary seats in a ratio of six to five; under Ta'if
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world supports Lebanon's refusal to deny voting rights and significant
economic opportunities to Palestinian refugees on the need to protect that
nation's delicate "ethnic balance.",
61
The quality of Israel's "democracy," however, is not appropriately
judged by Lebanese standards. While differential voting is not
uncommon in private organizations, for example, class voting in
American corporate law, and characterizes the political structures of
some nations, the principle of "one person-one vote" has become so
enshrined in Western democracies that it is unlikely Israel could sustain
such a transparently anti-democratic ruse for long. As a result, Israel
would face criticism and ostracism not materially different from
explicitly denying Arabs the right to vote.
If, then, Israel cannot retain both its sovereignty over the West Bank
and its status as a Jewish and democratic state without discriminating
against its Arab citizens, it must eventually relinquish sovereignty over
the West Bank. If so, does it not follow automatically that most
settlements-especially those not contiguous with the Armistice
Demarcation Line, or "Green Line," established by the 1949 Armistice
Agreement between Jordan and Israel-must be removed in order to
permit Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank?
Contrary to the assumption made by most commentators,
academics, and policy makers,62 the removal of Jewish settlers from the
West Bank is not the only option. Theoretically, three others exist:
(1) Israel maintains sovereignty over the Jewish settlements, but
relinquishes control over the remainder of the West Bank; (2) a land
swap occurs where the settlements become part of Israel and the Arab
communities in Israel become part of Palestine; or (3) the settlements
become part of a sovereign Palestine.63
Agreement, ratio was changed to ratio of fifty to fifty). As of 1987, it was estimated that
only sixteen percent of Lebanon's population was Maronite, see Lebanon Maronites,
http://www.photius.com/countries/lebanon/society/lebanon-society maronites.html (last
visited Aug. 6, 2006), a figure that might well be lower today.
61. See Orly Halpern, Damascus Torpedoed Jordan's Peace Offer, JERUSALEM
POST, Mar. 24, 2005, at 1.
62. For example, prior to the last Israeli elections, Amir Peretz, the Labor party
chairman, stated if Labor formed the next Israeli government, it would evacuate West
Bank settlements that do not fall into Israel's future borders. See Lilach Weissman, Nir
Hasson & Mazal Mualem, Peretz: Settlers Who Leave West Bank Will Be Fairly
Compensated, HAARETZ, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=673863. Similarly, prior to the lsraeli-Hizbullah war in the summer
of 2006, Ehud Olmert intended to follow a similar path with a Kadima-dominated
government. See Aluf Benn & Lilach Weissman, Olmert: We Must Separate from
Palestinians, Draw Final Borders, HAARETZ, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=679959.
63. A recent proposal, which was earlier said to become part of Labor's plank for the
last election, would combine the continuance option with a lease arrangement, whereby,
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Partial sovereignty would allow Israel to retain sovereignty over all
Jewish settlements. 64 All remaining land on the West Bank would be
transferred to Arab sovereignty. Indeed, Palestinian negotiators have
characterized the plan pressed by President Clinton and accepted by
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the 2000 Camp David Summit as
the partial sovereignty option.65 This outcome would leave islands of
Israeli sovereignty within a much larger geographical area of Palestine.
Precedents for partial sovereignty do exist, including the limited
sovereignty exercised by Native American reservations within the United
States, 66 the sovereignty of the Vatican within Italy,67 the sovereignty of
Monaco within France,68 and technically, the sovereignty afforded to
national embassies. 69 But to Palestinians, the partial sovereignty option
would be an infringement on their own sovereignty. Issues of security
and police forces aside, matters of trade, taxation, and the like would
transcend Palestinian authority.
A second theoretical option that resurfaced recently is the land swap
option,7° which would incorporate almost all of the settlements into Israel
in exchange for Arab communities in Israel. True, substantially all peace
although Palestinian sovereignty is agreed upon, the settlement areas, or at least the large
blocs of settlements, are then leased back to Israel under a Hong Kong arrangement for a
period of 99 years. See Mazal Mualem & Nir Hasson, Labor to Call for Leasing
Settlements from PA, HAARETZ, Dec. 28, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=663117. It does not appear, however, that this idea became part of
Labor's platform. See sources cited supra note 62.
64. See Akiva Eldar, Kadima Supporters and the Road Map, HAARETZ, Nov. 28,
2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=650612 (criticizing this
possibility).
65. See Ross, supra note 55, at 668, 691. This is shown graphically in maps
prepared by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, one depicting the actual
proposal tendered to the Palestinians by President Clinton and the other map depicting
the Palestinian's view of the proposal. See Wash. Inst. for Near E. Policy, Maps of Camp
David, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/maplmages/41db 10b8cal f.jpg (last visited
Aug. 7, 2006); see also Benny Morris, Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An
Interview with Ehud Barak), N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, June 13, 2002, at 42, 43-44
(describing Barak's refutation of Arafat's contention that proposal amounted to
"collection of 'bantustans' or 'cantons' and characterization of Arafat's claim as fear of
Palestinian reaction if they came to know real content of proposal and map).
66. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000).
67. See CIA, The World Factbook: Holy See (Vatican City),
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vt.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
68. See id.
69. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
70. See Uzi Arad, Swap Meet: Trading Land for Peace, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 28 &
Dec. 5, 2005, at 16 (Arad, former Director of Intelligence in Mossad, is founding head of
Institute for Policy and Strategy at Lauder School of Government of Interdisciplinary
Center, Herzliya); Yoav Stem, Geographers Propose Transfer of Israeli Arab Towns to
PA, HAARETZ, Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=673813.
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proposals, including that of President Clinton at the Camp David summit
in the summer of 2000 and the subsequent meeting at Taba in December
of that year,71 include some concept of a land swap with the largest
settlements contiguous to the 1967 borders incorporated into Israel and
some Israeli land, usually that in the Negev adjacent to Gaza,
incorporated into Palestine. But Uzi Arad, the former head of Israel's
intelligence agency, has larger ambitions. In order "to increase ethnic
homogeneity and to preserve each side's basic territorial reach, ' 72 Arad
proposes a land swap transferring not only vacant Israeli land, but areas
of Israel with large Palestinian and Bedouin populations to Palestine.73
According to one study, the Jewish population of Israel will decline to
seventy-four percent by 2050, but may remain at eighty-one percent by
performing a land swap.74 Arad's suggestion seems not to depend upon
whether Israeli Arabs consent to become part of a sovereign Palestine.
Moreover, if a land swap did not solve the demographic problem, Arad
would seemingly favor a transfer of Arab Israeli citizens to Palestinian
sovereign territory. However, whether one speaks in terms of a land
exchange, where Arab villages now part of Israel become part of a
Palestinian state, or a "population transfer," even Arad acknowledges
most Israeli Arab citizens-irrespective of their increasing nationalist
identity as Palestinians 75-wish to remain citizens of Israel. The rebuke
to this proposal has been fast in coming. Arik Carmon, the head of the
Israel Democracy Institute that has spearheaded an effort to establish a
written constitution, termed "Arad's arguments... racist in nature,
71. See Miguel A. Moratinos, The Taba Negotiations (January 2001), J. OF
PALESTINE STUD., Spring 2002, at 79, 79-80, available at http://domino.un.org/
UNISPAL.NSF/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/cea3efd8c0ab482f85256e3700670
afB!OpenDocument ("Both sides accepted the principle of land swap but the
proportionality of the swap remained under discussion.").
72. Arad, supra note 70, at 16.
73. Arad also writes approvingly of a trilateral land swap involving Israel, Palestine
and Egypt, again designed for the same demographic and geographic purposes. Id. at 18.
The leader of Yisrael Beiteinu, considered a "far-right" party, has also reiterated a similar
proposal incorporating Jewish settlement strongholds into Israel in exchange for "areas
within the 1967 border populated mostly by Israeli Arabs to be handed over to the PA."
Lilach Weismann & Lily Galili, Lieberman Says He's Ready to Evacuate His Own
Settlement, HAARETZ, Jan. 30, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=676593. Even former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger seems to
advocate a land swap that would involve "territories in present-day Israel with significant
Arab populations" and asserted that "[t]he rejection of such an approach, or alternative
available concepts, which would contribute greatly to stability and to demographic
balance, reflects a determination to keep incendiary issues permanently open." Henry A.
Kissinger, What's Needed from Hamas, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at A15, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/26/
AR2006022601263.html.
74. Arad, supra note 70, at 16.
75. See infra note 469 and accompanying text.
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damaging to human rights-and of course to the foundations of
democracy- ... in contradiction to international norms[,] and...
unrealizable. 76 As Carmon opined, "[t]he termination of an individual's
citizenship, according to international law, cannot occur unless he
relinquishes it by agreement., 77 A similar suggestion by a group of
academic geographers was rejected by Ahmed Tibi, a member of the
Knesset from Hadash-Ta'al, as "making its Arab population feel like a
rejected enemy., 78
Unlike the partial sovereignty and land swap options, with or
without the transfer of Arabs, only two options-the removal option and
the continuance option-do not infringe on Palestinian sovereignty or
result in the forced removal of Arabs from Israel in order to retain its
Jewish majority and character. Of the two, the removal option is almost
universally assumed to be necessary and inevitable, while the
continuance option remains overlooked by substantially all
commentators.
In sum, Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank is incompatible with
both Israel's continued status as a democratic Jewish state and the
creation of a viable sovereign Palestinian state. That conclusion does not
necessarily mean that removal of Jewish settlements is the only option.
Concentrations of Jewish and Arab populations should definitely
influence the de jure border between Israel and Palestine, but they need
not dictate sovereignty. If so, the continued presence of Jewish
settlements, per se, is not an obstacle to the creation of a Palestinian
state. Part III explores why the settlements' continued presence in
Palestine is, at least in theory, a more desirable option than their removal,
while Part IV posits and analyzes the necessary conditions and
prerequisites to this resolution.
III. Reasons in Support of Continuance Rather than Removal
The preceding section analyzed the incompatibility between Israeli
sovereignty over the West Bank and Israel's continued status as a
democratic Jewish state. Jewish settlements bordering Israel's 1948
armistice lines can be incorporated into Israel consistent with that status
with or without some land swap of unpopulated or sparsely populated
Israeli territory in the Negev contiguous to Gaza. But two options
remain with respect to other settlements: removal, that is, the destruction
76. Arik Carmon, A Blot on Israeli Democracy, HAARETZ, Dec. 12, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=656513.
77. Id.
78. Yoav Stem, Geographers Propose Transfer of Israeli Arab Towns to PA,
HAARETZ, Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=673813.
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of the settlements and the return of their residents to Israel, or
continuance, that is, their continued presence in a Palestinian state. This
section analyzes why the latter option is preferable.
A. Reversing an Exclusionary Policy: Jews, Too, Have the Right to
Live in the Historic Land of lsrael
In drawing borders between Israel and a Palestinian state, the
location of Jewish and Palestinian communities is not irrelevant: while
the location of these communities need not determine the borders
between the states, they should surely influence those borders. The great
bulk of Jews living west of the Jordan River should be within Israel, just
as the great bulk of Arabs should be within Palestine. From Israel's
perspective, that proposition follows from Israel's basic identity: it
cannot serve as a "homeland" for Jews, especially Jews oppressed in
other countries, unless it is predominantly Jewish. The same holds true
for a future Arab juridical entity-it too must be predominantly Arab.
Otherwise, the very desire for political rights that drives the Palestinian
political struggle would be thwarted.
But complete separation is impossible. Israel will always include
minorities and, as should be the case, strive for inclusion of those
minorities on a non-discriminatory basis. This proposition follows from
Israel's identity not only as Jewish state, but a democratic one.
Approximately twenty percent of Israel's present population is Arab.79
Arab political parties exist, such as the Hadash-Ta'al, National
Democratic Assembly, and United Arab List,80 Arabs belong to larger
Israeli parties, especially Labor,8' and Arabs serve in the Israel
79. Editorial, Population on Eve of 2006 Stands at 6,986,300, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 28, 2005, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=l135696353179&pagename=
JPost0/o2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (Central Bureau of Statistics report population of
6,986,300 in Israel at end of 2005, of whom seventy-six percent are Jews, twenty percent
Arabs, and four percent non-Arab Christians).
80. See Current Members of Seventeenth Knesset Circuit by Faction,
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/MKIndexCurrenteng.asp?view=l (last visited Aug.
7, 2006); see also Yoav Stem, Two Parties, and No More, HAARETZ, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=680069 (describing
differences between three Arab parties represented in Knesset and necessity for Arab
representation).
81. For example, two present Arab Knesset members representing Labor are Raleb
Majadele and Saleh Tarif. However, a poll taken prior to the last election indicated that
of the approximately twenty percent of Israeli Arabs that intended to vote for
predominantly Jewish parties, a plurality would vote for Kadima. See Jack Khoury, Poll:
20% of the Arab Public Will Vote for Predominantly Jewish Parties, HAARETZ, Mar. 9,
2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=692250 (according to
poll, Kadima will receive nearly 10 percent of Arab vote, compared to 7.5 percent for
Labor). The same poll indicated that sixty-six percent of Israeli Arabs intended to
exercise their right to vote.
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parliament, the Knesset,82  and occasionally voice views quite
antagonistic to the very existence of Israel. 3 Arabs have served on the
Israeli Supreme Court8 4 and in the ministerial ranks of the government.
8 5
Unlike Israeli Jews, who typically face compulsory army service, Arabs
can choose whether to serve in the Israeli military. With rare exceptions,
Palestinian Arabs do not serve, but a larger number of Bedouin86 and
Druze do volunteer.
No one should be deceived by the above sketch that Israel's record
of inclusion of its Arab minority has been stellar - quite the contrary. 7
82. See All Knesset Members, http://www.knesset.gov.iI/mk/eng/mkdetails-eng.asp
(complete listing of Knesset membership, including at least twelve Arabs) (last visited
Aug. 7, 2006).
83. Included within this group of Knesset members are Azmi Bishara, Ahmad Tibi,
Talab EI-Sana, Abdulmalik Dehamshe, and Mohammad Barakeh. See Ze'ev Segal, MK
Bishara's Liberty, HAARETZ, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=679104 (describing MK Bishara's expressions with respect to
terrorism and a recent Supreme Court decision permitting his continued presence in
Knesset); Alexander Yakobson, Assad's Advocates, HAARETZ, Jan. 3, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=665417 (three Arab MKs
alleged UN investigation into death of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, was
influenced by Israel, wanting to maintain tension with Syria); Editorial, Bishara's Blast,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 21, 2005, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=l&cid =
1134309618537&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (quoting Bishara as
having said, among other things, "We Arabs aren't interested in your democracy. Give
us Palestine and take your democracy with you."). More recently, the Israeli Arab
Knesset members from the Ballad party met with senior Hamas officials, despite an
official Israeli ban on such contacts. See Jack Khoury, Nir Hasson & Arnon Regular,
Balad MKs Meet Hamas Despite Police Intervention, HAARETZ, Apr. 21, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=707653.
84. In March 1999, Hamad Abdel Rahman Zuabi was appointed to a nine month seat
on Israel's Supreme Court, and, in May 2004, Salim Joubran became the first Arab to
obtain a permanent seat. See Greer F. Cashman, It Was Joubran's Day, JERUSALEM
POST, May 25, 2004, at 5.
85. For example, in the thirtieth Israeli government, Ruhama Avraham served as
Deputy Minister of the Interior and Majalli Whbee served as Deputy Minister of
Education, Culture and Sport. See Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministers and Senior
Officials of the 30th Government of Israel, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Government/Previous+govemments/Ministers%20and%2Senior/o20Officials% 2 0otf/o 2
0the%2030th%20Governm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). Salah Tarif served as Minister
without Portfolio in the twenty-ninth government. See Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Governments of Israel- 29th Government, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
MFAArchive/2000 2009/2001/3/The+Govemments+of+Israel-+29th+Government+-
March.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). Nawaf Massalha served as Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs in the twenty-eighth government of Israel. See Isr. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ministers and Senior Officials of the 28th Government of Israel,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Previous+govemments/Ministers%20and%20S
eniorO/o20Officials%20of/o2Othe%2028th%2OGovernm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
86. See David Ratmer, Bedouins to Staff Public Transportation Security Unit in
South, HAARETZ, Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=660306.
87. See, e.g., Dan Rabinowitz, A Lesson in Citizenship, HAARETZ, Dec. 20, 2005,
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But, of present relevance, Israeli Jews, subject to certain conditions
explored in Part IV, should have similar rights to live within a
Palestinian state.88 The continuance option, in contrast to removal,
allows Jews to live within their historic Jewish homeland, Eretz Yisrael,
the land of Israel, although they would not be living within the State of
Israel, Medinat Yisrael. Indeed, the single most important reason
supporting continuance over removal of settlements is that it upholds the
liberal principle that Jews, qua Jews, are not forbidden to live in a
particular place. Removal undermines, if not denies, that right.
Jordanian law forbade ownership of land by Jews.89 Similarly, the
Palestinian Authority considers a sale of land by an Arab to a Jew a
capital offense, and sellers of land to Jews have been executed. 90 Are
these truly policies that deserve reinforcement in a peace agreement
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to create a Palestinian state?
The principle that Jews should not be excluded from maintaining
communities on the West Bank is particularly important for reasons of
Jewish identity and history. Jewish identity began in the territory that the
Roman Emperor Hadrian, following the Jewish revolt of the second
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=659905 (detailing how
Interior Ministry's decision to reject request of predominantly Arab town to expand
favors Jewish population in same area); Ruth Sinai, Arab Woman Petitions High Court
Against Link Between Army Service, Mortgage Rights, HAARETZ, Jan. 3, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=665372 (suit filed with
Supreme Court, alleging army service and alternative national service, which are not
mandatory for Arabs, discriminate against Arabs because mortgage law gives additional
points for service). On the other hand, there are ongoing efforts at greater inclusion. See,
e.g., Gideon Alon, Knesset Panel Recommends Building New Israeli Arab Town from
Scratch, HAARETZ, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=683443 (planning advisor of Knesset Interior and Environment
Committee recommended building new Arab town to deal with shortage of space in
existing Arab communities); see also Raday, supra note 36, at 479-98 (legal discussion
of ongoing efforts).
88. It should be noted that this question differs from whether there is a "right of
return" for Palestinian refugees. See Ruth Lapidoth, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Do
Palestinian Refugees Have a Right to Return to Israel? (Jan. 15, 2001),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Do+Palestinia
n+Refugees+Have+a+Right+to+Return+to.htm. Recognition and implementation of a
right of return would mean Israel would cease to exist as a predominantly Jewish state.
Recognizing a Jewish right to live in Palestine, particularly in the numbers that a final
settlement with some border adjustments would imply, would not in any way undermine
the future of Palestine as a predominantly Arab state.
89. DERSHOWITZ, Conclusion: Israel-the Jew among Nations, in THE CASE FOR
ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 222, 233; DERSHOWITZ, Was the UN. Partition Plan Unfair to
Palestinians?, in THE CASE FOR ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 63, 65; Benvenisti & Zamir,
supra note 40, at 315; Joshua Weisman, Restrictions on the Acquisition of Land by
Aliens, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 47-48 (1980).
90. See JusTus REID WEINER, HUMAN RIGHTS OF CHRISTIANS IN PALESTINIAN
SOCIETY 13 (2005), available at http://www.jcpa.org/text/Christian-Persecution-
Weiner.pdf; Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40, at 315.
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century, renamed Syria Palaestina in order to expunge its Jewish
identity. 9' The formation of the Jewish people occurred between circa
1200 B.C.E. and the first several centuries A.D. During that time, Jews
migrated to the West Bank, were forced into exile by the Babylonians,
returned to rebuild the Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem, and transformed
their religious practice from one based upon priestly sacrifice to prayer.
92
Excluding perhaps Jerusalem, specific areas of the West Bank that
almost certainly would become part of a Palestinian state, such as
Hebron, are more central to Jewish identity than areas west of the Jordan
that would remain part of Israel. 93 Jews inhabited Hebron continually for
millennia and continuously for at least 500 years prior to a Jewish
massacre by Muslim Arabs in 1929 supported by Haj Amin al-Husseini,
the British appointed grand mufti of Palestine. Al-Husseini later, living
in Berlin as an adviser to Adolf Hitler, encouraged the extension of the
Final Solution to Jews living in the Middle East.94  Israel sits in the
general area most frequently labeled either the "Middle East" or "Near
East." Jews in this area have either been expelled95 or subject to
recurrent second-class status (dhimmitude),96  persecutions, and
expulsions. In the words of one scholar:
[While] persecution of Jews in the Islamic world never reached the
91. Following the Jewish revolt led by Simon bar Kokhba against Roman rule (132-
35 C.E.), the Roman Emperor Hadrian took various measures against the Jews, including
changing the name of the territory from Judaea (Israel) to Syria Palaestina. See A
HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 334 (Hayim H. Ben-Sasson ed., 10th ed. 1997).
92. Id. at 342; see also GILBERT, supra note 51, at 1-2.
93. PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 2 (1937) ("[B]y about 1100 B.C.[E.] the
Israelites had occupied most of the hill-country in Palestine and.., were already
distinguished from the peoples of the coast.") [hereinafter PEEL REPORT]; Bradley
Burston, Want Greater Israel? Vote for the Left, HAARETZ, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=681161 ("Netanyahu... gave
away nearly all of Hebron, a holy city second only to Jerusalem in its sanctity to Jews.").
94. DERSHOWITZ, Were the Jews Unwilling to Share Palestine?, in THE CASE FOR
ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 39, 40-44.
95. For example, Jews were slaughtered and expelled from most of the Arabian
Peninsula. See Hayim J. Cohen, Arabia, in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 231-35 (reprint
ed., Coronet Books 1994) (1972); 3 HEINRICH GRAETZ, HISTORY OF THE JEWS 76-85
(Jewish Publ'n Soc'y, Philadelphia 1894); U.S. Dep't of State, Reports on Human Rights
Practices in Saudi Arabia (Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2004/41731 .htm.
96. See MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI'S SIYAR I 1
(Majid Khadduri, trans., Johns Hopkins University Press 1966) ("[T]he tolerated
religious communities collectively called the 'People of the Book' or Dhimmis...
preferred to hold fast to their own law and religion at the price of paying a poll tax (jizya)
to Islamic authority. The Muslims enjoyed full rights of citizenship while the followers
of the tolerated religions enjoyed only partial civil rights .... ) (emphasis added). The
term "dhimmi" initially implied a protected status, but as time went on it connoted an
unequal and inferior status which subjected Jews to harsh treatment.
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scale of Christian Europe[,] ... that did not spare the 'Jews of Islam'
(to use the phrase of the historian Bernard Lewis) from centuries of
legally institutionalised inferiority, humiliating social restrictions[,]
and the sporadic rapacity of local officials and the Muslim population
at large.
At least prior to the influx of Russian Jews in the late 1980s and 1990s, a
majority of Israel's Jewish citizenry were exiles from Arab lands, or the
children or grandchildren of such exiles.98
Equally important to Israel's identity and statehood was its
emergence in the aftermath of the Holocaust,99 with the horrendous death
of a majority of the relatives of most Ashkenazi Jews in Israel. An
essential Nazi idea, precedent to the Holocaust itself, was the alleged
"despoliation" of the Aryan race by the presence of Jews in Germany and
Austria. Nonetheless, Israel established relations with the Federal
Republic of Germany. Suppose, however, Germany had insisted in
exchange that no Jew could thereafter live or own property within
Germany. Is it conceivable Israel would have signed such a peace
treaty? For Israel to accept that Jews cannot live in a predominantly
Arab governed polity would sever a nerve connected to its important
historical underpinning. 100
The removal and destruction of settlements from Gaza together with
the withdrawal of Israeli forces, produced much soul-searching and
agony among Israelis, but did not present the same emotional, historical,
and geographic challenges presented by the removal of settlements from
the West Bank. 10 1  Nonetheless, the Gaza removal, like an earlier
97. EFRAIM KARSH, The Long Trail of Arab Anti-Semitism, in RETHINKING THE
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 42, at 97, 98.
98. See Sarah Sennott, It Is Now or Never, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 9, 2004,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4703546/.
99. See generally AMOS ELON, THE ISRAELIS: FOUNDERS AND SONS 198-204
(Penguin 1993) (1971); TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE
HOLOCAUST (Haim Watzman, trans., 2000) (1993).
100. For sure, there are those who like former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who
negotiated the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty precisely to that position: as part of that
peace treaty, Israel completely evacuated Yamit, an Israeli settlement, without any
attempt to negotiate its continued existence as part of Egypt. Similarly, Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon masterminded and successfully effected the evacuation of all Jewish
settlements from Gaza. But, to Jews, the Sinai and even Gaza do not have the same
standing as the West Bank from religious, historical or geographical perspectives. See
sources cited supra note 93 and accompanying text; sources cited infra note 101 and
accompanying text.
101. See Rafael D. Frankel, Security and Defense: Has Unilateralism Run Its
Course?, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=
1139395428454&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull ("[T]he West Bank was
never viewed in the same light as Gaza by many Israelis. For years, a large segment of
the country supported leaving the tiny coastal strip for demographic reasons, since only
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decision by Prime Minister Menachem Begin to abandon Yamit in the
1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, 10 2 does offer precedent for the
removal option. At the same time, another aspect of the Gaza
withdrawal may actually offer an apt analogy to the emotional agony of
the removal of West Bank settlements. In response to public outcry and
its own soul-searching, the Israeli cabinet did not destroy the synagogues
in Gaza.
10 3
In sum, the continued existence of Jewish settlements in the West
Bank, like Arab communities in Israel, supports the principle that a
minority can maintain communities among a larger and different ethnic
group. The removal option contradicts this principle in the same way as
would any transfer of Palestinian Arabs from Israel to Palestine. There
are limits to the exercise of this principle, as explored in Part IV, but the
principle remains a weighty guide.
B. Jewish Settlements as a Metaphor ofAcceptance
The settlements should stay for another powerful reason. The Arab-
Israeli dispute has been characterized by two competing narratives.1°4
8,000 Jews lived among 1.3 million Arabs. This sector also sought to stem what they
considered to be the hemorrhaging of resources that providing security for the settlers
there drained in terms of both money and blood. Moreover, Gaza was not the crucial
security corridor that the West Bank is, nor were its sand dunes once home to the tribes of
Israel, as were the hills and gullies of Judea and Samaria."). The recent evacuation of an
illegal settlement on the West Bank, Amona, gives some indication of the emotional and
political complications of evacuating West Bank settlements in general. See Amos Harel,
Arnon Regular, Nadav Shragai, & Jonathan Lis, Security Forces Demolish Amona Homes
Amid Violent Clashes, HAARETZ, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=676627 (over 200 wounded settlers and police officers, along with
several members of Knesset from parties supportive of settlers). In the words of Hillel
Halkin:
There is indeed something unacceptable about telling Jews that although they
may live anywhere they wish, in New York and London, in Moscow and
Buenos Aires, there is one part of the world they may not live in-namely,
Judea and Samaria, those regions of the land of Israel most intimately
connected with the Bible, with the second Temple period, and with Jewish
historical memory, and most longed-for by the Jewish people over the ages.
Halkin, supra note 23, at 24.
102. See Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel, Egypt-Isr., Mar. 26, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 362.
103. See Steven Erlanger, Synagogue Dispute Clouds Gaza Transfer, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2005, at A7 ("But, the expected occurred, and the synagogues were razed by the
Palestinians after the Israelis departed."); Greg Myre, Israel Lowers Its Flag in the Gaza
Strip, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at A1O ("Hours after the Israelis left the settlement of
Neve Dekalim, young Palestinians were tearing aluminum window frames and metal
ceiling fixtures out of the main synagogue there, as fires burned inside.") (emphasis
added).
104. See DERSHOWITZ, Did European Jews Displace Palestinians?, in THE CASE FOR
ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 22, 24.
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Each narrative incorporates both an "affirmative" case relating the
Jewish or Arab nexus to the land and a "negative" brief that denies the
nexus asserted by the other. Unfortunately, the affirmative and negative
components are often so intertwined that separating them becomes
difficult.' 05
Many of the affirmative elements of the Jewish narrative have been
presented above. 0 6 Its core is the several millennia nexus between the
Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael.10 7 Historically, Israel's affirmative case
105. "We were herefirst," even without the accompanying negation of the conflicting
narrative, can be understood as, "You were here second."
106. See sources cited supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Dore Gold & Jeff Helnreich, An Answer to the New Anti-Zionists: The
Rights of the Jewish People to a Sovereign State in Their Historic Homeland, JERUSALEM
VIEWPOINTS, Nov. 16, 2003, available at http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp507.htm. Gold is a
former representative of Israel to the UN. Other prominent parties who have described
these narratives are Yehoshua Porath, Professor Emeritus from Hebrew University, see
Yehoshua Porath, Mrs. Peters's Palestine, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 16, 1986, at 36, and
Walter Reich, former director of the U.S. Holocaust Museum, 1995-98, and Professor of
International Affairs, Ethics and Human Behavior at George Washington University, see
Postings of Walter Reich to Rosner's Guest, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
rosnerGuest.jhtml?itemNo=670656 (Jan. 16, 2006). Porath, writing a critical review of
Joan Peters' work, see JOAN PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: THE ORIGINS OF THE
ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE (2001), writes somewhat critically of some
elements of the Jewish narrative, at least in its unquestioned form:
Jews, and Zionists especially, developed their own myths about Palestine.
First they interpreted ancient Jewish history according to the ideology of
modem nationalism, equating the old Israelite and Judean kingdoms with
modem nation-states. The Maccabean revolt and the period of Hasmonean rule
were seen as typical manifestations of the struggle for modem national
liberation. During the years when most Jews lived in exile, it was argued, they
always kept a separate national identity: they never converted of their free will
to another religion, and they preserved the memory of their ancestral land, to
which they always hoped to return. Indeed, against all odds, some never left.
Special emphasis was put on this last group. Every bit of evidence that
could be found, however trivial it may have been, was used to prove the
continuity of the Jewish presence in Eretz Israel and to show that it was central
to the life of Jews in exile.... The Zionists argued that Jewish identity and the
yearning to return to Palestine were strengthened by the persecutions of the
Jews in all parts of the world, including the Islamic and Arab countries.
The return itself was mainly perceived as a matter of Jewish resolve to
establish a homeland, which required struggle against Palestine's foreign
rulers-the Ottoman Empire first, and then the British Mandate.
Porath, supra, at 36. Reich describes the Jewish narrative thus:
It was a story that saw that the Jewish claim to the land as ancient and
unbroken.
Central to this story was the understanding that the Jews had lived in that
land for over a thousand years; that it was the core of their cultural, moral and
religious achievements; that while there they had developed the teachings that
had spawned the three great religions of the West; that it was the place of their
Temples and the site of their worship and their Zion; that ultimately most of the
Jews were exiled from that land; that many nevertheless remained in it; that the
exiles continued to pray, three times a day, for a return to it; that while they
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was supplemented by its negative brief: Palestine was barely inhabited
when modem Jewish immigration began; many Arabs came to Palestine
attracted by the economic development produced by modem Zionism
prior to the establishment of the State of Israel; Palestinians never
considered themselves to be a separate people in a separate polity apart
from other Arabs; and, in general, Arab states and the Palestinians have
pursued repeated warfare and terrorism against Israel and the Jews.
10 8
Combining its affirmative and negative elements, the Israeli narrative has
historically portrayed the conflict as the unwillingness-carried to the
extreme by Arab encouragement of the Holocaust, successive wars
against Israel, and repeated acts of terrorism during the years of Israel's
existence-to permit the existence of a sovereign Jewish nation in the
Middle East despite the demonstrated connection between the Jewish
people and the land.
As might be expected, the Palestinian narrative is substantially
different. Its affirmative case stresses that at the end of the nineteenth
century Palestine was inhabited, Arabs formed the majority of the
population, and Arabs lived in villages-i.e., they were more than
Bedouins roaming across the deserts. More recently, Palestinians have
sought to buttress their claim to the land with the assertion that they
descended from the Canaanites and therefore have always inhabited the
land, preceding even the ancient Hebrews. It is the Palestinian negative
brief, however, that has seemed to merit the most repetition. Walter
Reich, former director of the U.S. Holocaust Museum and now Professor
were in exile in Europe they were constantly abused and repeatedly and
genocidally massacred; that as a result, in the nineteenth century, Herzl and
other political Zionists created a movement, Zionism, to bring Jews back to
their homeland, their Zion, where they could [sic] a normal nation, determine
their own destiny and protect themselves; and that the creation of Israel was a
just achievement based on the origin of the Jews in that land and a necessary
achievement based on the centuries of massacres and genocide the Jews had
endured in exile, of which the Holocaust was the most recent and most stunning
example.
Postings of Walter Reich to Rosner's Guest, supra.
108. Porath describes the negative brief as follows:
The Arab population was not presented as a major obstacle since, it was said, it
was so small. Palestine during the late Ottoman and early British periods was
portrayed as a barren land, hardly inhabited, whose tiny Arab population
consisted mostly of wandering Bedouin tribes whose presence was only
temporary.
According to the Zionist myth, only modem Jewish colonization brought
about the economic development of Palestine and improved the hard conditions
there. These developments, it was said, attracted poor Arabs from the stagnant
neighboring countries. Their numbers grew faster than the Jewish immigrants
because the malicious British authorities always encouraged them to come and
did much to help to absorb them, both economically and legally.
Porath, supra note 107, at 36.
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of International Affairs, Ethics and Human Behavior at George
Washington University, describes its elements as follows:
In the Palestinian narrative, Jews have no right to the land, and even
had nothing, or little, to do with it in the past. The Jews of today are
seen as unrelated to the Hebrews who lived there two thousand years
ago; according to some versions of this narrative, European Jews
were simply the offspring of converts in Europe, and were not
descended from the Hebrews who used to live in what is now Israel
and the West Bank. So important is it for the Palestinian "narrative"
to deny the Jewish connection with the land-and therefore the
justice of the Zionist return-that even the existence of the Temples
is denied.
By creating Israel, Europeans were colonizing Palestine, coming
there without any basis for their arrival, much as the French had
colonized Algeria and the Boers and British had colonized South
Africa.
10 9
According to this view, Israel's creation-a European colonial enterprise
to deny Palestinians, the indigenous population, their right to the land
and sovereignty' l°-was "utterly unjust."' 11
109. Postings of Walter Reich to Rosner's Guest, supra note 107.
110. This view suffuses and affects the legal analyses of some authors. See, e.g., Ardi
Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44
HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 72-78, 101 (2003); sources cited supra notes 25-26. It is also
repeatedly emphasized in the various writings of Edward Said and his disciples. See,
e.g., SAID, supra note 10; John Strawson, Reflections on Edward Said and the Legal
Narratives of Palestine: Israeli Settlements and Palestinian Self-Determination, 20 PENN
ST. INT'L L. REV. 363 (2002) (applying Said's methodology and supporting the colonialist
narrative). Summarizing Said's writing on the subject, Karsh characterizes Said's view as
"the local populations of the Middle East, the Arabs in particular, as the hapless victims
of an alien encroachment." See EFRAIM KARSH, Preface to RETHINKING THE MIDDLE
EAST, supra note 42, at xi. Porath describes the Palestinian "myths" in the following
terms:
The Arab side tried to prove that first of all the Jews were not a nation in
the modem sense of the term and consequently did not require a state of their
own. In the tradition of both Western liberal and doctrinaire socialist thinking,
the Arabs argued that the Jews were only a religious community; that peoples
could not return to their ancient homelands without turning the entire world
upside down; and, most important, that Palestine had been settled since the
seventh century [C.E.] by Arabs. Over the years many Arab ideologists even
claimed that Arabs had occupied the land in pre-Biblical times because of the
"Arab character" of Canaanites.
Zionism, the Arab argument continued, if it had any grain of historical
justification at all, emerged only in a European setting. It came about as a
reaction to Western Christian or secular and racist anti-Semitism, with which
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To what degree have Jews and Arabs remained steadfast in
believing in and/or adhering to these narratives? Most Israelis still
believe in the positive core of their narrative-that Zionism and the
resultant State of Israel represented the act of self-determination by a
people with an extraordinarily strong physical, emotional, and religious
nexus to the land' 12-but have abandoned key elements of their negative
brief.113  In doing so, most Israelis understand that the Jewish/Arab
struggle is, in the words of Chaim Weizmann, the first president of
Israel, "not the clash of right and wrong, but the clash of two rights.",
' 14
It is unclear, however, whether Arabs, in general, and Palestinians, in
particular, have similarly abandoned those narrative elements that would
the Arabs had nothing to do; therefore, they should not be required to pay the
costs of remedying it. In Arab and Islamic countries Jews suffered none of the
terrible treatment that Western Jews had suffered. On the contrary, the
Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular treated their religious and ethnic
minorities with full equality and enabled both Christians and Jews to take part
in public life, to rise to high positions of state, and, in recent times, to become
full members .of the modem and secular Arab nation living in its various states.
The Jews living in the Arab and Muslim countries, moreover, did not take part
in the Zionist movement. They even actively opposed it and did not want to
emigrate to Israel. That most of them eventually did so the Arabs attribute to
the machinations of Israel working with corrupt Arab rulers who were "stooges
of imperialism."
After the 1948 war Arab propaganda added an important new claim: since
the Jews wanted Palestine empty of Arabs, they used the opportunity of the war
to systematically expel the indigenous Arab population wherever they could do
so. Some Arab writers, and others favorable to their cause, have gone so far as
to claim that the war itself was set off in December 1947 by the Jews in order
to create the right circumstances for the mass expulsion of Palestinian Arabs
from their homeland.
Until the mid-1960s the Arab claims were usually presented as part of the
ideology of Arab nationalism. Palestine was (and ideologically speaking still
is) considered part of the greater Arab homeland and the Palestinians part of the
greater Arab nation. The aim of the Arab struggle was to preserve the Arab
character of Palestine from the Jewish-Zionist threat. The Palestinian case was
at best secondary when it was made at all. Only since the middle of the 1960s
and particularly after 1967 has the distinctively Palestinian component become
relatively stronger among the factors that shape the identity of the Palestinian
Arabs.
Porath, supra note 107, at 36.
111. Postings of Walter Reich to Rosner's Guest, supra note 107.
112. See Raday, supra note 36, at 461-68.
113. This is not to say that all elements of the Israeli negative brief are incorrect, any
more than that there is no truth to the Palestinian negative brief. For example, Kenneth
Stein's exhaustive study of Middle East history revealed that "[b]efore 1950, Arab
histories that treated Palestine or the Palestinian Arabs as separate historical entities were
extremely rare." Kenneth W. Stein, A Historiographic Review of Literature on the
Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 96 AM. HIST. REv. 1450, 1454 (1991). He added,
"Most Arab historians viewed Palestine as a geographic adjunct to greater Syria and
Palestinians as a small but integral portion of a larger Arab nation." Id. at 1455.
114. Eugene V. Rostow, Correspondence, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 717, 720 (1990).
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deny any legitimacy to Jewish historical claims.' 15  Approximately
fifteen years ago, Michael Curtis noted:
[I]t needs to be reiterated that the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict
remains what it has been for some seventy years, the implacable
opposition by Arab states, except Egypt since 1979, to the Jewish
presence in the Mandate area of Palestine and, since 1948, to the
existence of the [S]tate of Israel."16
While in the subsequent fifteen years Jordan made peace with Israel, and
the Palestine National Council met to revise the Palestinian Liberation
Organization Charter, 1 7 also referred to as the Palestine National
Charter, the only publicly available version of the Charter still calls for
the destruction of Israel' 8 as does the even harsher representation of
Israel and Jews in the Hamas Charter." 9 As recently as the Camp David
summit between then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, President Yasir
Arafat of the Palestinian Authority, and President Clinton, Arafat
reportedly insisted on "repeat[ing] old mythologies and invent[ing] new
ones, like, for example, that the Temple was not in Jerusalem."'
' 20
To the Israelis, the question is an existential one: can Jews, as Jews,
maintain a degree of power without dhimmi status in the Middle East?
That is, is there some acceptance of the Jewish narrative of a permanent
and continual connection between the Jewish people and the land?
Whether Jews are permitted to live within a Palestinian state, in effect,
then, is a metaphor as to whether Israel, as a Jewish nation, can live in a
sea of twenty-two or, once Palestine is established, twenty-three different
Arab nations.' 21 If the answer is negative-that is, any Palestinian state
115. DERSHOWlTZ, supra note 104, at 24.
116. Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457,
460 (1991).
117. Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the UN, Decisions & Actions
Related to the Palestine National Charter (Apr. 26, 1996), http://www.palestine-
un.org/plo/pna-one.html.
118. See PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER arts. 19, 22, available at
http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/pna three.html.
119. See sources cited supra note 49; see also Richard Cohen, A Disturbing
Invitation, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at A15 (discussing extent to which Hamas is not
only anti-Israel but virulently anti-Semitic).
120. Dennis Ross & Gidi Grinstein, Camp David: An Exchange, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS,
Sept. 20, 2001, at 90, 90.
121. See Halkin, Beyond the Geneva Accords, supra note 27, at 26 ("The issue, it
should be clear, is not one of sovereignty. There is no reason why, under conditions of
peace, Jewish towns and villages should not exist in a sovereign Palestine as Arab towns
and villages exist in a sovereign Israel. On the contrary: if a sovereign Palestine cannot
tolerate the presence of Jews, in what sense has it made peace with a Jewish state?");
Halkin, supra note 23, at 27 ("One thing should be clear. A West Bank without Jews
means a Palestine and Israel without a normal relationship.").
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must exist without Jewish settlements- the answer portends that such
state, once established, will not truly support the two-state solution. To
Israel, the question of establishing a legal entity of Palestine depends
upon whether it brings an end to the conflict-an acknowledgement that
Jews, too, have a right to the land (as Israel, in recognizing such a
Palestinian state, would reciprocally be acknowledging)-or simply
represents a strategic move to be supplanted in the future by one
predominantly Arab state.' 22
122. See Giora Eiland, The Palestinian Authority and the Challenge of Palestinian
Elections, JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF (Jerusalem Ctr. for Pub. Affairs, Jerusalem, Isr.), Feb.
1, 2006, at 5, available at http://www.jcpa.orgfbrief/briefD05-16.htm ("The second
strategic decision that the Palestinians have yet to make is to recognize that a two-state
solution means that on one side there will be a Palestinian state, but on the other side
there will be a Jewish state."). Eiland, who is head of Israel's National Security Council,
adds, "I have never heard any real Arab leader say loud and clear that Israel has the right
to exist as a Jewish state. We are looking for real recognition of the right of a Jewish
state to exist alongside a Palestinian state and we have not yet heard it." Id. (emphasis
added); see Kissinger, supra note 73 ("Even relatively conciliatory Arab statements, such
as the Beirut summit declaration of 2003, reject Israel's legitimacy as inherent in its
sovereignty; they require the fulfillment of certain prior conditions. Almost all official
and semi-official Arab and Palestinian media and schoolbooks present Israel as an
illegitimate, imperialist interloper in the region."); Daniel Pipes, Why Hamas Leaves Me
Neutral, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 31, 2006, http://www.nysun.com/article/26722 ("[T]he elections
might bring benefits, prompting Israelis finally to recognize the deep and pervasive anti-
Zionism in the Palestinian Arab body politic."). Even Robert Malley and Hussein Agha,
who are in the minority in not ascribing all responsibility for the breakdown of the
summer 2000 Camp David talks to Arafat and the Palestinians, see infra note 204,
describe the Palestinian perspective in the following terms:
For all the talk about peace and reconciliation, most Palestinians were more
resigned to the two-state solution than they were willing to embrace it; they
were prepared to accept Israel's existence, but not its moral legitimacy. The
war for the whole of Palestine was over because it had been lost. Oslo, as they
saw it, was not about negotiating peace terms but terms of surrender.
Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Aug. 9, 2001, at 59, 62. Hamas has been even more explicit about its aim of
liberating all of Palestine even if, after the Parliamentary elections, it extends the hudna,
or truce, against Israel. As the leader of Hamas remarked:
By Allah, I know that all Arab leaders-and I have met many of them--deep
inside want the resistance in Palestine to be victorious, and want Palestine to be
liberated. Perhaps the need for flattery and for diplomacy, and the American
hegemony, force other things on them, but in their hearts they are happy when
we are victorious.
Khaled Mash'al, Hamas Leader, Address at the A1-Murabit Mosque in Damascus (Feb. 3,
2006), available at http://menri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=
SP108706; see Asaf Maliach, Hamas' Post-Election Strategy: Step-by-Step to the
Liberation of Palestine, INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, Feb. 5, 2006,
http://www.ictconference.org/s119/apage/5232.php ("Hamas' [sic] calls for the 'Hudna'
with Israel is merely an ancient maneuver commonly used by radical Islamic
organizations to reestablish and strengthen their power without being exposed to danger
from their adversaries. The 'Hudna' is intended to serve the step by step program that
Hamas advocates for the liberation of all of Palestine, from the sea to the river.")
(emphasis added). Even more recently, after it won a majority of seats in the
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C. Contiguity and Borders
If the Palestinian Authority succeeds in establishing order and a
functioning self-governing entity in Gaza, 123 and Hamas' recent victory
in Palestinian parliamentary elections does not foreclose future peace
efforts, it is inevitable that a Palestinian state, the geographic bulk and
center of which will consist of much of the West Bank, will be
established. In addition to the question of how Gaza and the West Bank
will be connected, a key focus now has become whether the Palestinian
West Bank will be a contiguous unit with sensible borders or a group of
loosely tied districts. Given the very small area west of the Jordan, only
10,871 square miles, 24 drawing borders with the clarity that often
characterized colonial borders is impossible, and contiguity for both a
predominantly Jewish and Arab Palestinian state cannot easily be
achieved. The Peel Commission Partition Plan of July 1937 would have
allowed for a contiguous Arab state, but not a contiguous Jewish state;
25
Parliamentary elections and was asked to form the next Palestinian Authority
government, Hamas submitted for approval a "cabinet with hardliners." Stephen Farrell,
Defiant Hamas Packs Cabinet with Hardliners, TIMES (London), Mar. 21, 2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2095266,00.html.
123. As of this date, lawlessness in Gaza undermines attempts to organize a civil
society, a prerequisite for statehood. See, e.g., Sarah El Deeb, Palestinian Police Storm
Gaza-Egypt Border, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
english/doc/2005-12/30/content_508202.htm (describing Palestinian police officers
storming border to prevent feuding families from crossing to consternation of European
monitors); Stephen Farrell & Ian MacKinnon, Red Cross Leaves 'Lawless' Gaza, TIMES
(London), Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25 1-1729052,00.html;
Ian MacKinnon, Increase in Seizures Prompted Exodus of Foreigners, TIMES (London),
Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-1963176,00.html ("Security
has deteriorated to such an extent over the past year that only a few dozen international
staff dare to live and work in Gaza.... [T]he authority has caved in to the kidnappers'
demands, fuelling the cycle of seizures by clans or groups of renegade gunmen who have
seen the snatching of foreign staff as a quick way to resolve their difficulties."); Ze'ev
Schiff, Escalation Is Inevitable, HAARETZ, Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=664152 (describing which assumptions have proved incorrect
since Gaza withdrawal and cessation of Palestinian rockets targeting Israel); Conal
Urquhart, Frantic Search for Aid Worker and Parents as Gang Fails to Make Contact,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/
0,2763,1675137,00.html (describing growing anarchy in Gaza resulting from "the
inability of the PA to impose its authority over the armed men who fought against Israeli
forces since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000"); Editorial, Democracy in
Palestine, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/
main.jhtml;jsessionid=?xml=/opinion/2005/12/30/dl3002.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/12/30
/ixnewstop.html ("Mahmoud Abbas's chronic inability to contain Palestinian violence
has been demonstrated this week in both parts of the Occupied Territories.").
124. JuLIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 17
(1981).
125. See PEEL REPORT, supra note 93, at 382-86; GILBERT, supra note 5 1, at 22. King
Edward VIII of England appointed the Peel Commission to determine the causes of the
Palestine riots in 1936 and make recommendations to prevent their recurrence.
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a 1938 Jewish proposal for partition foresaw both a Jewish and an Arab
state in several sections; 26 a British proposal for partition of the same
year envisioned a Jewish state in two sections and an Arab state that
included, but was physically cut off from, Jaffa;127 and pursuant to the
1947 UN Partition Plan accepted by the Jews, but rejected by the Arabs,
both Israel and the Palestinian state would have had three different
segments. Perhaps most significant to the present discussion, even a
cursory look at a map of Israel slightly north of Tel Aviv, its largest city,
reveals a pre-1967 "waist-line" of only approximately fifteen kilometers
with a population even denser than the Gaza Strip. 128  It has been
suggested that if the largest of the settlements, Ma 'ale Adumim, remained
under Israeli sovereignty and was connected to Jerusalem by
construction in the several kilometer stretch between the two, a
Palestinian state would lack contiguity; however, that area of the
Palestinian state would still have the same width, fifteen kilometers, as
does Israel at its narrowest point. In other words, continuance of Israeli
settlements on the West Bank, even if they remained under Israeli
sovereignty, would probably not result in a Palestinian state any less
convoluted than Israel.
Nonetheless, contiguity has seemingly been elevated from wise
policy, to the extent it can reasonably be achieved, to principle, and its
violation has become a frequent allegation leveled against Jewish
settlements. 129 Thus, if the presence of settlements with Israeli Jews
prevents a contiguous state with sensible borders, the facile solution is to
remove rather than tolerate them.' 30 Both principle and policy, however,
126. See GILBERT, supra note 51, at 26.
127. See id. at 27.
128. See GILBERT, supra note 51, at 53; Ricki Hollander & Gilead Ini, Updated. The
Contiguity Double Standard, CAMERA MEDIA REPORT, Fall 2005, at 15, 15-16; Uri
Elitzur, It's Crowded Around Here, YNET NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3149627,00.html.
129. See Lein, supra note 35, at 42 ("[M]any settlements block the territorial
continuity of dozens of Palestinian enclaves.... This lack of contiguity prevents the
establishment of a viable Palestinian state, and therefore prevents realization of the right
to self-determination."); Editorial, Bush, Abbas Intentions, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21,
2005, at A16 ("Palestinians perceive continued thickening of settlements as proof that
Israel has no intention of allowing a viable Palestinian state on land that is not divided
into multiple separate enclaves."). For example, it has been charged that Israeli
construction of housing on the several kilometers of land between Jerusalem and Ma 'ale
Adumim, the largest West Bank settlement, would preclude contiguity for a state of
Palestine. In fact, however, such a state to the east and southeast of Ma'ale Adumim
would still have a waist as wide as Israel in the Qalkilya-Kfar Saba area. See
HonestReporting, Orla Guerin's Lack of Contiguity (May 2, 2005),
http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/45884734/critiques/OrlaGuerinsLack-of Con
tiguity.asp; see also Lein, supra note 35, at 102 (describing specific examples of smaller
settlements that may interfere with Palestinian community contiguity south of Jerusalem).
130. That is the Palestinian view, voiced over and over in various meetings and
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militate in favor of continuance over removal.
The principled reason has already been explored: removal only
achieves contiguity at the expense of the principle that Jewish
communities, just because they are Jewish, should not be automatically
excluded from the land of Israel. The continuance option, on the other
hand, by separating the concept of Jewish settlements from Jewish
sovereignty, allows for both contiguity and that principle.
The policy reason takes account of political reality. With its
implicit equation of Jewish settlements and Israeli sovereignty, the
removal option puts tremendous stress on the question of the exact
location of the border between Israel and a state of Palestine. This
phenomenon is reflected, for example, in pressure to expand Jerusalem
eastward so that Jews inhabit a geographic continuum between Jerusalem
and eastern settlements.' 3' In contrast, if Jews could be assured that, as
Jews, they would be allowed to live safely and freely within Eretz
Yisrael, albeit outside of Israeli sovereignty, less opposition can be
expected to a proposed border.13 2 The weight held by the question (does
the final resolution involve the forced removal of 50,000 to 100,000
settlers, including Jews who perceive their communities in religious
terms or merely acknowledging Palestinian sovereignty without
interfering with the lives of the people in these communities?) bears not
only on the probable success of negotiations, but the time required to
arrive at a resolution. In short, it is actually the continuance option that
offers the greater prospect for a Palestinian state, Gaza aside, that
minimally has borders as sensible as the Green Line.
pronouncements. For example, Palestinian aids of Abbas expressed this view to
President Bush in a recent meeting. See Kessler, supra note 14.
13 1. See Caroline Glick, Column One: Where Olmert Leads, Israel Mustn't Follow,
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 10, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=
1139395379720&pagename=JPost/o2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (criticizing Olmert
government for not building Jewish neighborhood connecting Ma'ale Adumim to
Jerusalem and, in changing security fence to exclude Palestinian village of Japba, for
endangering movement between Gush Etzion and central Israel); Nadav Shragai, Expand
J'lem Beyond the Green Line, Panel Urges, HAARETZ, Dec. 27, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=662691 (describing proposals
by Zionist Council in Israel for widened corridors and housing connecting Jerusalem to
settlements to North, East and South rather than continuing to build Jerusalem westward);
Nadav Shragai, No More Talk of a Unified Jerusalem, HAARETZ, Mar. 7, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=690895 (describing sharp
disagreement over which neighborhoods in and around Jerusalem will remain in any
"division" of city).
132. The role of sovereignty has diminished in its classical sense. See sources cited
infra notes 470-71. Analogously, Israel's peace treaty with Jordan recognized Jordan's
sovereignty over certain areas effectively leased back to Israel for an initial period of
twenty-five years. See Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, Isr.-Jordan, Annex I, Oct. 24, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 43.
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D. Cost Considerations
Continuance of Jewish settlements is also the least expensive way of
creating a Palestinian state. Although the Roadmap called for the
creation of a Palestinian state by 2005, there is still great impetus for that
reality to be created sooner rather than later. Three sets of cost
considerations need to. be considered: the costs associated with
establishing a viable Palestinian state; the costs associated with resolving
the Palestinian and Jewish refugee problems; and, if removal rather than
continuance is effected, the cost to Israel of removing and resettling all
settlers not within Israel's final borders once a peace agreement is
concluded.
The first broad category of costs includes those associated with
insuring the viability of the new Palestinian state. To bolster the
Palestinian economy and provide the other practical prerequisites of
statehood will require billions of dollars.' 33  Even in anticipation of
Israel's withdrawal of settlements from Gaza, the World Bank estimated
an additional $1.8 billion of necessary donor aid.' 34  The costs for
insuring the economic viability of a Palestinian state following an Israeli
withdrawal from the West Bank would be exponentially higher. While
much of its economic success depends upon the ability of a high number
of Palestinians to find labor in Israel, as in the period prior to the 2000
intifada, increasing Palestinian economic independence is highly
desirable. 135  The most recent World Bank report on the Palestinian
economy credited eight to nine percent growth of gross domestic product
in 2005 to large increases in both credit to the private sector (thirty
percent) and donor disbursements (twenty percent) to $1.1 billon. 136 It
concludes "[t]he only satisfactory way forward is to combine good
policies by both sides with more money"'137 and calls on "[d]onors ... to
increase their assistance levels" further.1
38
133. By way of example, according to one study, the Palestinian Authority could
require up to $7.7 billion to build an internal security infrastructure over its first decade.
See Editorial, Rand.- Palestinian State Will Need Crack, $7.7 Billion Security System,
WORLD TRIB., May 9, 2005, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2005/
me_palestinians05 09.html.
134. WORLD BANK GROUP, DISENGAGEMENT, THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AND THE
SETTLEMENTS 5 (2004), available at http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/
Attachments/Disengagement+Paper/$File/Disengagement+Paper.pdf.
135. WORLD BANK GROUP, THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ITS
RECOVERY: ECONOMIC MONITORING REPORT TO THE AD Hoc LIAISON COMMITTEE 22
(2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Data/
20751555/EMR.pdf.
136. Id. at 1,4.
137. ld. at 2.
138. Id. at 5.
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The creation of a de jure Palestinian state, with recognition by
Israel, the United States, and others, will almost certainly require a
permanent resolution to the Palestinian and Jewish refugee problems.
Otherwise, the grievances that have made peace between Israel and
Palestinians in the Middle East so illusive will continue to hamper true
reconciliation. The Palestinian refugees, and their descendants, who fled
Israel or the territory that became Israel in the 1947-48 period must
abandon their right of return. It matters little whether international law
supports such a right of return 139 or the exact circumstances of the
exodus. Some small number of refugees may be allowed to reunite with
family in Israel, but, for most, resolution will entail resettlement or
reintegration in other Arab states with compensation for property losses
within Israel, which may cost tens of billions of dollars.140  Jewish
refugees forced to flee from Arab countries after the establishment of
Israel are similarly seeking compensation for the loss of value of their
homes and businesses. 14  In the words of Julius Stone, "any rule of
international law requiring rights of return or compensation would have
to apply equally to Jewish refugees from Arab countries.'
142
If the removal option were to be exercised, the total cost of a final
settlement would necessarily increase to include the cost of evacuating
and resettling any settlements outside of Israel's negotiated borders. The
aggregate cost of removing and resettling 7,000 settlers from Gaza
exceeded $1 billion. 43 As of four years ago, one party estimated over
139. Some doubt that international law supports such a right of return. See STONE,
supra note 124, at 67-69; Ruth Lapidoth, Legal Aspects of the Palestinian Refugee
Question, JERUSALEM LETTERVIEwPOINTS, Sept. 1, 2002, at 3-4, available at
http://www.jcpa.org/jl1/vp485.htm.
140. While no exact figures have been discovered, over eight million Palestinians
claim refugee status, and UN figures show over four million refugees as of June 2004.
See Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet, Palestinian Refugees: An Overview,
http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/new_prrn/background/index.htm (last visited Aug. 8,
2006). Using the larger figure, a cost of $1,000 per refugee would exceed $8 billion;
raising the amount to $10,000, the total cost would exceed $80 billion.
141. See Am. Sephardi Fed'n, Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries,
http://www.americansephardifederation.org/sub/sources/jewish refugees.asp (last visited
Aug. 8, 2006). See generally ITAMAR LEVIN, LOCKED DOORS: THE SEIZURE OF JEWISH
PROPERTY IN ARAB COUNTRIES (Rachel Neiman, trans., 2001) (providing detailed study
of seized property).
142. STONE, supra note 124, at 67.
143. Different sources report different calculations. Compare Meirav Arlosoroff,
Billion-Shekel Culture Shock, HAARETZ, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=654026 ("The civilian cost of evacuating Gaza, the cost of
moving just 1,700 families, has already reached NIS 5 billion to NIS 6.5 billion[, or about
$1.08 to $1.4 billion]."), with Moti Bassok, Fischer: Israel's Credit Rating Could be
Raised with Stable Fiscal Responsibility, HAARETZ, Dec. 21, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=660416 ("The total civil cost
to the state of disengaging from the Gaza Strip has reached NIS 4.8 billion[, or about
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twenty billion dollars to evacuate all the settlements, 144 an amount that
would have to be adjusted to account for real estate inflation within the
pre-1967 borders of Israel. Moreover, the definition of "cost" becomes
relevant. The term as typically used in the Gaza context referred to the
cost of compensating Gaza residents for loss of housing. Necessarily,
any measure of compensation suffers from being simultaneously highly
subjective and objective. The scheme is highly subjective as politics and
availability of funds determine compensation just as much as rigorous
effort to determine the financial costs of resettlement.145 Three months
after the disengagement from Gaza, three-quarters of the evacuees were
left unemployed and a substantial number still living in tents. 146 The
scheme is highly objective in the sense that rather than an individualized
and highly particularized calculation, settlers are treated in broad
categories. While the exact number of settlers that would have to be
compensated varies depending upon which settlements would remain in
Israel, the number is usually presented as upwards of 70,000 people.
Moreover, with increased opposition to the removal of West Bank
settlements, the cost of implementation may well exceed the enforcement
expenses in evacuating the Gaza settlements.147 Inevitably, Israel would
necessarily turn to the international community, and especially the
United States, to aid with resettlement. However, at the same time, that
international community must cope with the enormous financial demands
$1.04 billion], according to Yonatan Bassi, head of the Disengagement
Administration .. "). Neither figure appears to include the full costs, including the
evacuees' lost income (most are unemployed), psychological and similar personal related
costs, and military costs of removal. All of these are considerable. The military costs
would include costs of mobilizing and devoting a sufficient number of appropriate
military personnel to handle the removal. A recent report of the cost of evacuating the
Gaza settlements estimates NIS 11 billion, or approximately $2 to $2.5 billion. See Zvi
Bar'el, Pullout Pipe Dream, HAARETZ, Mar. 26, 2006, http://www.haaretz.con/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=698427.
144. Halkin, supra note 23, at 22.
145. Arlosoroff, supra note 143.
146. Nadav Shragai, 75% of Pullout Evacuees Jobless, HAARETZ, Nov. 9, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=643163.
147. For example, costs to evacuate settlers from Amona were enormous given the
large number of protesters. Jonathan Lis, Amona Evacuation Cost NIS 7.5M, Most of It
from Money Earmarked for War on Crime, HAARETZ, Feb. 9, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=680575. In the words of
Brigadier General Ilan Paz, former head of the Israeli administration on the West Bank
and strong proponent of a peaceful, negotiated settlement:
"The evacuation of places like Kiryat Arba, Elon Moreh, Shilo and Eli would
not at all be like the Gush Katif evacuation ...." "You cannot compare the
religious and historical connection to the lands of Judea and Samaria to the
settlers' connection to Gaza. Evacuation of these ideological settlements is
liable to bring us to the brink of civil war."
Eldar, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
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of constructing a new Palestinian state and resolving the Palestinian and
Jewish refugee problems.
In sum, conditioning the creation of a Palestinian state on removal
of Jewish settlements within its borders would substantially aggravate
the calculus of the total costs of that creation. Correlatively, the fastest
and least expensive means of achieving a Palestinian state is to allow
Jewish communities to remain within its borders.
IV. Conditions Precedent for Israeli Jewish Settlements in a State of
Palestine
All other things being equal, continuance is preferable to removal
based upon considerations of principle, contiguity, cost, and final
resolution of the conflict. But are other things equal? It has been argued
that Jewish settlements stand on "Arab" land, violate international and
other law, and prevent the establishment of a viable, sovereign
Palestinian state, and that neither Jews nor Arabs would find it practical
to have Jewish settlements continue to exist in that state. These
arguments, in effect, posit several necessary conditions for Jewish
settlements to remain in Palestine: that settlements are not shown to
have been established on "Arab" land; that their establishment is not
demonstrated to be "illegal" under international law; that their presence
does not prevent the creation of a viable,, sovereign Palestinian state; and
that continuance rather than removal is a pragmatic solution.
These are necessary conditions not only because they respond to
arguments and concerns that have been voiced against Jewish settlements
on the West Bank, but also for independent good cause. The condition
that Jewish settlements not lie on land that legally belongs to another is
based upon the principle that military victory does not justify theft of
property. 48 Abstractly, at least, the condition that the creation or
continued presence of the settlements not be demonstrated to have
violated international law is premised both upon respect for that body of
law and the instrumental consideration that if actions contrary to law are
validated, one simply invites additional breaches. Exploring the legality
of Jewish settlements is quite difficult, which is why this condition has
been stated in the negative.1 49 Because the question of land ownership
148. Admittedly, this principle is often violated more in breach than observance as
evidenced by the difficulty of original owners of artwork or land in retrieving or laying
successful claim to property after the Holocaust, even in European nations that pledge
adherence to this principle.
149. The condition, as stated, asserts that Israeli settlements have not been
demonstrated to violate international law rather than claiming that Israeli settlements are
demonstratively consistent with international law. This condition is intentionally stated in
the negative because political stances underlie most legal arguments. Given the
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and use implicates questions of international law, the condition related to
land ownership is considered below as part of the overall discussion of
international law.
The condition that Israeli Jewish settlements not prevent the
creation of a viable Palestinian state is necessitated by the desirability of
the two-state solution. As explored previously, any solution other than
two states would eventually mean the cessation of Israel or, as previously
discussed, apartheid-like or forced transfer options that would negate
Israel's status as a democracy. The pragmatic condition responds to
arguments made by parties that do not necessarily accept the notion that
Jewish settlements are illegal or interfere with the creation of a viable
Palestinian state. If the continuance option is impractical, most
particularly if Jews could not live in a Palestinian state based on security
or other concerns, then the continuance option advanced in this article is
at best academic. Both the state viability condition, which deals
primarily with Palestinian interests, and the pragmatic condition, which
addresses primarily Israeli interests, question what it would mean for
Israeli Jews to live under Palestinian Arab sovereignty.
A. The Condition that Israeli Settlements Are Not Demonstrably
Illegal: Occupation, Land, and Transfer Issues
Well over one hundred scholarly works weigh in on the question of
whether Israeli settlements are "illegal."' 150 When this body of work gets
condensed in the popular press, the dominant notion concludes the
settlements are illegal, and the more popular commentators and
politicians hostile to Israel repeat this, the more it is believed. 15 1 The
task here is not to repeat or refute every scholarly argument, but it is
interesting to reflect both on the extent to which these arguments have
changed over time and the weaknesses inherent in the arguments of both
supporters and opponents of the settlements.
The arguments on both sides are well rehearsed and extraordinarily
inconclusive character of the legal arguments, other considerations, both for and against
the settlements, merit greater weight. See infra notes 458-508 and accompanying text.
150. See Peter Malanczuk, Israel: Status, Territory and Occupied Territories, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1468, 1497-1501 (Rudolf Bernhardt, ed.,
1995).
15 1. As Minow noted in reference to the persistence of belief in the Czarist forgery,
THE PROTOCOLS OF THE LEARNED ELDERS OF ZION (Victor E. Marsden, trans., Liberty
Bell Publ'ns 2004), "mere resonance and reverberation lends credibility." Martha L.
Minow, The Persistence of Falsehood and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, in FROM
THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION TO HOLOCAUST DENIAL TRIALS: CHALLENGING
THE MEDIA, THE LAW AND THE ACADEMY 47, 47 (Deborah R. Kaufman et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2006).
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heated. 152 Unfortunately, as Michael Curtis has observed, "[n]o doubt,
customary and conventional international law have often been used to
buttress tendentious political positions, and it would be unrealistic to
expect otherwise." 153 Commenting on the views of two such scholars
who have sought to support Palestinian violence, 154 Curtis characterized
their argument as "infused with an animus that exceeds the usual
boundaries of scholarly discourse while paying scant attention to the
realities of the Arab-Israeli conflict."155 Some commentators start from
such a strong position that the creation of the State of Israel is "unlawful"
or "wrongful" that their particular position with respect to Israeli
settlements on the West Bank is both predetermined and suspect. 1
56
International law based arguments concerning Israeli settlements
rest primarily upon two sources of international law: the 1907 Hague
Regulations 157 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.' In particular,
Articles 43,159 46,160 52,161 and 55162 of the Hague Regulations and
152. See, e.g., Craig Jackson, Israeli West Bank Settlements, the Reagan
Administration's Policy Toward the Middle East and International Law, 79 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 217 (1987) (quoting remarks of Francis A. Boyle, Allan Gerson, Eugene
V. Rostow, and W. Thomas Mallison from April 25-27, 1985).
153. Curtis, supra note 116, at 457.
154. Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law to
Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Inti/ada, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (1991).
155. Curtis, supra note 116, at 457.
156. See, e.g., W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (1986). The work denigrates the
concept of a "Jewish people" and the Zionist movement, see id. at 5-17, the Balfour
Declaration calling for the creation of a Jewish state in the Palestinian Mandate, see id. at
18-78, the Jewish Agency that purchased most of the land on which Jewish settlers reside
within the Green Line, see id. at 79-141, the UN resolution calling for the creation of two
states in the Palestine Mandate west of the Jordan River, see id. at 142-73, and, hence, its
"juridical analysis" of Israeli settlements is totally predictable and pre-ordained, see id. at
240-75. A similar analysis pervades the Mallisons' earlier work, "prepared and published
at the request of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People." MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 25; see Mallison, supra note
26.
157. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. While Israel is not a signatory
of the Convention, the Israeli Supreme Court held it applies to Israel as customary
international law and is enforceable as municipal law.
158. See Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention]. Although Israel signed the Convention, subject to several reservations, the
Israeli Supreme Court ruled the Knesset must adopt it as municipal law to bind Israel.
Nonetheless, the court has measured the actions of the Israeli military against the
Convention. See infra notes 429-40 and accompanying text.
159. "The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country." Hague Regulations, supra note 157, art. 43. Benvenisti
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Article 49163 of the Fourth Geneva Convention have been cited both
against and in support of the settlement activity. Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations generally obligates an occupying power to "ensure, as far as
possible, public order and [civil life], while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country";164 Article 46 bars the
confiscation of private property; Article 52 bars requisitions from
municipalities or inhabitants "except for the needs of the army of
occupation"; and Article 55 obligates the occupying power to "safeguard
the capital of... [the real estate of the hostile State], and administer
them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.' ' 165 More generally, these
provisions, along with others such as Article 23(g), 166 create a standard
uses the term "civil life," deeming it a more accurate translation of the French than the
term "safety," which has been used in English sources. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 7 & n. 1 (2004).
160. "Private property cannot be confiscated." Hague Regulations, supra note 157,
art. 46.
161. "Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or
inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation." Id. art. 52.
162. "The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary
of... real estate ... belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country.
It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with
the rules of usufruct." Id. art. 55.
163. Article 49 provides:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected
persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to
that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their
motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial
evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative
military reasons do demand. Such evacuations may not involve the
displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory
except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement.
Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as
hostilities in the area in question have ceased.
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall
ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is
provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in
satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that
members of the same family are not separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as
soon as they have taken place.
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area
particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population
or imperative military reasons so demand.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 49.
164. Hague Regulations, supra note 157, art. 43.
165. Id. art. 55.
166. Article 23(g) provides, "[I]t is especially forbidden... [t]o destroy or seize the
enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
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of "military necessity" by which to judge the actions of an occupying
army. Although the Hague Regulations do protect the inhabitants of an
occupied territory, they were primarily designed to protect the interests
of a temporarily ousted sovereign 167 in the context of a short-term
occupation:
[T]he Regulations placed emphasis on a settlement whereby
reversion of control to the ousted power, in whole or in part, would
occur. The predominant theme... was the provisional character of
occupation, wherein the ousted power retains sovereignty, his
authority being merely in a state of abeyance. Interference in the
ousted power's legislative and institutional system was thus
prohihited [sic], for fear of being inimical to the settlement
process.... To preserve the rights and authority of the ousted
sovereign, the Hague Conventions proscribed any activity on the part
of the occupant that might tend to undercut it, with changes in
existing laws and institutions being the foremost concern.
168
In contrast, the Fourth Geneva Convention is unabashedly humanitarian
law that primarily seeks to protect persons caught up in warfare and its
aftermath. Article 49 thereof generally seeks to prohibit the forced
movement or use of people; the extraordinarily negative behavioral
models primarily underlying Article 49 were the deportations and slave
labor practices of the Nazis during World War II, which had a felt
immediacy at the 1949 Geneva Conference of Delegates and the
preparatory conferences that preceded it.169  Article 49(6) specifically
necessities of war." Id. art. 23(g). Unlike Articles 43, 46, 52 and 55, which are part of
Section III of the Hague Regulations dealing with occupied territory, Article 23(g)
applies in hostilities, i.e., the warfare prior to belligerent occupancy.
167. For example, the Russian delegate Alexander Nelidow emphasized both themes
in an address to the Hague Conference and the President of the Conference:
This task... consists of two parts: on the one hand, we must endeavour to
discover a method of settling amicably differences which may arise between
States, and thus prevent ruptures and armed conflict. On the other hand, we
must endeavour to lighten the burdens of war-in case it breaks out-both as
regards the combatants and those may be indirectly affected by it.
REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 197 (James B. Scott ed.,
1917).
168. ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1978)
(footnote omitted).
169. Max Petitpierre, Head of the Swiss Federal Political Department, who presided
over and convened the first plenary session of the Conference considering the
Convention, declared, in relation to the Fourth Geneva Convention:
Most important of all, the second World War showed that the Geneva
Conventions would be incomplete if they did not also assure the protection of
civilians. It has become an imperative necessity to give such persons certain
moral and material guarantees. In 1859 it was the groans of the wounded
abandoned on the battlefield of Solferino which upset Henry Dunant. Today
another still more tragic appeal is being made to us-that of the millions of
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prohibits an occupying power from transferring or deporting its own
civilians into occupied territory.
The contentions about the illegality of the settlements usually take
one of three interrelated forms, or variants of such: (1) the settlements
are illegal because Israel illegally occupies the West Bank; (2) the
settlements are illegal because they are on "Arab" land and not justified
by military necessity under the Hague Regulations; and (3) the
settlements, as a transfer by Israel of its citizens into occupied territory,
violate Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The
corresponding contentions, by supporters of the settlements, stress the
disputed nature of the West Bank, the "military necessity" of settlements
to combat terrorism and protect Israel from an eastern attack, the
"public" or "state" lands on which settlements have been situated since
1979, the voluntary rather than forced nature of the settlement activity,
and, in general, either the inapplicability of international law to Israeli
actions on the West Bank or the conformity of Israeli actions with that
law.
Before the particulars of these conflicting arguments are explored, it
is instructive to note the uniqueness of Israel's position from both an
institutional and a temporal perspective. Although the Israeli
government's stance has vacillated with respect to whether the West
civilians who perished in the horrors of the concentration camps or died a
miserable death, even though they had taken no part in military operations.
It lies with us to give civilians the protection which has become a necessity.
This is perhaps the most important part of our mission.
2A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 10 (2005)
[hereinafter FINAL RECORD]. Even more generally, German conduct during World War II
was the negative paradigm underlying the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Revising perhaps the most prestigious international law text used in the English language
after World War II-a revision that took account of the Fourth Geneva Convention-
Hersh Lauterpacht commented:
In the part devoted to rules of warfare, the account and analysis of the new
developments are based, to a considerable extent, on the record of the violation
of the law of war by Germany and her allies and of the decisions of the various
war crimes tribunals which were called upon to adjudicate upon them.
Hersh Lauterpacht, Preface to 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, at v
(Hersh Lauterpacht, ed., Routledge 1952) (1905-06); see G.I.A.D. DRAPER, The
Historical Background and General Principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in
REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS 54, 58 (1998) ("This Civilians' Convention
was called into being by the civilized States of the community of nations as a direct result
of the experience of the Second World War. In that conflict, as we know, the civilian
population suffered in death, torture, and starvation to an extent that has never been
witnessed in the recorded history of humankind. In Auschwitz Concentration Camp
alone [4.5] million civilians died by gassing, let alone the tens of thousand who perished
there from shooting, flogging, torture, hanging, starvation, typhus and tuberculosis.");
GERALD IRVING, A. DARE DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 26, 34-35, 47-48
(1958) (reflecting influence of "Holocaust" on drafting of Fourth Geneva Convention)
[hereinafter DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS].
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Bank is "occupied territory" within the meaning of the Hague
Regulations and Geneva Convention, 17 it did in fact establish a military
administration overseeing the West Bank in accordance with the Hague
Regulations and has also asserted that its conduct with respect to the
West Bank and the Palestinians conforms to the humanitarian standards
of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In the words of Eyal Benvenisti, a
critic of Israeli settlements:
[T]his is the only occupation since World War II in which a military
power has established a distinct military government over occupied
areas in accordance with the framework of the law of occupation[,
whereas] [a]ll other modem occupants who have assumed control
over a foreign territory have rejected this body of laws as
inapplicable and irrelevant.
1 71
The temporal singularity of Israel's position is that its control over the
West Bank has continued for close to forty years. This radically differs
from a "classical" sequence of events related to occupation: belligerent
occupation is fairly quickly followed by a surrender (post-surrender
occupation), which then results in a peace agreement according to which
either the defeated sovereign regains control over the occupied territory
status quo ante or the occupying power retains some or all of the
occupied territory with the border redrawn to accommodate the
victorious nation.1 72  Most of the international law of occupation,
particularly the Hague Regulations, is premised upon this model of short-
term rather than long-term occupations,' 73 making the issue of the
170. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40, at 305-06.
171. BENVENISTI, supra note 159, at 107. Geoffrey Best, another party somewhat
critical of Israel's policies, echoes this thought:
Whatever reservations may be discerned behind the Israeli Government's
refusal to recognize the de jure applicability of the fourth Geneva convention, it
has at least acknowledged "the relevance of international legal standards" as for
instance have not, in comparable circumstances, the USSR in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, the Republic of South Africa in Namibia,
and, one might add, Indonesians in East Timor. Israel's military authorities
have allowed the [International Committee of the Red Cross] considerable
freedom of access to the occupied territories and its Supreme Court has
affirmed the applicability of the Hague Regulations. It is relevant to remark
also that the Israel Defence Forces' commitment to the three other Geneva
Conventions has never been in doubt, and that Israel has permitted an almost
unexampled latitude of comment, from within its armed forces as well as from
without, on the compatibility of their operations with their legal and ethical
obligations.
GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 316 (reprint ed. 1997).
172. GERSON, supra note 168, at 20-21.
173. Benvenisti explores the tension between a body of law primarily directed
towards short-term contexts and the needs of the people of occupied territory in longer
term occupations. See generally BENVENISTI, supra note 159, at 7-31. But even the
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applicability of international law to Israel's occupation of, or control
over, the West Bank somewhat especial. 74 In short, there is scant
precedent in discussing the legal issues.
1. The "Occupation" Issue: Israel's Legal Status on the West
Bank
The claim has frequently been made that Israeli settlements on the
West Bank are illegal because Israel's occupation of the West Bank is
illegal. 75  Such reasoning perhaps falsely equates the two: Israeli
settlements on the West Bank might be illegal even if Israel's occupation
accords with international law; conversely, Jewish settlements on the
West Bank theoretically could be quite legal even if Israel's occupation
were illegal. Nonetheless, enough of a connection between occupation
and settlements has been drawn to merit review of the differing views
regarding the legality of Israel's control over the West Bank, including
the legality of its initial occupation, the legality of its continuing
occupation, and the implications of those questions on the legality and
status of Israeli settlements.
a. "Disputed" or "Occupied": The terminological debate
Initially, one might differentiate, however subtly, between a people
under occupation and a territory under occupation. From one
perspective, all people not in control over the governing authority who
reject the legitimacy of that authority might be considered occupied. So,
for example, many Sunnis in present day Iraq might well consider
themselves occupied, in the sense they both do not control the authority
that governs them and reject that government. The Palestinians similarly
and rightly feel they are occupied by a power in whose government,
army, and society they do not participate. To what extent can we also
say that the West Bank is occupied territory in a legal sense?
This question of whether Israel is "occupying" Palestinian territory
in a legal sense has been debated as long as Israel has had control over
the territory. One cited problem is that "occupation" of a territory
implies "the effective control of a power.., over a territory to which that
power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that
Fourth Geneva Convention has been described as premised on an occupation of "limited
and temporary" nature. See DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS, supra note 169, at
39.
174. BEST, supra note 171, at 316.
175. See, e.g., Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas Mallison, The Central Role of Law in
the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in UN DwV. FOR PALESTINIAN
RIGHTS, QUESTION OF PALESTINE: LEGAL ASPECTS 87, 87-100 (1992).
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territory.' 7 6  The question then arises: what is the "sovereignty" that
Israel's control over the West Bank cannot negate? Jordan occupied the
West Bank in 1948, contrary to a UN General Assembly resolution that
called for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish state in
the territory west of the Jordan River. 77 Further, its annexation of the
West Bank was never internationally recognized, except by Pakistan and
Great Britain.
In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Yehuda Blum, an international
law scholar later to become Israel's ambassador to the UN, argued that
since Transjordan had attacked and occupied the West Bank in an
aggressive rather than defensive war, it lacked even the status of a
"belligerent occupant"'' 78 with the rights to control the West Bank
according to the standards of belligerent occupancy, including the power
to regulate it according to military necessity. At best, Jordan was a
"belligerent occupant," but "her rights could not amount to those of a
legitimate sovereign ... [a] conclusion which is of decisive legal
significance as regards the nature and scope of the present rights of Israel
over these territories." 179 Because Jordan could not be considered the
sovereign, according to Blum, he described the West Bank as having a
"missing reversioner." Because Jordan had no sovereign right over the
West Bank, Israel cannot be said to have occupied Jordanian land.
Moreover, in Blum's view:
[Because the] assumption of the concurrent existence, in respect of
the same territory, of both an ousted legitimate sovereign and a
belligerent occupant lies at the root of all those rules of international
law.... [T]hose rules of belligerent occupation directed to
safeguarding that sovereign's reversionary rights ha[d] no application
[to the West Bank].180
In any event, Jordan renounced any claim to the West Bank on July 31,
176. BENVENISTI, supra note 159, at 4. Indeed, "[t]he foundation upon which the
entire law of occupation is based is the principle of inalienability of sovereignty through
the actual or threatened use of force." Id. at 5. While the Hague Regulations state,
"Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army," Hague Regulations, supra note 157, art. 42, Article 42 is the first article in
Section III entitled, "Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State." Id.
(emphasis added).
177. See G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181 (Nov. 29, 1947), available at
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/7f0af2bd89
7689b785256c330061 d253 !OpenDocument.
178. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea
and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279, 292 (1968).
179. Id. at 293.
180. Id.; see Curtis, supra note 116, at 463-65; Robbie Sabel, The International Court
of Justice Decision on the Separation Barrier and the Green Line, 38 ISR. L. REV. 316,
318 (2005).
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1988. 181
Picking up on Blum's analysis, well prior to Jordan's
relinquishment of any claim to the West Bank, Eugene Rostow, former
Dean of Yale Law School and Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs in 1967 during the Six-Day War, considered the West Bank
"unallocated territory."' 8 2  Once part of Ottoman Empire and placed
under the trusteeship of the British, the West Bank, in Rostow's view,
was still under the trust mandate sanctioned by the League of Nations
continued by Article 80 of the UN Charter. From this vantage point,
Israel, rather than simply "a belligerent occupant," had the status of a
"claimant to the territory." He concluded, "Jews have a right to settle in
it under the Mandate," a right he declared to be "unchallengeable as a
matter of law."' 
83
In accord with these views, the Israeli government historically was
careful to characterize the West Bank as "disputed territory.' ' 184 Many
advocates of Israeli settlements still use that term, 185 while other Israeli
Jews, many of whom perceive of the West Bank in religious terms, use
language indicating an even greater right to Jewish possession of the
land. In the eyes of the latter, all of the West Bank "belongs" to Israel,
thereby equating Eretz Yisrael with Medinat Yisrael.186  With greater
widespread recognition of the threat that eventual sovereignty over the
West Bank posed to Israel's status as a Jewish state, the "Greater Israel"
movement lost much of its former following, and, today, most Israelis
accept the necessity of a two-state solution. More recently, the Israeli
181. John Kifner, Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the P.L.O.; US. Peace
Plan in Jeopardy; Internal Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, at Al.
182. See Eugene V. Rostow, "Palestinian Self-Determination ": Possible Futures for
the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD.
147 (1979).
183. See Jackson, supra note 152, at 225 (remarks of Eugene V. Rostow); see also
Eugene V. Rostow, Resolved: Are the Settlements Legal?, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1991,
at 14.
184. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law (May
20, 2001), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/
Israeli+Settlements+and+Intemational+Law.htm ("Politically, the West Bank... is best
regarded as territory over which there are competing claims which should be resolved in
peace process negotiations. Israel has valid claims to title in this territory based not only
on its historic and religious connection to the land, and its recognized security needs, but
also on the fact that the territory was not under the sovereignty of any state and came
under Israeli control in a war of self-defense, imposed upon Israel."). Dore Gold, a
former Israeli Ambassador to the UN, has repeatedly echoed this view. See Dore Gold,
From "Occupied Territories" to "Disputed Territories," JERUSALEM LETTER/
VIEWPOINTS, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp470.html.
185. Id
186. See, e.g., Mark Rosenblit, International Law and the Jewish People's Collective
Rights of Settlement and Self-Determination in the Land of Israel,
http://www.rosenblit.com/Law.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2006).
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government has itself used the term "occupation" in a practical if not in a
legal sense.
b. Defensive occupation
Even if, for purposes of international law "occupied" is equally as,
if not more, appropriate an appellation than is "disputed" to characterize
the West Bank under Israeli control, the analysis cannot stop there. To
the extent the legality of Israeli settlement activity may depend upon the
legality of Israel's occupation of the West Bank, it bears repeating that
"occupation" in itself is not unlawful. Yoram Dinstein has articulated
why:
Some Arabs claim that belligerent occupation, as such, is intrinsically
unlawful. But this is a spurious contention. In every war which is
not confined to a Sitzkrieg, armies are on the move. When the
situation stabilizes, the zones between the frontiers and the frontlines
are subjected to belligerent occupation. While belligerent occupation
does not transfer title (sovereignty), it does mean that the occupying
Power has a temporary right of possession (which can continue as
long as peace is not concluded). 18 7
Moreover, international law has long recognized a distinction
between a lawful occupation, for example, occupation in self-defense,
and an unlawful occupation. From the latter, based upon the principle of
ex injuriajust non oritur, no rights can arise. 188 Conversely, annexation
of territory can result from the former and has often followed after war.
As Alan Gerson has noted:
Any other rule would impose no sanction on aggressive behavior and
thus defeat the basic quest of international law, or any law, in
distinguishing lawful from unlawful behavior. A rule or policy
requiring lawful entrants to relinquish gains in bargaining power
gained in reacting against unlawful behavior would condone
aggression and penalize defensive action.
189
c. The legality of Israel's initial occupation of the West Bank
Turning to the issue of whether Israel's initial occupation of the
West Bank was lawful, Israel acquired control over the West Bank
187. See Yoram Dinstein, The International Legal Dimensions of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON ISRAEL'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY 137, 150 (Alfred E. Kellerman, Kurt
Siehr, Talia Einhom eds., 1998).
188. GERSON, supra note 168, at 14.
189. Id. at 75.
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during the 1967 War, about which volumes have been written.' 1 Most
impartial observers acknowledge that Israel fired the "first" shot against
Egypt, but also that Israel had little choice in doing so: Nasser had
imposed a blockade on all Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and
the Straits of Tiran, ordered the UN troops and observers between the
Israeli and Egyptian borders to leave (a demand inexplicably complied
with by UN Secretary-General U Thant), and had planes fly over Israeli
bases. 191  In short, Israel fired the first shot (attacked the Egyptian
airfields), but not before Egypt signaled it was ready to attack Israel.
More importantly, Israel, through intermediaries, twice asked Jordan not
to attack Israel and join in the war. 192 Only after Jordan rejected these
pleas and attacked Israel did Israel capture the remainder of Jerusalem
(including the Jewish section of the Old City and the Western Wall,
considered the holiest site in Judaism) and the West Bank. In short,
Israel occupied the West Bank in a defensive war, and its occupation,
therefore, could not violate international law.1
93
d. The legality of Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank
Nor does it appear that Israel's control over the West Bank since the
cessation of hostilities in 1967 has been illegal. The generally accepted,
operative international legal document pertaining to this question is
Security Council Resolution 242,194 passed by the UN Security Council
190. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. OREN, SIx DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST (2002).
191. Seeid. at 61-126.
192. See Arye Naor, The Six-Day War and Its Aftermath: A Case for Professionalism
in Policy Planning, in PUBLIC POLICY IN ISRAEL: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 109, 114-
15 (Dani Korn ed., 2002) ("On the day before the war broke out (6.4.67) Dayan gave the
General Staff permission to plan only the conquest of Latrun, which was not to be
implemented if the Jordanians did not enter the war. Two messages were sent to Jordan's
King Hussein on the first day of war, warning him not to get involved and promising him
no harm if he stayed out of the hostilities which Israel blamed on Egypt. The Jordanians
responded with artillery fire on civilian and military targets, including Jerusalem and Tel
Aviv.").
193. See, e.g., Ruth Lapidoth, Security Council Resolution 242 at Twenty Five, 26
ISR. L. REV. 295, 303 (1992) ("[I]t is generally recognized that occupation resulting from
a lawful use of force, i.e. from an act of self-defence, is legitimate.").
194. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967); see Lapidoth, supra note
193 (discussing drafting history and intent of Resolution 242). Failure to refer to
Security Council Resolution 242 is one of several gaps in a recent attempt to argue the
illegality of Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank. See Orna Ben-Naftali,
Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 551 (2006). The authors measure the
legality of occupation by three basic propositions: (1) occupation does not equate with
sovereignty or title; (2) an occupying power is entrusted to manage the occupied territory
"in view of the principle of self-determination," id. at 554; and (3) an occupation is
temporary. See id. at 554-55. The first proposition is generally unobjectionable, but it is
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in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 War, later supplemented by
Resolution 338 passed during the 1973 War.' 95  While various
resolutions were considered by the Security Council, only the
compromise British draft was voted upon, and it was adopted
unanimously. 196  Its English version called for Israel, in return for
"[t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace
a non sequitur to infer illegality of occupation from lack of title. The second proposition
as to trusteeship makes a huge leap. Recognizing that the absent former sovereign was
the intended beneficiary under the Hague Regulations, and acknowledging that Jordan's
own sovereignty was suspect, the authors attempt to reformulate the trusteeship as one
enabling the native population to exercise its right of self-determination. See id. at 563-
67. But the leap fails because Israel is not a signatory to the primary legal support
adduced by the authors, namely the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Fourth Geneva
Convention. See id at 566. The third proposition is objectionable inasmuch as the
authors' argue "temporary" means "reasonable time" and, ipso facto, because Israel's
occupation of the West Bank has been lengthy, a reasonable time has passed. The
authors dismiss judging the legality of occupation by its defensive nature or the failure of
Arab States or the Palestinian Authority to conclude peace with Israel. See Ben-Naftali et
al., supra, at 570-73. While automatically terming Israel's occupation of Palestine
unreasonable, the authors do not seriously engage the security factors underlying it, and,
in effect, try to cast the causal arrow back towards Israel with respect to events like the
intifada. See id. at 591. However, this distorts a history of continued refusal by Arab
nations and Palestinians to make peace with Israel. Their proposal to replace Israeli with
international forces is hardly realistic in light of the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from
Sinai, one of the precipitating events of the 1967 war, the failure of international forces in
Bosnia, and the present failure of a regional peace force in Darfur. See id at 613. The
experience of Israel's withdrawal from Gaza has not been positive; similarly rocket fire
from the West Bank, given the small width of Israel's waistline in the densely populated
area north of Tel Aviv, might well result in numerous casualties. In no way should the
right to, or importance of, self-determination be denigrated, but the path to Palestinian
self-determination lies in a realistic peace between Israel and the Palestinians (and, for
that matter, other Arab states), rather than the imposition of another international force.
Applying their construct specifically to the settlements, the authors largely rely upon and
repeat the arguments made by other authorities, e.g., B'Tselem and Raja Shehadeh with
respect to land issues. See sources cited infra notes 265-83 and accompanying text
(responding to these arguments). They do have a telling point in elaborating how, under
occupation, Israeli settlers and Palestinian residents largely live under different legal
regimes. See Ben-Naftali et al., supra, at 583-85. One would not expect Israel to
enforce, for example, Jordanian or Palestinian Authority law that declares it a capital
offense to sell land to Jews. See infra text accompanying note 210. As to voting, Israelis
vote in Israeli elections and Palestinians vote in Palestinian Authority elections simply
because, otherwise, the occupation would turn into sovereignty and would expressly
violate the authors' first proposition (that occupation does not equate to sovereignty).
While the authors are rightly concerned with the status and rights of Israeli Arabs, see
Ben-Naftali et al., supra, at 611 n.336, they are strangely antagonistic to the presence of a
much smaller Jewish minority in territory that undoubtedly will become part of a
Palestinian state. The exercise of the Palestinian right of self-determination need not
equate to an exclusion of Jewish communities from that state.
195. S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973).
196. Lapidoth, supra note 193, at 297.
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within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force," to withdraw from "territories" captured in the 1967 War. 97
Parties who participated in drafting Resolution 242 have testified to the
significance and intentionality of the omission of the article "the" prior to
"territories" from the English text, thereby signifying Israel's right to
insist on border adjustments in the context of a peace settlement with the
Arab nations. 98  Israel, of course, has always advanced this
interpretation, while Arab nations and Palestinians have always
disagreed. As Ruth Lapidoth reports:
Israel's interpretation is based [not only] on the plain meaning of the
English text of the withdrawal clause which was the draft presented
by the British delegation[, but also] the fact that proposals to add the
words "all" or "the" before "territories" were rejected; and on the
idea that in interpreting the withdrawal clause one has to take into
consideration the other provisions of the Resolution, including the
one on the establishment of "secure and recognized boundaries."
Even if Resolution 242 did not contemplate border changes, Israel
was not required to withdraw prior to termination of all states of
belligerency against it. Rather than pursuing peace, Arab leaders
convened a summit conference in Khartoum, and, reacting to their defeat
in the 1967 War and the resultant UN Security Council Resolution 242,
restated that there would be no negotiations, recognition, or peace with
Israel.2 °° Moreover, after Jordan relinquished its claim to sovereignty
197. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 194.
198. See Rostow, supra note 183, at 14. Rostow helped draft and negotiate the text of
Resolution 242. He writes:
Resolution 242, which as undersecretary of state for political affairs between
1966 and 1969 I helped produce, calls on the parties to make peace and allows
Israel to administer the territories it occupied in 1967 until "a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East" is achieved. When such a peace is made, Israel is
required to withdraw its armed forces "from territories" it occupied during the
Six-Day War-not from "the" territories, nor from "all" the territories....
Five-and-a-half months of vehement public diplomacy in 1967 made it
perfectly clear what the missing definite article in Resolution 242 means.
Ingeniously drafted resolutions calling for withdrawal from "all" the territories
were defeated....
Id. Arthur Goldberg, the U.S. Representative to the UN echoed this interpretation, see
Arthur J. Goldberg, United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and the Prospects
for Peace in the Middle East, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 187, 190-91 (1973), as did
Lord Caradon, the UK ambassador to the UN, see Lapidoth, supra note 193, at 307-10;
Wash. Inst. for Near E. Policy, supra note 65. Specifically, a return to the 1949 armistice
lines was not called for because "it was felt that a return to those lines would not
guarantee peace in the area as the 1957 precedent had proven." Lapidoth, supra note
193, at 296 (refers to withdrawal of Israel from Sinai Peninsula in 1957 in return for
guarantees of safe shipping through Suez Canal).
199. Id. at 307.
200. See The Khartoum Resolutions, Sept. 1, 1967, available at Isr. Ministry of
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over the West Bank, no legal entity existed with whom Israel could
negotiate a withdrawal until 1993 when Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Accords,201 establishing the
Palestinian National Authority.
Later interim accords between Israel and the Palestinian Authority
led to greater degrees of Palestinian self-government and control over the
West Bank2 2 -with the exception of Israeli settlements and external
border controls-until the breakdown of the prolonged negotiations in
2000 between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, first at Camp David
and then at Taba. The breakdown was followed by the second
Palestinian intifada and the renewal of Israeli military control over West
Bank population centers. Most observers have placed the onus for that
breakdown on the Palestinian Authority and its then head, Yasir
Arafat.20 3 While Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza 2°4 and, prior to
Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.i/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the
%20Peace%20Process/The%20Khartoum%20Resolutions.
201. See Oslo Accords, supra note 13.
202. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-
Palestinian Liberation Organization, 33 I.L.M. 622; Agreement on the Preparatory
Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29, 1994, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 34
I.L.M. 455; Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron,
January 21, 1997, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 547; Agreement on
the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron, January 21, 1997, Isr.-
Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 547;Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M.
551 [hereinafter Interim Agreement]; Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron,
Jan. 21, 1997, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 650; The Wye River
Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998; Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 37 I.L.M. 1251;
Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron, May 9, 1996,
available at Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/
CE8DE4D5-C645-418F-AE5D-IC7C079B42A5.htm; Final Statement, William Clinton
& Hosni Mubarak, Summit Of Peacemakers: Sharm el-Sheikh (Mar. 13, 1996),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Summnit+of+P
eacemakers+-+Sharm+el-Sheikh-+March+ 1 3-.htm.
203. See, e.g., BILL CLINTON, MY LiFE 937-38, 943-45 (2004) ("Arafat's rejection of
my proposal after Barak accepted it was an error of historic proportions."); see also Ross,
supra note 55, at 753-58 ("Barak says yes; Arafat Equivocates."); SHLOMo BEN-AMI,
SCARS OF WAR, WOUNDS OF PEACE: THE ISRAELI-ARAB TRAGEDY 270-77 (2006). But see
Malley & Agha, supra note 122. Malley and Agha's revisionism was followed by
interchanges with Dennis Ross and Gidi Grinstein, writing separate letters, see Ross &
Grinstein, supra note 120, at 90-91, and Benny Morris and Ehud Barak, see Morris,
supra note 65, at 42-45; Benny Morris & Ehud Barak, Camp David and After-
Continued, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 27, 2002, at 47, 47-49. Yet, Malley and Agha
stress the perceived flawed process of the negotiations rather than the substance. They
concede:
If there is one issue that Israelis agree on, it is that Barak broke every
conceivable taboo and went as far as any Israeli prime minister had gone or
could go.
[T]he Palestinians' principal failing is that from the beginning of the Camp
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the Israeli-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006, a substantial
percentage of Israel's population was prepared to repeat the exercise on
the West Bank,2 °5 withdrawal from the West Bank without a peace treaty
is much more difficult. The West Bank lies contiguous for several
hundred miles to Israel's heartland, and thus Israel lacks the same option
allegedly available to other nations, for example, the United States in
Iraq, 2°6 to simply withdraw.
e. Relationship between lawful occupation and Jewish
settlements
If one is prepared to accept the fact that Israel's occupation of the
West Bank is lawful, but not the position of Blum and Rostow that
Israel's rights to the West Bank exceed that of a occupying power, how
do Israeli Jewish settlements on the West Bank fare under the Hague
Regulations? It is difficult to respond to the question for two previously
noted reasons: (1) Jordan's abrogation of sovereignty over the West
Bank; and (2) the admittedly short-term occupation envisioned by the
Hague Regulations.
Consistent with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, which calls on
the occupant to "respect[,] ... unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country, ' 20 7 Israel has for the most part continued to follow
Jordanian law on the West Bank, despite its position that Jordan illegally
occupied the West Bank. Israel's stance has been criticized as
contradictory, 20 8 but general continuance of Jordanian law by the military
administration can be justified on grounds of legal stability, long-term
reliance and equitable grounds reflected in international as well as other
law. Israel, however, has distinctly abrogated Jordanian law that
criminalized land sales to Jews as a capital offense. It is inconceivable
that any country would retain such law against its own citizens,209 any
David summit onward they were unable either to say yes to the American ideas
or to present a cogent and specific counterproposal of their own.
Malley & Agha, supra note 122, at 62.
204. This is still the subject of some debate in light of continued attacks, particularly
Qassam rockets, from Gaza. See infra note 219.
205. See Karby Leggett, Israel's Next Struggle May Be Internal: Rising Support for
Pullback From West Bank Presages Power Shift, Societal Strife, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13,
2006, at A6.
206. See, e.g., Theodore C. Sorensen & Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Op-Ed., What Would
J.F.K. Have Done?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,2005, § 4 at 13.
207. See Hague Regulations, supra note 157, art. 43.
208. Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied
Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 98 (1990).
209. As Alan Gerson points out, the language "absolutely prevented" in Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations, as well as limitations in other articles, "have been interpreted
liberally rather than literally." GERSON, supra note 168, at 8.
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more than the new State of Israel in 1948 would "give effect to the White
Paper of 1939 regarding the prohibition of land sales to Jews, and the
prohibition of Jewish immigration into the country" 210 or the American
occupation of Germany following World War II would continue to
implement the Aryan laws against the Jews.
Most Israeli settlements on the West Bank are not on land
purchased by Jews, however. While some early settlements, particularly
those in the Jordan Valley established according to the Allon Plan under
Labor-led governments, were on land requisitioned from Arab owners,
the great bulk of Jewish settlements were established after 1979 pursuant
to Israeli law on "state" or "public" lands. The development and
controversy over these lands is explored more fully in Part III.A.2.
Scholars raise two cogent arguments against the settlements on the basis
of the Hague Regulations: (1) the incompatibility of civilian settlements
with a justification based upon military necessity under Article 52 (the
requisitioning of private property); and (2) the incompatibility of
permanent civilian settlements with the obligation of an occupying
power, consistent with military necessity, to ensure the continued civil
life of the occupants of the territory under Article 43-arguably to
maintain the status quo ante-and hold real estate belonging to the
hostile state as a usufructuary 211 under Article 55 of the Hague
Regulations.212
210. Shabtai Rosenne, Revisiting Some Legal Aspects of the Transition from Mandate
to Independence: December 1947-15 May 1948, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS, supra
note 187, at 311,318.
211. "Usufruct" is a right of use; its roots extend back to Roman law. According to
Von Glahn:
In accordance with Roman law (ususfructus est jus alienis rebus utendi,
fruendi, salva rerum substantia) the occupant is obliged to respect the
substance, the capital, of the enemy public property but is entitled to its use and
to complete control over the product or proceeds arising out of the property in
question.
GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY ON THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 176-77 (1957).
212. In urging this incompatibility or inconsistency between settlements and the
occupying power's obligations under the Hague Regulations, Kretzmer, among others,
would stress the intention of the settlers to permanently settle the land and the Likud
government, which encouraged settlement in the late 1970s, rather than the observable
fact that settlements were removed from Sinai in the earlier Egyptian-Israel peace treaty
and later from Gaza as a unilateral move on Israel's part. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE
OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
88, 93 (2002). Kretzmer's stress on the settlers' intention accords with the Israeli
Supreme Court's emphasis on the settlers' intentions in Elon Moreh. See HCJ 390/79
Dwaikat v. Israel [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1; sources cited infra notes 240-54 and
accompanying text. However, in that case, the court focused upon the settlers' intention
in discussing the justification for the settlement's establishment, not the settlement's
continued existence. Moreover, once Jordan relinquished claim to the West Bank, it
became impossible to allege its public lands are "real estate belonging to a hostile state"
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Few would dispute the initial strategic relevance of the earliest
settlements established according to the Allon Plan,21 3 primarily in the
Jordan Valley. Recent instances of terrorism in Jordan and by terrorist
groups with leadership in Syria have reinforced the view that an Israeli
presence on the West Bank is still necessitated to deter terrorism and
other threats from sources to the east of Israel,214 although debate
continues about whether military bases or civilian settlements best serve
that strategic function. Elsewhere on the West Bank, perhaps the most
contentious settlements are located across and to the west of the central
mountain ridge, fairly close to Palestinian populated areas. While it has
been contended these settlements inhibit the expansion of Palestinian
communities and economic activity,21 5 it is also true settlements may
inhibit Palestinian terrorism. 216  The proximity of some of the most
contested areas to Ben Gurion International Airport and Israel's major
population centers is a subject of considerable concern.21 7  The
showering of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip, most frequently from
territory once occupied by Israeli settlements, strengthens the argument
that civilian settlements serve as a security buffer and undercuts the
theory that they play no strategic or military role.218 In the reality of
under Article 55.
213. Yigal Allon, who served as head of the Ministerial Committee on Settlements in
the later 1960s and early 1970s, prepared a strategic plan for the establishment of
settlements on the West Bank, "which the plan's proponents argued was necessary to
ensure state security." Lein, supra note 35, at 12. It was this plan that was followed
during the Labor governments that lasted until 1977. See id. at 12-13.
214. See Dore Gold & Jonathan D. Halevi, Al-Qaeda, Zarqawi, and Israel: Is There a
New Jihadi Threat Destabilizing the Eastern Front?, JERUSALEM VIEWPOINTS, Jan. 1,
2006, available at http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp538.htm. A group of Israeli defense experts
has opined, in particular, it would be dangerous for Israel to relinquish control of the
Jordan Valley. See Rafael D. Frankel, Defensible Borders Are Key to Israel's Safety,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=
1137605901492&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull; Yaakov Katz, Naveh:
Zarqawi Trying to Get Better Grip, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 22, 2006,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=l 139395468413&pagename=JPost%2FJPArti
cle%2FShowFull (Central Command Major General Yair Naveh remarks that Jordan
Valley is "strategic security asset" in fighting terrorism); Moshe Ya'alon, Former Chief
of Staff, Isr. Def. Force, The Security Implications of a Hamas-Led Palestinian Authority
(Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2444.
215. Lein, supra note 35, at 96-102.
216. See, e.g., Amir Buhbut, *71;W 17OD .j2)YR,7. w7,7 ' 71 [The Rockets Are Getting
Closer: JDF Finds Kassam in West Bank], NRG (Isr.), Feb. 22, 2006,
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/l/ART1/051/546.html.
217. See Ya'alon, supra note 214.
218. See Moshe Arens, The Wages of Unilateralism, HAARETZ, Jan. 31, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=676700 ("In August 2005,
10,000 Israelis were forcibly removed from their homes in Gush Katifli,].. . while
Kassam rocket launching sites were allowed to move into areas formally occupied by the
settlements of Elei Sinai, Nissanit, and Dugit, thus moving them into range of Ashkelon,
2006]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
terrorism, disrupting the "territorial contiguity of Palestinian
communities"2 19 has both negative and positive effects. In the absence of
terrorism and the protection of all, neither effect would be felt or
relevant.
Recent history also undermines the argument that there is an
inherent contradiction between "permanent" civilian settlements and
Israel's rights and obligations under Articles 43, 52, and 55 of the Hague
Regulations. Israel has demonstrated such settlements can be removed;
for example, it has evacuated and removed or destroyed civilian
settlements in Sinai (after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty), Gaza, and
the West Bank (during and following the Gaza withdrawal). The
question, of course, remains whether settlements should be removed. To
fully explore this question, it is necessary to inquire into whether the
settlements were established on "Arab" land.
2. The "Land" Issue: The Charge that Israeli Settlements Have
Been Illegally Placed on "Arab" Land
This commonly made and accepted charge merits deconstruction, as
it conflates and therefore masks several different possible assertions:
(1) Jewish settlements have been established by expropriating or
requisitioning,22 ° without military necessity, privately owned Arab land;
(2) settlements have been established on land belonging to specific Arab
one of Israel's larger cities."); Boaz Ganor, Don 't Be Fooled by Calm: Israel Continues
to Face Three Strategic Threats, YNET NEWS, Jan. 16, 2006, http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-3201230,00.html ("The vacuum created in the Gaza Strip after Israel's
departure and Abbas' failure have allowed global Jihad to rank up its terrorist abilities in
Gaza, and eventually they will probably do so in the West Bank as well."); Amos Harel,
Two Killed in Ninth Targeted Killing in Last Four Days, HAARETZ, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=680070 ("[T]he Israel
Defense Forces have resumed enforcing a 'no man's land' in northern Gaza that
Palestinians are not allowed to enter. This area, the site of three former Israeli
settlements, has been a favorite launch site for Qassam crews."); Aaron Lerner, Israel
Radio: Palestinians Launching Rockets from Abandoned Communities on Northern Gaza
Border, INDEP. MEDIA REV. ANALYSIS, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.imra.org.ilU
story.php3?id=27832 ("Palestinians are now exploiting the abandon Israeli communities
on the northern border of the Gaza Strip as rocket launching sites that are considerably
closer to such strategic Israeli targets as a power plant and a large fuel storage area
located south of Ashkelon.").
219. Lein, supra note 35, at 102.
220. "Expropriation" usually refers to a taking of land without compensation although
it can refer to a taking with compensation, such as eminent domain. The former clearly
violates Article 45 of the Hague Regulations as a "confiscation of private property."
Hague Regulations, supra note 157, art. 46. "Requisition," which under Article 52 of the
Hague Regulations "shall not be demanded... except for the needs of the army of
occupation," id. art. 52, retains original ownership, but involves use by the occupant for a
fee. Thus, requisition is similar to rental, except by an involuntary rather than voluntary
transaction.
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villages or communities; and/or (3) the land, while not privately owned
by individual Arabs or collectively owned by certain Arab communities,
belongs to a general Arab "polity" having rights to the land. Each of
these assertions bears exploration, both in terms of its own validity as
well as the implications flowing from each. Each is also, in large part,
dependent upon the proper characterization of the land upon which most
settlements lie.
a. Privately owned Arab land
Excluding Jewish development in East Jerusalem, 221 a few early
Jewish settlements constructed on uncultivated land specifically
requisitioned for military needs,222 and some illegal West Bank outposts
established by Israeli Jews without permission of the military
administration, 23 substantially no present Jewish settlement on the West
Bank has been established on land that Israel considers to be privately
224methaebn
owned. Further, with some exceptions, no settlements have been
established on land privately owned by Jews prior to 1948. Despite
Israel's reversal of Jordanian law barring the sale or ownership of land
221. This exclusion seems reasonable in that most realists acknowledge that Jewish
neighborhoods in Jerusalem, regardless of whether the territory is characterized as East or
West, would remain part of Israel in any final settlement. Hence, the subject matter of
this article pertains to those areas that would most probably become part of a Palestinian
juridical entity.
222. As the Israeli Supreme Court noted in Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel,
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files-eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf, requisitioning of
property differs from expropriation and does not involve a change of ownership, but
rather a change in possession:
Taking of possession is temporary. The seizure order orders its date of
termination. Taking of possession is accompanied by payment of
compensation for the damage caused. Such taking of possession-which is not
related in any way to expropriation-is permissible according to the law of
belligerent occupation.
Id. at * 10 (citations omitted).
223. See Sason, supra note 8; Yuval Yoaz, Amos Harel & Nadav Shragai, IDF and
Hebron Settlers Holding Secret Talks on Evacuation of Market Area, HAARETZ, Jan. 29,
2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.j html?itemNo=676051 (Israeli
Supreme Court turned down petition to halt evacuation of Amona, illegal settlement and
focal point of dispute between settlement activists and government). However, one
observer pled to delay the evacuation, partly on the ground that there are numerous Arab
housing projects built illegally but not torn down. See Nadav Shragai, Compromise
Building in the Outposts, HAARETZ, Jan. 29, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?iteiNo=675859. Even more recently, the Civil Administration in the
West Bank announced a plan to map the illegal outposts and implement demolition
orders against those constructed on private Arab land. See Yuval Yoaz, W. Bank
Outposts to Be Mapped, then Razed, HAARETZ, May 8, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=713258.
224. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40, at 311.
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by Jews, Israel has "de facto recognized the actions carried out by Jordan
regarding the property of Israelis." 225  Jordan, under its statutory and
administrative "trading with an enemy" corpus of law, regarded Jewish-
owned land as state land. Thus, contrary to popular opinion,
substantially all Israeli settlements established after 1979 are either on
land purchased by Jews from Arabs after 1967,226 a small minority of
settlements, or on property designated as "state land." To understand
this development requires, in turn, a review of two seminal Israeli
Supreme Court cases decided in 1979, Ayyub v. Minister of Defence,227
popularly known as the Beth-El case; and Dwaikat v. Israel,228 known as
the Elon Moreh case, and an understanding of the role of Israel's
Supreme Court in relation to the Israeli government and military.
229
The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice, 230 has
225. Id. at 304. Interestingly, even land owned by Israelis in East Jerusalem has not
been returned to the owners. According to Eyal Benvenisti and Eyal Zamir:
[S]uch practical recognition [of the Jordanian treatment of such property] is...
found in the fact that Israeli assets that were purchased or used for public
purposes during the Jordanian rule, and for which the public need did not cease
after 1967, were not returned to their owners. In these cases, the owners
received monetary compensation only.
Id. at 309. The authors relate that, after 1967, the Israeli military authorities faced a
choice: either return the property to its original owners or administer the property as the
Jordanians had. They then explore why, despite both logical and humanitarian reasons,
see id. at 311, the military authorities selected the latter alternative to continue the
Jordanian treatment of Jewish owned property on the West Bank. As a result, Jewish
owned land became public property just as Arab absentee owned land. Id. at 313. A
somewhat related question is whether Jews in the territories may rightfully settle on land
owned by Jews prior to the establishment of Israel, although the settlers do not have a
claim based upon original ownership. For instance, Jews attempted to settle in homes
owned by Jews prior to the Hebron massacre of 1929; the Israeli government considers
the settlement illegal and evicted the settlers following a court order. See Amos Harel,
Four Policemen Lightly Injured in Clash with Hebron Settlers, HAARETZ, Jan. 4, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=665699.
226. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40, at 299.
227. HCJ 606/78 Ayyub v. Minister of Def. (Beth-El) [1979] IsrSC 33(2) 113,
translated in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL
1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 371 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982) [hereinafter MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES].
228. HCJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. Israel (Elon Moreh) [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1, translated in
1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note 227, at 404; see GERSHOM
GORENBERG, THE ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE: ISRAEL AND THE BIRTH OF THE SETTLEMENTS,
1967-1977, at 281-95, 306-10, 329-38, 342-61 (2006) (describing varied attempts, some
surreptitious, of Israeli settlers to establish Elon Moreh).
229. Pnina Lahav credits two features of the Judges Law, enacted in 1953, as key
factors in the Israeli Supreme Court's independence: judicial tenure and the selection of
judges by committee, which replaced a political process with one that "emphasized...
professionalism and apolitical content of judicial decision-making. See Pnina Lahav, The
Supreme Court ofIsrael: Formative Years, 1948-1955, STUD. IN ZIONISM, Spring 1990, at
45, 55.
230. See KRETZMER, supra note 212, at 10-11 (describing dual role of Israeli Supreme
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considered claims of international law violations made against Israel and
its military to a degree unimaginable in other national courts with respect
to actions of their governments or military in armed conflict. As Eyal
Benvenisti noted, "Although the legality of occupation measures has
been examined by many national courts on various occasions, never have
these measures been scrutinized by the occupant's own judicial
system., 231  While "[t]he Act of State doctrine (in the British or
American sense), the sovereign immunity doctrine[,] ... and questions of
justiciability and standing have proved to be high hurdles for claimants
in other jurisdictions,. . . the [Israeli] Supreme Court has flatly and
consistently rejected these arguments." 232  In Beth-El, the Court
considered whether military authorities could requisition private
Court as both appellate court from district court decisions and High Court of Justice).
231. Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the Territories
Occupied in 1967, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 371, 372 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds.,
1996). Benvenisti adds: "Indeed, the [Israeli] Supreme Court's willingness to permit
judicial review of occupation measures stands in marked contrast to the attitude of the
U.S. courts, which refused to entertain claims of Panamanian citizens and firms against
the U.S. military, following the occupation of Panama in December 1989." Id. Allan
Gerson made much the same point in an earlier work when he asked the question, "Does
the occupied populace, however, have a right under international law to appeal to
domestic courts of the occupant for the purpose of questioning whether military orders
and promulgations were within the scope of the issuer's legitimate authority?" GERSON,
supra note 168, at 127. Gerson answered, "In no instance of belligerent occupation, other
than the Israeli case, is there any record of such practice." Id.
232. Benvenisti, supra note 231, at 374. Kretzmer elaborates on the Israeli Supreme
Court's assumption of jurisdiction (initially, perhaps on account of the government not
contesting such) and its bypassing questions of justiciability and standing that have
characterized courts of other nations in similar contexts. See Kretzmer, supra note 212,
at 19-25. Another opponent of the settlers, Adam Roberts, expressed somewhat similar
views, comparing Israel's position with that of other countries:
Israel deserves credit for acknowledging openly, albeit inadequately, the
relevance of international legal standards. Its position contrasts with those of
the many occupying powers in the past [forty] years that have avoided
expressing any view on the applicability of international legal agreements: such
powers have included the Soviet Union in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia
(1968) and Afghanistan (1979); and South Africa in Namibia. Israel also
deserves credit for cooperating with the International Committee of the Red
Cross, which has played an important role in the occupied territories by
performing a wide range of tasks, including, in particular, monitoring
conditions of detention.
Roberts, supra note 208, at 63 (footnote omitted). The Israeli Supreme Court seems
destined to rule upon the Israeli military's targeted assassination of terrorists where the
Palestinian Authority refuses to assist in arrests. See Ze'ev Segal, Targeting the High
Court, HAARETZ, Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=656512. On the other hand, like the United States Supreme Court,
the Israeli Supreme Court will not decide a case in the absence of a concrete dispute. For
this reason, a three-judge panel of the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of
Justice, refused to hear a general political challenge to civilian settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza. See HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Israel [1992] IsrSC 47(4) 210.
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property 233 for a civilian settlement upon proof of military necessity.
Elon Moreh more deeply explored the definition of military necessity
and effectively precluded further requisitioning of Palestinian privately-
held land for civilian settlements without regard to military necessity.
Beth-El involved two joined cases in which Palestinian petitioners
sought relief for lands that had been requisitioned by the military for the
use of civilian settlements. In Beth-El, the owners neither resided on nor
cultivated the land, while in the other, Beka'ot, the petitioners had
cultivated the land. In both cases, the petitioners challenged the
consistency of justifying the requisition of land on grounds of military
necessity for use as civilian settlements. They also challenged more
generally the legality of such requisitioning under international law.
Writing the court's majority opinion, Justice Witkon rejected the
contention that use of land for civilian settlement is necessarily
contradictory to its taking based upon military necessity. He stressed the
strategic location of the settlements, 234 the threat of terrorism, the
reservist nature of the Israeli Army, and the reluctance of the court to
substitute its judgment for that of the military, even if the latter's views
corresponded to those of a civilian government that favored Jewish
settlement on the West Bank.
Turning to the claim of international law violations, Justice Witkon
affirmed the template that was, with some later modifications
(particularly, during the presidency of Aharon Barak), used by the Israeli
Supreme Court in later cases: Article 49(6) of the Geneva Convention
does not reflect customary international law (although the court did not
dispute the possible customary status of certain other provisions of the
Geneva Convention) and as "a conventional provision[,] ... the
petitioners... [could not] rely on it ' 235 before the court; but the Hague
Regulations, having become customary international law, could be used
by the petitioners. Turning to Article 52 of the Hague Regulations,
which specifically sustains requisition for "the needs of the army of
occupation, ' '236 Witkon considered the divergent interpretations of the
233. See supra note 220 (explaining distinction between expropriation and
requisition).
234. The court, for example, relied upon the affidavit of Major-General Avraham
Orly:
[Beth-El] camp is situated in a place of great importance from a security point
of view. This is evidenced by the fact that it was previously a Jordanian camp.
The settlement itself is on an elevation commanding the vitally important
junction of the longitudinal Jerusalem-Nablus route and the transverse route
from the Coastal Plain to Jericho and the Jordan Valley.
1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note 227, at 385 (quoting HCJ
606/78 Ayyub v. Minister of Def. (Beth-El) [1979] IsrSC 33(2) 113).
235. Id. at 388 (Landau, D.P., concurring).
236. Hague Regulations, supra note 157, art. 52.
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standard, whether quite narrow as alleged by the petitioners, or more
expansive as alleged by the Israeli government. The court accepted the
government's interpretation of Article 52 for much the same reason it
decided military necessity would an acceptable ground for the
settlements (i.e., protection from terrorist attacks and the like). 23
7
It should be noted that one argument advanced by counsel for the
petitioners has been used by subsequent critics of Israeli settlements:
"[H]ow a permanent settlement can be established on land requisitioned
only for temporary use., 238 To this Witkon responded, "This occupation
can itself come to an end some day as a result of international
negotiations leading to a new arrangement which will take effect under
international law and determine the fate of ... settlements existing in the
Administered Territories., 239 This argument would have attained much
greater importance over the years were it not for Elon Moreh.
In that case, the military government had requisitioned 700 dunams
of land for a civilian settlement within the borders of the Rujeib village,
located close to Nablus and approximately 2 kilometers from the
Jerusalem-Nablus Road. Although the land requisitioned for the
settlement was uncultivated, 17 Arabs who owned 125 dunams of the
land successfully challenged the action before the Israeli Supreme
Court.2 40  Elon Moreh can be analyzed on several different levels,
including the facts of the case (especially those that distinguish it from
Beth-E1), the tenor of the justices' opinions, the reasoning employed,
and, most importantly, its enormous effect on the building of future
settlements. The case produced three different opinions, the majority
written by Deputy President Justice Landau (in which two other justices
concurred) and separate concurring opinions by Justices Witkon and
Bekhor.
The opinions painted a rather negative picture of the settlers and
their actions. Landau's opinion was highly critical of the speed that the
237. Ironically, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza has strengthened the argument that
settlements serve as a security buffer. Recently, Palestinian rockets fired from the
premises of former Israeli settlements have reached the outskirts of Ashkelon, a major
Israeli city. See sources cited supra note 218.
238. 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note 227, at 392 (quoting
Ayyub, [1979] IsrSC 33(2) 113).
239. Id. Justice Ben-Porat opined "the word 'permanent' must be taken in a relative
sense," stressing the continuing state of emergency that Israel had found itself for its first
thirty years. Id. at 396 (Ben-Porat, J., concurring).
240. Technically, the landowners petitioned the court for an order nisi against the
Government of Israel, the Minister of Defense, the Military Commander of the West
Bank, and the Military Sub-Commander of the Nablus Sub-District to show cause why
the requisition orders should not be declared void and why the equipment and structures
on the land should not be removed. An interim order was issued, which, as a result of the
court's judgment, became absolute.
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requisition and initial construction occurred and the impropriety of the
military governor having given notice to the village mukhtar rather than
the actual landowners-steps that created "the impression.., that the
occupation of the land was organized as a military operation by
employing an element of surprise and in order to forestall the 'danger' of
intervention by th[e] [c]ourt on an application by the landowners before
work began in the area.",24 1 Witkon stated he "d[id] not wish to refer to
incidents.., in which members of Gush Emunim (among them the
settlers before us) were shown to be people who do not accept the
authority of the Army and do not even hesitate to give violent expression
to their opposition,, 242 but, of course, he did precisely the opposite by
mentioning such. In short, the die was cast, although no justice explicitly
based his opinion upon these negative depictions of the settlers.
The government and military first tried to argue that the requisition
could be justified under a 1948 ordinance by the Provisional Council of
State "regard[ing] the State of Israel as possessing sovereignty over all of
the land of Israel (Palestine). 243 The justices rejected that position:
In dealing with the legal basis of Israeli rule in Judea and Samaria
[(the West Bank)], our concern is with legal norms which exist in fact
and not only in theory, and the basic norm upon which the structure
of Israeli rule in Judea and Samaria was erected is still today.., the
norm of military government and not the application of Israeli law
that entails Israeli sovereignty.
244
In other words, Israel's rights on the West Bank would be judged in
terms of its status as an occupier.
In accordance with the earlier Beth-El decision, each justice
accepted the applicability of the Hague Regulations, as part of customary
international law, to the actions of the Israel's Military Authority
(regardless of the legality of Jordan's occupation of the West Bank). The
court employed the standard of military necessity under Article 52 of the
Hague Regulations to adjudge the Military Authority's actions.
Distinguishing Elon Moreh from Beth-El, the court concluded the Elon
Moreh requisition primarily reflected a political response to the settlers'
desires rather than calculated military necessity. Indeed, important facts
pointed to both the lack of military necessity and to the political nature of
the decision.
241. Id. at 407 (quoting HCJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. Israel (Elon Moreh) [1980] IsrSC
34(1) 1).
242. Id. at 435 (Witkon, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See generally GORENBERG,
supra note 228.
243. 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note 227, at 417 (quoting
Dwaikat, [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1).
244. Id.
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While the Chief of General Staff claimed the settlement was
militarily required, an affidavit and other evidence indicated the Minister
of Defense had initially disagreed. 245  Further, the court noted that
"military necessity" was based upon a generalized notion of "the
importance of regional defence, 246 in wartime, rather than the
comparable justification of protection against terrorist activity offered in
Beth-El.247 Moreover, several high-ranking reserve officers opined in
affidavits that Elon Moreh would be a settlement without military value
and, if anything, would consume military resources in protecting the
settlers and settlements in a time of war.
248
The settlers did not help their own case. Unlike the settlers from
Beth-El, the settlers were permitted to file affidavits of their own, and, in
one such affidavit, a settler "explained that the members ... had settled
at Elon Moreh because of the Divine commandment to inherit the land
given to our forefathers. '" 249 Both the content of the various affidavits as
well as the history of Elon Moreh convinced the court that politics came
first and the conclusion of military necessity followed as, at best, a
secondary motivation for the settlement. 25
0
To Justice Landau, implicitly,251 and to Justice Witkon, explicitly,
252
the government bore the burden of proof on the issue of military
necessity. Without so declaring, this position seemed to have been a
procedural shift from its earlier decision in Beth-El. Justice Landau
stressed "that the military needs referred to in [Article 52 of the Hague
Regulations] cannot include, on any reasonable interpretation, national-
security needs in the broad sense, 253 that is, the broad political
245. The Minister of Defence later went along with the decision, as the Ministerial
Defence Committee, which the Prime Minister chaired, came to a positive decision on the
settlement.
246. Id. at 408.
247. Id. at 392-93 (quoting HCJ 606/78 Ayyub v. Minister of Def. (Beth-El) [1979]
IsrSC 33(2) 113 (careful location of settlements impedes terrorist activity)).
248. Id. at 409-10.
249. 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note 227, at 414 (quoting
HCJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. Israel (Elon Moreh) [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1) (emphasis added).
250. Id. at 406-14.
251. Justice Landau, after stating the facts, then asked, "Have the [Israeli authorities]
shown sufficient legal warrant for seizing the petitioners' lands?" Id. at 420 (emphasis
added).
252. As Justice Witkon expressed:
[W]e must ask ourselves who bears the burden of proof? Must the petitioners
convince us that the land was not requisitioned for the needs of the Army and
security or should we perhaps require the respondents, the security authorities,
to convince us that the requisition was needed for this purpose? I think that the
burden rests upon the respondents.
Id. at 433 (Witkon, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 422.
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perspective of the Government and settlers. And, while military
necessity could conceivably include the regional defense justification
used by the Chief of General Staff in his affidavit to the court, the
primacy of politics over military judgment in making this decision
undermined that justification. Hence, not only the government's broadly
stated "national security" rationale, but also the narrower "regional
defence" grounds proffered by the Chief of General Staff could not
justify the requisition of private property in Elon Moreh. In Justice
Landau's words:
In our legal system, the right of private property is an important legal
value protected by both civil and criminal law, and as regards the
right of an owner of land to legal protection of his property, it is
immaterial whether the land is cultivated or barren.
The principle of protecting private property applies also in the law of
war ....
To Julius Stone, the decision was remarkable in that "[p]robing of this
severity by civilian judges of the motives of this level of military and
political decision-makers of their own government is. . . rather unique
even in democratic policies. 255  Its precedent in the general law of
"belligerent occupation" "now offers the novel rider that 'military
needs,' even if attested in good faith by the highest military authorities,
will not qualify as such if it appears that historically the subjective
motive of the officials initiating the requisitioning procedure was not
predominantly military.' 256
Even more important than the court's showing of independence, its
rhetoric and the particular result regarding the initial location of the Elon
Moreh settlement was the long-term consequence of the decision.
257
Thereafter, all Israeli settlements legally258 authorized by the Israeli
254. 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note 227, at 419.
255. Julius Stone, Aspects of the Beit-El and Elon Moreh Cases, 15 ISR. L. REV. 476,
490 (1980). Stone further questioned whether it was appropriate to allow the testimony
of individuals to surmount testimony of military officers as to whether military necessity
existed. Id. at 492.
256. Id. at 490.
257. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40.
258. At times Israelis have established settlements without the authority of the
Military Government, usually in the form of mobile homes on empty hilltops. In
response to these unauthorized settlements, the Prime Minister appointed a commission,
chaired by Talya Sason, to determine the extent of and make recommendations
concerning illegal outposts. As a consequence of the Sason Report, such settlements
were supposed to be immediately dismantled. See Sason, supra note 8. It appears,
however, the great bulk of the settlements were still in existence as of December 2005.
See Dan Izenberg & Tovah Lazaroff, No Action Taken on W. Bank Outposts, Dec. 7,
2005, JERUSALEM POST, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132475697589&
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Military Administration have been constructed on lands that Israel
characterizes as state-owned or "public" land.259 This term would appear
to include uncultivated rural land not registered in the name of anyone
260
and land owned by absentee owners,261 both categories that existed under
pre-existing legal regimes, including Jordanian and Ottoman law.
Inversely, the term excludes land registered in the name of someone
other than an absentee owner (regardless of whether the land is presently
cultivated), land to which a title deed exists (even if the deed is
unregistered), 262 and land held by prescriptive use.2 63 The latter requires
continuous use of the land for a period of ten years.
As might be expected, Israel's categorization and characterization
of certain lands as "state" or "public" have provoked considerable
pagename=JPost% 2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. According to the Sason Report, a
settlement must satisfy four conditions to be considered legal under Israeli law:
First, the decision to establish a settlement must be made by the authoritative
political echelon .... [Second,] Israeli settlements shall be established only on
State land .... [Third,] a settlement shall be established only according to a
lawful designed building scheme.... [Fourth,] the bounds of jurisdiction of
such a settlement was determined in an order by the Commander of the area.
Sason, supra note 8. Because of these conditions for legality, the Sason Report defines
an illegal settlement as having one of the following characteristics: (1) established
without governmental decision; (2) established without legal planning status; (3) not
attached to existing settlements; or (4) established after the mid-i 990s. Id.
259. The term, as used by Israel since Elon Moreh, includes lands owned by absentee
owners and uncultivated rural land not registered to anyone. See Benvenisti & Zamir,
supra note 40, at 307-314, 315 n. 106. The absentee owner category includes land on the
West Bank under registered ownership to Jews prior to 1948 and held by Jordanian
authorities prior to 1967. In any event, the land most in dispute involves uncultivated
rural land not under registered ownership. Even if this characterization continues
Jordanian characterization and law on the subject, it is not to say Palestinians accept the
notion that unregistered land qualifies as "state land." See RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S
LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 26-33 (rev. ed. 1988). In addition, there have been
recent reports of fraudulent land sales from Arabs to Jewish settlers and land dealers who
transfer the land over to the Civil Administration. The custodian then converts the lands
to "state lands" and leases them back to settler associations for development. See Akiva
Eldar, There's a System for Turning Palestinian Property into Israel's State Land,
HAARETZ, Dec. 27, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=662729.
260. KRETZMER, supra note 212, at 90. Although Ottoman law required registration
for ownership, B'Tselem claims most land on the West Bank was never registered "to
preserve the collective ownership system (musha'a)[,] ... evade tax liability, and...
avoid being drafted into the Turkish army." Lein, supra note 35, at 54. During the
British Mandate period and subsequent Jordanian rule, the pace of registration picked up,
and "[bly the time Israel occupied the West Bank, regulation proceedings had been
completed for approximately one-third of the area." Id.
261. The "public" designation of land owned by absentee owners was a continuation
of the Jordanian designation. Some of this land was owned by Jews or the Jewish
Agency prior to 1948. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40, at 310-14.
262. Both of these types of land ownership would presumably come under the
designation of mulk land. Lein, supra note 35, at 51.
263. KRETZMER, supra note 212, at 90.
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controversy.2 64  Several of the most detailed critiques have been
undertaken by B'Tselem, the Israeli human rights group, which concedes
that ninety percent of the settlements have been established on what is
nominally "state" land,265 but takes issue with that designation on both
substantive and procedural grounds.
B'Tselem's principal substantive objections relate to the percentage
of West Bank land designated as "state" land and to the categorization of
such land. According to B'Tselem, approximately forty percent of the
West Bank2 6 6 has been declared to be "state" or "public" lands, a vast
expansion of the sixteen percent of West Bank land considered state or
public land while under Jordanian control. Other settlement opponents
have used percentages in the range of sixty percent,267 although even
B'Tselem's figure may be on the high side considering its inclusion of
certain Jerusalem neighborhoods in its calculations. However,
B'Tselem's concedes that the vast majority of this land is in the Jordan
Valley, which, with the primary exception of Jericho, was barely
populated by Palestinian Arabs prior to 1967 (which explains why such
land was both unregistered and uncultivated).2 68 Moreover, regardless of
the gross percentage of land designated as state or public land, according
to B'Tselem's own statistics, only approximately 5 percent of the West
Bank is within settlement "municipal boundaries" and a much, much
smaller percentage of land, 1.7 percent, is developed.269 In other words,
B'Tselem's emphasis on the large percentage of land considered "state"
or "public" on the West Bank relates more to the potential takeover of
West Bank land by Jewish settlements than to the present reality of the
actual land occupied. As B'Tselem itself concedes, there is a huge
divergence between built-up areas and municipal boundaries.27 °
264. See, e.g., Raja Shehadeh, Jewish Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, in
QUESTION OF PALESTINE, supra note 175, at 6, 7-11; Stacey Howlett, Palestinian Private
Property Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 117,
143-46 (2001); Lein, supra note 35, at 51-59; Kretzmer, supra note 212, at 90-94.
265. Lein, supra note 35, at 51.
266. Id. at 8.
267. See, e.g., Deborah Horan, The Promised Land Grab-Israel's West Bank, WASH.
MONTHLY, May 1993.
268. B'Tselem acknowledges "[t]here are no permanent Palestinian communities in
the Judean Desert and Dead Sea areas." Lein, supra note 35, at 93. Further, "a
significant proportion of land in this area was already registered as state land under the
Jordanian administration, ... [and] most of the land reserves held by Israel in the West
Bank and registered in the name of the Custodian for Government and Abandoned
Property is situated in this strip." Id. at 94.
269. Id. at 116.
270. See, e.g., id. at 101 (discussing several settlements south of Trans-Samaria
highway). One group of settlements is described as having municipal boundaries of
fourteen times the built-up area and another group as having municipal boundaries equal
to seven times the built-up area. Id.
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Of greater substantive merit is B'Tselem's claim that, while in
percentage terms the amount of public lands involved may not be large,
West Bank areas designated as public lands along the central mountain
range between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and areas
immediately east or west, where many settlements exist, lie close to
populated Palestinian centers and choke off their expansion and the use
of the land for agricultural purposes. But analysis of particular
settlements, including Ariel, one of the West Bank's largest, focuses
more upon the stultifying effect of Ariel's presence if expansion
continues to its full municipal boundaries rather than the comparatively
small presently built-up area.271 In other words, the notion of expansive
municipal boundaries only has great relevance if continued Israeli
sovereignty rather than Palestinian sovereignty is assumed.
B'Tselem also takes issue with Israel's categorization of land as
"state" or "public" lands. To lands that were considered "state" lands by
the Jordanians, according to B'Tselem, the Israeli military administration
added land owned by the Jordanian government-as property belonging
to an enemy state-and three categories of untitled land:
272
Miri land that was not farmed for at least three consecutive years, and
thus became makhlul; Miri land that had been farmed for less than ten
years (the period of limitation), so that the farmer had not yet secured
ownership; [and) land defined as mawat due to its distance from the
nearest village.
Clearly it would be unfair to declare Miri lands that have been
continuously farmed, but not yet for the full ten years, as "state" land.
271. B'Tselem states only twenty-two percent of the municipal area has been built-up
or is in the process of construction. Lein, supra note 35, at 119.
272. That is, land the ownership to which is claimed on the basis of prescriptive use.
273. Id. at 53. B'Tselem defines Miri lands as:
[T]hose situated close to places of settlement and suitable for agricultural use.
A person may secure ownership of such land by holding and working the land
for ten consecutive years. If a landowner of this type fails completely to farm
the land for three consecutive years for reasons other than those recognized by
the law (e.g., the landowner is drafted into the army, or the land lays fallow for
agricultural reasons), the land is then known as makhlul. In such a
circumstance, the sovereign may take possession of the land or transfer the
rights therein to another person. The rationale behind this provision in the
Land Law was to create an incentive ensuring that as much land as possible
was farmed, yielding agricultural produce which could then be taxed.
Id. at 52 (footnote omitted). On the other hand, Mawat land is classified as:
[L]and that is half an hour walking distance from a place of settlement, or land
where 'the loudest noise made by a person in the closest place of settlement
will not be heard.' According to the legal definition, this land should be empty
and not used by any person. In this case, the sovereign is responsible for
ensuring that no unlawful activities take place in such areas.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Yet it is unclear from B'Tselem's presentation how much of the "state"
land consists of Miri lands and which, if any, Jewish settlements were
actually established on that land.274
B'Tselem's procedural objections to the notion of "state" or
"public" land on which all settlements have been established since 1979
are deserving of serious attention. 275  B'Tselem claims that, because
most land was not registered under the Ottoman Empire for reasons such
as tax avoidance, it was held according to prescriptive use. Yet,
according to B'Tselem, parties who might have been affected by the
designation of land as "public" were frequently not directly notified of
such designation. While village mukhtars, appointed by the military
government, were notified, they in turn failed to notify the affected land
"owners," who first discovered the designation when settlement building
had begun.276 Theoretically, an appeals process existed, but the land
claimants often learned of the designation of their property as "state"
land too late to appeal the designation. Moreover, regardless of when the
affected Palestinians heard about the designation, their only source of
contesting the designation was a Board of Appeals established by the
military administration, which granted relief in only a small percentage
of cases. The burden of proof lay on the petitioners and was difficult to
overcome given that Israeli authorities took periodic aerial photographs
searching as to whether the land was in fact being used for farming.
2 77
With respect to West Bank property that was registered, but owned by
someone mistakenly classified as an absentee owner, B'Tselem asserts a
similar failure in the notice process. It cites one instance in which the
appeals committee refused to undo the transaction that allowed for a
settlement to be built on the ground that the faulty conclusion that the
land had been abandoned was made in "good faith. 278  In addition,
B'Tselem claims, the presence of the military court of appeals actually
274. David Kretzmer, who is critical of Israeli governmental policy concerning
settlements (as part of a larger criticism of Israeli actions on the West Bank), likewise
argues since only about a third of the land on the West Bank was registered prior to 1967,
unregistered lands are not necessarily state lands. However, he also cites a government
attorney, who estimated that approximately forty percent of the West Bank land could be
characterized as "state land." Thus, while Palestinians may hold deeds for some of the
unregistered land that is classified as private by Israel, that category or designation would
seem clearly to include substantial areas where ownership has been accepted or proved
on the basis of "prescriptive use." At least some of Kretzmer's criticism, then, focuses on
the means by which Palestinians must prove "prescriptive use" and the appeals
committee before whom such proof has to be made. See KRETZMER, supra note 212, at
90-91.
275. Kretzmer echoes these procedural objections. See id. at 91-94.
276. Lein, supra note 35, at 55.
277. Id. at 56.
278. Id. at 59.
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precluded, in most instances, Palestinian appeals to the Israeli Supreme
Court because, in theory, another procedural recourse existed.
These are, of course, allegations. B'Tselem seems to say that the
military administration, by using aerial photographs, had an unfair
advantage over those contesting land ownership, but it is unclear why use
of technology should prejudice the purported landowner. B'Tselem also
concedes that many prospective claimants had discontinued use of
unregistered land because of high wages in the Israeli labor market,
which made working in that market more favorable than continuing to
farm.2 7 9 This argument, in any event, relates more to the political and
economic relationship between a prospective Palestinian state and Israel
rather than the genuineness of an ownership claim based upon
prescriptive use. It is difficult to jump to the conclusion that a settlement
falls on private land, claimed on the basis of alleged use which was
discontinued by choice on the part of the purported owner.
280
Nonetheless, B'Tselem's core accusation that many land claimants
were denied notice or failed to contest the designation of land because of
the biased, or perceived biased, nature of the tribunal remains a serious
allegation. Even if recourse was never sought from the Board of
Appeals, landowners should still have the opportunity to prove their
claims. If such a claim is established, two resolutions are possible,
consistent with the theme of this Article. Where substantial construction
on land has not yet occurred (that is, the land is in effect "reserved" for a
particular settlement), the condition that no private Arab land has been
taken for the settlement will not have been established, and the particular
land should revert to its Palestinian owner, with damages for the period
in which the Palestinian owner was unable to use the land. If there is
substantial settlement construction on that land with conflicting claims of
settlers who relied upon the characterization of the land as "state" land,
rightful Palestinian claimants should be granted restitutionary relief that
would include a monetary amount representing lease payments equal to
what they would have received had the land been requisitioned rather
than mistakenly designated as "state" land, with appropriate interest
thereon from the date those lease payments would have been made, as
well as damages equal to the present value of the property (rather than
the value as of the date of the false designation).
Settlements falling into two other categories would, as well, not
279. Id. at 56-57.
280. Significantly, as Von Glahn points out, "[T]he Hague Regulations do not define
state property or supply a test of state ownership," and the "[g]eneral practice among
modem occupants indicates that if doubt exists concerning the nature of the ownership of
property, it is held to be publicly owned until and unless private ownership is
established." VON GLAHN, supra note 211, at 179.
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meet the condition that a settlement must not have been established on
Palestinian owned land. Certain outposts, mostly hilltop caravans, have
been set up without the approval of the Israeli government; some of these
were later abandoned and then reoccupied. These settlements are
considered illegal under Israeli law. Several years ago, the Israeli
government appointed Talya Sason, an attorney, to investigate this
phenomenon. Her investigation revealed at least 105 of these illegal
outposts. Of these, to the extent that Sason was able to establish the legal
status of the land on which the outposts sit, twenty-six are located on
state land, seven are located on survey land, and fifteen located on
Palestinian private property. Thirty-nine are located on "mixed" lands,
that is, land that is part state, part survey, and partly owned by
Palestinians. 281 These outposts, almost all of which were established in
the 1990s, are supposed to be dismantled, although only several have
been thus far.282 A majority of these outposts fail the condition that a
settlement must not be established on Palestinian private property and
hence should not continue in a future Palestinian state.283
Another group of settlements that may illegally reside on
Palestinian land are those which were constructed on fraudulently
acquired land.284 One recent allegation by B'Tselem,285 for instance,
281. See Sason, supra note 8. "Survey land" refers to land that has gone through a
survey land procedure for the settlement. In some cases, these procedures were
accomplished without regard to whether the settlements were otherwise legally
established. Id. at 14.
282. See, e.g., Aluf Benn, Amos Harel & Yuval Yoaz, AG Mazuz to Security Forces:
Enforce Rule of Law on Settlers, HAARETZ, Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=671976 (describing Olmert's call for defense establishment
to formulate plan to evacuate twenty illegal outposts and negative reaction of settler
leaders); Myre, supra note 24 ("Under Mr. Sharon, the Israeli government removed a few
outposts, but most remained."); Nadav Shragai, Yuval Yoaz & Akiva Eldar, Government
Official: Illegal Outpost to Go No Matter What, HAARETZ, Jan. 12, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=669054 (describing
difficulties in dismantling Neveh Daniel North and Amona outposts).
283. Prior to the last Israeli election, Amir Peretz, chair of the Labor Party, announced
that a condition for joining a coalition government would be the dismantling of all illegal
settlements. See Lilach Weissman, Labor Will Only Join Gov't That Pledges to Quit All
105 Illegal West Bank Outposts, HAARETZ, Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=691823. On the other hand, there has been some suggestion
a Kadima led government might ex post authorize certain settlements (i.e., "legalize"
them under Israeli law) provided "that they were built on state land and not private Arab
property,... fall within... [an existing legal settlement's] master plan[,] and are in areas
which Israel intends to keep" in any final settlement or unilateral border decisions. Herb
Keinon & Yaakov Katz, Exclusive: Gov't May OK Illegal Outposts, JERUSALEM POST,
Mar. 21, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/2FJPArticle%
2FShowFull&cid=1 139395644062.
284. Lein, supra note 35, at 63. Allegedly, one reason for the lack of visibility is that,
because a sale of land to Israeli Jews is considered an act of treason punishable by death,
the Israeli military authority issued an order extending the period for an irrevocable
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relates to new construction in the Modi'in Illit settlement on land within
the territory of the Palestinian village of Bil'in. Supposedly, a
Palestinian father sold land to his son who in turn sold it to the Society of
the Foundation. The latter then transferred the land in trust to the Israeli
administration, which, after converting the land to "state" land, leased
the land back to the settlers' building concern.286 Both the Palestinian
father and son have died,287 and it is claimed that their signatures as well
as those of others involved were forged in this chain of events. If
proved, the leased settlement would violate the condition that it cannot
exist on Arab land. The facts of the case remain murky, including
whether the land at issue belonged to the individual Palestinian-sellers or
the village within the borders of which the land was situated. The Israeli
Supreme Court has issued a temporary injunction in the case, and the
prosecution is considering a criminal investigation.288
With the exception of these settlements, however, the vast majority
of settlements were not established on land deeded or registered to
resident Palestinian Arabs or to which they can lay claim by cultivated
use over a period of time. Critics rightly note that Arab individually
owned land has been used for public improvements such as roads.289 As
power of attorney from the five years provided by Jordanian law to fifteen years, an
extension that sought to hide the identity of Palestinian sellers. Id.
285. See Akiva Eldar, Documents Reveal Illegal West Bank Building Project,
HAARETZ, Jan. 3, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=
665425. The article, which alleges the Modi'in Illit settlement "is being built on land
belonging to the Palestinian village of Bil'in," id., is based in large part upon the research
and allegations of B'Tselem. Eldar, like B'Tselem, is a vociferous opponent of Israeli
settlements and whether the allegations turn out to be accurate remains to be proved.
Unclear in Eldar's piece is whether this was land allegedly owned by private individuals
within the village or by the village itself.
286. Id.
287. The son was apparently shot in Ramallah in 2005. Since the Palestinian
Authority considers it a capital offense to sell land to Jews, an alternative explanation
might be that the sale was in fact legitimate, but other Palestinian residents of the village
are simply now alleging otherwise.
288. See Akiva Eldar, State Mulls Criminal Probe into Illegal Settlement
Construction, HAARETZ, Jan. 8, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=667303.
289. See, e.g., HCJ 393/82 Askan v. Commander of IDF Forces, [1983] IsrSC 37(4)
785, translated in Benvenisti, supra note 231, at 396-409. The petitioners, who
constituted a cooperative society, purchased land for the purpose of a housing project.
When they applied for a housing permit, the permit was denied and part of the land was
requisitioned to construct two highways, linking two different towns in the West Bank to
Israel. Justice Barak spoke of the Hague Regulations' twin theme: the interests of the
military occupant (in this case, Israel) and the interests of the civilian population (in this
case, the Palestinians). Since a military commander must secure the continued existence
of civilian order and life under Section 43 of the Hague Regulations, and since, especially
in a long occupation not envisioned in the Hague Regulations, circumstances do not stand
still, the Israeli Supreme Court held the Commander was able to take account of changed
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long as Israel is the ultimate power in the West Bank, especially over a
forty-year period, it cannot simply neglect infrastructure improvements
that other governments routinely effect, even if private property must be
taken with compensation or requisitioned with periodic use payments for
such purpose. Every nation in the world, including the United States,29 °
takes land for such purposes. Until a final peace settlement is achieved,
road construction and other public infrastructure improvements are
theoretically both inevitable and warranted. The heart of the criticism,
however, is that most of the road work has primarily benefited the Israeli
military and settlers rather than the Arab residents and therefore cannot
be justified on the need to ensure the civil life and order of the local
populace in accord with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.29' On the
other hand, the extent of terrorist attacks on the Israeli military and
Jewish residents while traveling would tend to legitimize takings
necessary for infrastructure work on a theory of "military necessity. ' 292
circumstances in pursuing public investments, as long as a prime reason was the good of
the civilian population. In Justice Barak's words, "Fundamental investments which
might lead to permanent change that persists after termination of the military government
are permitted if they are reasonably required for the needs of the local population." Id. at
494.
290. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), where in a 5-4 decision
the Supreme Court validated New London's expropriation of homeowners' property, not
even to construct a highway or public facility, but to facilitate construction on the land by
a private developer. The majority consisted of the Court's most liberal Justices including
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. One prominent Supreme Court
observer, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky of Duke Law School, disputed the notion that
this decision was a "dramatic change in the law": "in reality the Court applied exactly the
principle that was articulated decades ago: a taking is for public use so long as the
government acts out of a reasonable belief that the taking will benefit the public." Erwin
Chemerinsky: The Supreme Court 's Decision in Kelo Is Not So Radical as Many Have
Made It Out to Be (Prac. L. Inst./All-Star Briefing), Dec. 8, 2005, available at
http://media.whatcounts.com/pli/allstar/ASB3.45.htm.
291. Kretzmer argues the party making the decision, the military government or a
panel appointed by such, can hardly have the interests of the local populace solely in
mind. In fact, he postulates "[t]he notion of 'public benefit' [the theory under which such
improvements have been sustained by the Israeli Supreme Court] is intimately connected
to political objectives and interests." KRETZMER, supra note 212, at 70. He particularly
takes aim at the court's decision to disband district planning bodies that provided input
into the central planning process under Jordanian law. District councils may have made
sense under the law of Jordan, which, in many ways, disregarded the economic
development of the West Bank in favor of Jordan's East Bank (Transjordan), but retarded
central planning in an administrative structure trying to modernize society. Nonetheless,
Kretzmer rightly points out that there should be local input in the process, although not
necessarily a veto, and the main consideration under the Hague Regulations should be the
welfare of the population in the occupied territory rather than the political needs of Israel
where the two conflict. In an occupation that has lasted this long, however, it must be
considered whether the local populace should not also include the West Bank's Jewish
residents, unless there are other grounds that make their presence on the West Bank
illegal.
292. See Benvenisti, supra note 231, at 396 (quoting Askan, [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 785).
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Moreover, while there is dispute as to whether these roads presently
benefit the Israeli military and citizens more than West Bank
Palestinians, in any peace settlement the roads would serve all residents
and substantially contribute to the economic well-being of a new
Palestinian state.
b. Land owned by Arab communities or villages
B'Tselem has also made a wider claim, to wit, that Israel has
expropriated land belonging to Arab villages, without compensation, in
order to construct Jewish settlements. For example, B'Tselem
vigorously argues that Ma'aleh Admumim, the largest Israeli settlement
on the West Bank and one several kilometers to the east of Jerusalem, is
situated on territory taken from Abu Dis, al- 'Izriyyeh, al- 'Issawiyyeh, a-
Tur, and 'Anata, Palestinian Arab villages on the outskirts of
Jerusalem. 293  But its "brief' to that effect then equivocates: "The
farmland of these villages extended from the border of Jerusalem on the
west to a'-Khan al-Ahmad, at the approach to the Dead Sea, on the east.
Ownership determined land usage, i.e., each family worked the land that
it owned., 294 Thus, it is unclear whether B'Tselem claims the land is
owned by private individuals within the identified villages or constitutes
village land owned collectively by its residents. If it is the former,
B'Tselem's argument collapses into the argument, already discussed, that
Israeli settlements have been placed on land privately owned by
Palestinians. If, instead, B'Tselem's claim is that it is village land, the
source of this claim needs to be examined.
Since the five villages identified do not have any registered title to
this expanse of land, B'Tselem tries to argue on the basis of prescriptive
use. But, while some claim is made that the villagers themselves had
used the land for grazing, the use demonstrated was by Jahalin Bedouin,
who in recent years intermittently camped and grazed their livestock on
land to the east of Jerusalem going down to the Dead Sea. But B'Tselem
strains to find a connection between Jahalin Bedouin and the Palestinian
villagers whose claim to the land B'Tselem champions: "They grazed on
village land in accordance with lease agreements (at times symbolic)
with the landowners-including landowners from the villages of Abu Dis
293. See Yuval Ginbar, On the Way to Annexation: Human Rights Violations
Resulting from the Establishment and Expansion of the Ma'aleh Adumim Settlement,
INFO. SHEET (B'Tselem, Jerusalem, Isr.), July 1999, at 3, available at
http://www.btselem.org/Download/199907_OnTheWay To AnnexationEng.doc; see
also GoRENBERG, supra note 228, at 297-98, 305-06, 309, 319, 328 (history leading to
establishment of Ma 'ale Adumim).
294. Ginbar, supra note 293, at 4 (footnote omitted).
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and al'Izariyyeh.295
In other words, only Palestinian Arab villages may be constructed
and expanded on the land because Bedouin have occasionally grazed
their flocks thereon pursuant to the implied consent of Palestinian
villagers whose right to the land (that is, the right to consent to someone
else using it) is based upon the same Bedouin use. Aside from its
circularity, B'Tselem's argument equates whatever rights Bedouin may
or may not have with the rights of sedentary Arab villages on the
outskirts of Jerusalem. Are the rights identical? Why? 2 96 Interestingly,
Bedouin do not necessarily identify themselves as Palestinian Arabs,
and, although they are surely not Israeli Jews, many Bedouin are Israeli
citizens, serve (unlike most Palestinian Arabs who are Israeli citizens) in
the Israeli army, and have been disproportionately killed by Palestinian
attacks on Israeli border patrols.
Moreover, when the expansive reach of B'Tselem's claim on behalf
of the villages (all land substantially down to the Dead Sea to the east of
Jerusalem) is considered, presumably the question of which of the five
villages has the right to this expansive stretch of land becomes pertinent.
Is the right of each village identical? Would not the claim of one village
conflict with the claims of others? B'Tselem's "brief' neither asks nor
attempts to answer these questions. The result is that, sometimes
explicitly and otherwise implicitly, its claim that the land belongs to
these villages collapses into the contention-dealt with in the next
subsection-that only Arabs, not Jews, have the right to own and use this
land.
c. Land owned by a larger Arab polity of "people"
The meaning of the argument (by some), or the assumption (by
others), that Israeli Jewish settlements have been established on "Arab"
land in a broader sense is quite obscure. Let us put aside for the moment
whether Israel's only status on the West Bank is that of an "occupying
power" and any international legal implications of that
characterization. 297 If the resultant conclusion from that argument or
assumption is that Jews cannot legally establish settlements west of the
Jordan River and east of the Green Line, is the essence of this claim
295. Id. at 22.
296. Interestingly, the problem of designating and dividing land on the basis of
Bedouin use is not unique to the West Bank situation; Jordan has struggled with the same
issue east of the Jordan River. See M.F. Tarawneh, Public Land Between the State and
the Tribes: A Dilemma of Rural Development: A Case from Southern Jordan, OPTIONS
MtDITERRANtENNES: StRIE A (Int'l Ctr. for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Stud.,
Paris, Fr.), 1999, available at http://ressources.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a38/99600176.pdf.
297. See supra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
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based upon the negative notion that Jews have no rights, or the positive
notion that the land legally belongs to "Palestinian" Arabs?
29
As related previously, that Jews have only limited privileges in the
Near East is a recurrent historical theme. This perspective denies
substantially all aspects of the Jewish narrative, including a millennia-old
nexus with the land. More recently, within the twentieth century, after
promising the land in the Palestinian mandate for a Jewish homeland,299
the British decided to partition off approximately seventy percent of
Mandatory Palestine to provide a kingdom for the Hashemites. °°
Transjordan, once created, barred Jews from owning land or even living
within its borders, a prohibition it extended to the West Bank when it
captured it in 1948.301
If the basis of the argument is that, in a positive sense, the West
Bank "belongs" to Palestinian Arabs, what is the basis for this claim-
legal title, longevity of habitation, the concept of peoplehood, or
something else? And, in any event, how would such a claim justify a
conclusion that Israeli Jewish settlements are illegal? Prior to the first
Zionist aliyah in the late nineteenth century, most of the privately owned
298. Eugene Rostow described this diffuse feeling as follows, "The legal
assumption... is that the territories in dispute are in some sense "Arab" territories held
by Israel only as military occupant." Rostow, supra note 182, at 152,
299. The promise was made in what is commonly known as the Balfour Declaration,
issued on November 2, 1917:
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the right and political status enjoyed by
Jews in any other country.
3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: THE DIFFICULT SEARCH FOR PEACE (1975-1988) 31-32
(John N. Moore ed., 1992). The Balfour Declaration was binding on Britain, and when
Britain was assigned the Mandate for Palestine after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,
the Balfour Declaration became binding on the League of Nations as an international
agreement between Britain and the League. See Dinstein, supra note 187, at 137-54.
Dinstein states:
It follows that virtually the whole international community, as it existed in the
era between the two World Wars, was legally committed to the Mandate for
Palestine, which included the obligation for the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people. Admittedly, the Balfour Declaration and
the Mandate for Palestine did not ignore the right s of non-Jews in Palestine.
Nevertheless, whereas Jews were granted the right to establish a national home,
non-Jews were conceded only civil and religious rights. In other words, the
expectation was that non-Jews would live as a protected minority within the
Jewish national home.
Id. at 140.
300. PEEL REPORT, supra note 93, at 37, 60-61.
301. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40, at 315; see Weisman, supra note 89, at 47-
48 (describing Jordanian restrictions on selling land to Jews).
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land west of the Jordan was either "state-owned" land or land privately
held by absentee Turkish landlords. Thereafter, the Jewish Agency made
most of the purchases of privately-owned land, allowing Jewish
settlements to exist. Virtually all of this land was not even farmed by
Arabs in the area. As for state ownership, any title claims descended
from the Ottoman Empire (that is, Turkish state ownership) to British
trusteeship and thereafter to Jordan, whose annexation of the West Bank
was not internationally recognized. Moreover, it has been estimated that
over thirty square kilometers of land on the West Bank were owned by
Israeli Jews prior to any requisitions for settlements.3 °2 In short,
whatever Palestinian claim exists with respect to West Bank land is not
based upon any concept of a recorded legal title.
Certainly, much of the popular belief in the Palestinian claim to the
West Bank rests upon a notion of longevity-that is, the Arabs were
there first. But what does "first" mean? One possible meaning of
"firstness" is "most ancient." As mentioned previously, Arabs have
recently tried to buttress the "firstness" of their claim by asserting that
303they descended from the ancient Canaanites, but there is no
anthropological or other evidence that supports this claim.30 4 The solely
political nature of the claim is transparent.30 5 If, then, "first" means the
most ancient tie to the land, the three-millennia history of the Jews in that
area306--a history increasingly supported by mounting archaeological
302. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40. Benvenisti and Zamir further report:
Some of the Jewish-owned lands in these areas were not inhabited, but most
were. Some of the inhabitants had been forced to leave their property during
the turbulence of the 1920s and 1930s, and most of them (several thousand,
mainly from the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and the Gush Etzion settlements
south of Jerusalem) were displaced in the 1948 war. Yet, unlike the Palestinian
refugees, these Jewish refugees were rehabilitated and resettled with the help of
the Israeli authorities, which prevented the creation of a permanent problem.
Id. at 298 n. 15.
303. See, e.g., ABU-SITTA, supra note 42; Itamar Marcus & Barbara Crook,
Palestinian Media Watch, "Be Gone. Die Anywhere You Like, but Don't Die Here." PA
Hate TV Reaches New Levels (Dec. 29, 2005), http://www.pmw.org.il/
BulletinsDec2005.htm (describing program about Jaffa that "opens with a revision of
history, by casting the ancient Canaanites as Arabs [and] [b]y doing this, the more than
3,000 years of Jewish history in the area are pre-dated by a fabricated Arab history").
304. As Efraim Karsh reported:
[I]n an attempt to prove the historic continuity of an "Arab nation," the
Palestinian intellectual and political leader Yusuf Haikal traced Arab imperial
greatness to the ancient Fertile Crescent peoples such as the Hittites,
Canaanites, Amourites, et. al., ignoring the minor problem that these diverse
peoples never constituted a single people, let alone an Arab one.
KARSH, supra note 43, at 7.
305. See Morris, Details and Lies, supra note 42, at 9 (reviewing Atlas of Palestine:
1948).
306. See sources cited supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 25:1
THE UNEXPLORED OPTION
evidence 307 -would give Jews the superior claim.
Popular support for the Palestinian argument depends far less upon
an ancient notion that the Palestinians were the first inhabitants of the
land several millennia ago, however. Instead, it relies on the idea that, in
more recent times, Palestinian Arabs were the majority inhabitants of the
land prior to the advent of modem Zionism. Edward Said and Noam
Chomsky, °8 among others, popularized this view, according to which the
Zionists were colonizers over an indigenous Palestinian population. But
even that argument raises more questions than it supplies answers. What
land is included in the claim of .majoritarianism or exclusivity? For
example, Jews apparently constituted a plurality of the residents of
Jerusalem, whose other inhabitants included Palestinian Arabs, Greeks,
Europeans, Turks and others, at least at the turn of nineteenth century.
309
Prior to Arab riots and massacres in the early twentieth century, Jews
inhabited Hebron along with Arabs for centuries. 310  While the exact
numbers are uncertain, it appears many Arabs who assert a "Palestinian"
identity were attracted to the land west of the Jordan because of Jewish
settlement and economic development that provided jobs. 311 The quality
of some of the research on this subject has been subjected to enormous
criticism-for example, on the theory that the twentieth century increase
in the Arab population in Palestine may have resulted from better health
care rather than the economic growth generated by Jewish
settlement 312-but the two tendered explanations are not mutually
307. See, e.g., Itim, Remains of Second Temple Era Jewish Village Discovered,
HAARETZ, Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?
itemNo=664845.
308. See generally SAM, supra note 10, at 266-77. Said so adamantly supported the
Palestinian cause that he rejected a two-state solution in favor of a bi-national state,
which is generally recognized to be code for destruction of Israel. See DERSHOWITZ,
Introduction to THE CASE FOR ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 5.
309. See MARTIN GILBERT, Introduction to JERUSALEM IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY,
at ix (1998) (describing Jews as majority of Jerusalem's residents around 1900); see also
DERSHOWITZ, Is Israel a Colonial Imperialist State?, in THE CASE FOR ISRAEL, supra note
45, at 13, 17 (describing Jews as majority since first population census in 1700s).
310. Id.
311. The extensive literature has been summarized by Dershowitz. See DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 104, at 27-28 & nn.13-32. The uniqueness of the UN definition of a
Palestinian refugee is also instructive. A Palestinian refugee is any person who lived in
Palestine "between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of
livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict." UN Relief and Works
Administration, Who Is a Palestinian Refugee?, http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/
whois.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
312. See PETERS, supra note 107, at 260-61. Peters, an English researcher, started
looking at the Israeli-Arab dispute several decades ago from a Palestinian perspective,
but after almost ten years of research concluded many "Palestinians" came from
elsewhere due to the improving economic conditions that accompanied Jewish
settlement. See id. at 259-63. While some of the criticism directed towards Peters' work
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exclusive. The fact that the Arab population in and around Jewish
settlements increased several times the increase recorded in other areas
of Palestine, as well as other evidence, lends support to the economic
growth thesis.313 In short, both Jews and Arabs lived for centuries in a
sparsely populated, desolate and largely neglected land; Arabs surely
constituted the majority of the population prior to the twentieth century,
but Jews constituted a majority or plurality in Jerusalem and certain other
places. Yet, Jews were excluded from most of the area included within
the Palestinian Mandate once the British created Transjordan in order to
provide the Hashemites a throne.314
To some extent, the Arab claim of exclusive right to the West Bank
rests on the notion of Palestinian "peoplehood." Indeed, an argument
made in favor of the State of Israel has been applied to the Palestinians:
Israel is justified on the grounds that people (Jews) having a common
culture and religion (Judaism, whatever its variety) with a distinct
language (Hebrew) deserve, like other peoples, a distinct, autonomous
geographical area. But the analogy breaks down on many fronts. First
and foremost, if the argument is used to counter the right of Jews to settle
on the West Bank, one must initially note that there are Arab
communities in Israel.315 Equally significantly, the Palestinian Arabs do
not have a tradition, religion, language, or anything else that is materially
distinct from other countries in the Middle East, with the exception of
Israel and possibly Lebanon.3t 6 Through much of the twentieth century,
most Arabs, including those in Palestine, saw Palestinian Arabs less as a
separate people and more as part of a greater polity of Arabs within
greater Syria.317 There is even evidence that the Palestinian peoplehood
was politically motivated, the strongest critique was not. See Porath, supra note 107, at
37 (ascribing growth of Arab population not to immigration, but better health provision).
313. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 104, at 27-28; Ronald Sanders & Daniel Pipes,
Mrs. Peters's Palestine: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1986, at 50, 50-51.
314. Originally, the Balfour Resolution, recognized by the League of Nations, called
for a Jewish National home in all of Palestine, but the League of Nations' "assent to a
British proposal to suspend application of Jewish national rights under the Palestine
Mandate to the area of Trans-Jordan," GERSON, supra note 168, at 44, narrowed the
Resolution's mandate by at least two-thirds. See id; see also PEEL REPORT, supra note
93, at 37-38.
315. As stated elsewhere, they comprise approximately twenty percent of Israel's
population. See Zeev Klein, Israel's Population Almost 7m on Eve of 2006, GLOBES,
Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://archive.globes.co.il/english/.
316. The prominent Palestinian academic, Walid Khalidi, has even stated "[t]he Arab
nation both is, and should be, one." Walid Khalidi, Thinking the Unthinkable: A
Sovereign Palestinian State, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 695, 695 (1978).
317. PEEL REPORT, supra note 93; see Curtis, supra note 116, at 471-72 ("The myth
that Jews in Palestine unjustly displaced 'the Palestinian people' may be widely
espoused, but official documents before 1947 generally spoke of 'Arabs in Palestine,' not
of a 'Palestinian people.' Though some Arab journalists and politicians spoke of a
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was created as a construct to oppose the creation of a modem Jewish
state rather than a firmly held reality.
3 18
However, all of these arguments are beside the point: whether or
not Palestinians considered themselves a distinct people prior to Israel's
establishment, they do so now, and the question of whether there should
be an independent Palestinian state has been answered in the affirmative.
The point here is not that there should not be a Palestinian state, but that
state need not be inhabited exclusively by Palestinian Arabs. To the
extent this claim depends upon a notion that the land belongs to an Arab
polity, it did not in the past (the Ottoman Empire was not an Arab
polity), and, most importantly, it would not destroy the "peoplehood" of
Palestinian Arabs by having Jewish communities in their midst.
Indeed, in the broadest sense, the notion hat the West Bank
"belongs" only to Palestinian Arabs because it is "Arab" land speaks not
only to the issue of Jewish settlements, but to the question of Jewish
settlement within the pre-1967 borders of Israel, that is, the legitimacy of
Israel itself.
319
3. The "Transfer" Issue: The Charge that Israel, as an Occupying
Power, Has Transferred Its Citizens into the West Bank in Violation of
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
320
As time passed, settlement opponents have increasingly relied less
Palestinian national movement in the 1920s, the people in the area did not consider
themselves a separate Palestinian people per se. Rather, they historically identified
themselves with the larger Moslem or Arab world (Qawmiya) or with the Syrian nation.
Only with the creation of Israel and the Arab exodus from the occupied territory did a
Palestinian national consciousness develop.") (footnotes omitted).
318. While Arabs were undisputedly in the Palestinian Mandate, their "Palestinian"
identity has been fiercely contested. For an example, some espouse the view that
"Palestinian" identity is simply "a purely negative reaction to Zionism after the Balfour
Declaration." See Marie Syrkin, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Development and Goal, in
THE PALESTINIANS: PEOPLE, HISTORY, POLITICS 199, 199-208 (Michael Curtis et al. eds.,
1975). On the other side of the political spectrum, some support an extreme view of
"Palestinian" identity based upon continuity from the ancient Philistines. See FRANK C.
SAKRAN, PALESTINE, STILL A DILEMMA 104-05 (1976). A group of "new historians" in
Israel, who generally are regarded as more favorable to the Palestinian rather than the
Israeli viewpoint, have taken a more nuanced view of "Palestinian" identity as arising
simultaneously with the Zionist movement. See, e.g., BARUCH KIMMERLING & JOEL S.
MIGDAL, THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE: A HISTORY (2003).
319. In an article primarily addressed to the legality of Jewish settlements, but also
whether a second Palestinian state should be established (the first being Jordan itself,
which was carved out from the majority of the Palestinian Mandate), Eugene Rostow
recognized this fundamental reality: "[The proponents of Palestinian self-determination]
cannot bring themselves to believe that the object of the campaign for a third Palestinian
state is not a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem, but the destruction of Israel."
Rostow, supra note 182, at 171.
320. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158.
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on the Hague Regulations, with its underlying dominant theme of
protecting an ousted sovereign, and more on the Fourth Geneva
Convention, with its transparently humanitarian ideals and provisions.
The opponents specifically charge that the settlements violate Article
49(6),321 which states: "The occupying power shall not deport or transfer
parts of its own civilian population into territories it occupies. 322
Frequently, Article 49(6) is recited as if its "plain meaning" were
transparent and its application to the establishment of Israeli settlements
beyond dispute.323 However, as is the case with respect to the Hague
Regulations, both the meaning of this provision and its applicability to
Israeli settlements are subjects of substantial dispute. Many general texts
on international humanitarian law give Article 49(6) scant if no
attention,324 and, if anything, its origins and meaning are more obscure
than the provisions of the Hague Regulations discussed previously.
a. The Rostow perspective, redux
An initial problem with the claim that Israeli settlements violate
Article 49(6) is that this argument, once again, may presuppose a
conclusion that the West Bank constitutes "occupied" rather than
"disputed" territory. Eugene Rostow consistently took the position that
the predicate for the application of Article 49, as a provision in Section
III ("Occupied Territories") of Part III ("Status and Treatment of
Protected Persons") of the Fourth Geneva Convention, was the act of one
signatory of the Convention occupying "the territory of a High
Contracting Party., 325  To Rostow, who noted that Jordan's own
321. See id. art. 49.
322. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 49.
323. See, e.g., Letter from Sarah L. Whitson, Executive Director, Middle E. N. Afr.
Div., Human Rights Watch, to President George W. Bush, (Dec. 26, 2005), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/27/isrlpal2346_txt.htm; THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 246 & n.33 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) ("[Article
49(6)] prohibits... the settlement of nationals of the occupying power in the occupied
territory .... The settlement of civilians in the territories occupied by Israel therefore
contravenes [Article 49(6)].").
324. See HILAIRE McCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 199 & n.70 (2d ed., Ashgate Publ'g
1999) (1990) (scant reference to Article 49(6)); RENE PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 38-39 (2002) (no mention of Article 49(6) and misses
scenario in which it might apply); VON GLAHN, supra note 211, at 72-74 (no mention of
Article 49(6) in discussion of Article 49); infra note 399 (discussing McCoubrey's
reference to Article 49(6)). Even Draper, while calling Article 49(6) "very important,"
merely devotes one clause of a sentence to its discussion. See DRAPER, THE RED CROSS
CONVENTIONS, supra note 169, at 41 ("Conversely, this Article prohibits the detaining of
protected persons in danger areas, and furthermore, which is very important, prevents the
Occupant from moving parts of its own population into the occupied territory.").
325. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 2; see Rostow, supra note 114,
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occupation of the West Bank was not internationally recognized, "[t]he
West Bank is not the territory of a signatory power, but an unallocated
part of the British Mandate. 326 Rostow's reference was to Article 2(2)
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states "[t]he Convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed
resistance.
327
To the extent that Rostow's conclusion was based upon his positive
view of the legitimacy of Israel's claim to the West Bank-that is, his
view that the West Bank is "disputed" rather than simply "occupied"
territory-Rostow might have a point. Otherwise, one would arrive at
the totally paradoxical result that, for example, once Kuwait's
government reacquired control over its territory after the first Gulf War,
it could not construct housing for Kuwaitis because both it and Iraq were
signatories to the Geneva Convention. However, to the extent that
Rostow's conclusion was meant solely as an interpretation of the Fourth
Geneva Convention in light of Jordan's suspect sovereignty rights, a
sensible reading of the application of the Convention described in Article
2 is to the contrary. The vast weight of authority concludes Article 2(2)
expands rather than limits the application of the Convention described in
Article 2(1)328: "the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
at 719. Rostow's correspondence was in response to an article by Roberts, in which
Roberts termed Rostow's analysis-which he ascribed to Israel-a "technical error":
To refer to the terms of the second paragraph of common Article 2 is of limited
relevance, because it is in fact the first paragraph that applies when a
belligerent occupation begins during a war.... [T]his paragraph says nothing
about "the territory of a High Contracting Party," referring simply to "all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict" arising between two or more of
the high contracting parties.
Roberts, supra note 208, at 64 (footnote omitted). In response, Rostow argued Roberts
presented "the problem of terminating the Israeli occupation of the territories as if the
only relevant legal question were the arbitrary denial of Palestinian national rights
[whereas] ... [t]he true issue is. . . 'not the clash of right and wrong, but the clash of two
rights."' Rostow, supra note 114, at 720.
326. Id. at 719. Among others who express a similar view are David Ball, Robert
Caplen, and Robbie Sabel, although their reasoning is not identical. See David John Ball,
Toss The Travaux? Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Middle East
Conflict-A Modern (Re)Assessment, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990, 1009-16 (2004); Robert A.
Caplen, Mending the "Fence": How Treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by the
International Court of Justice at the Hague Has Redefined the Doctrine of Self-Defense,
57 FLA. L. REv. 717, 753-54 (2005); Robbie Sabel, Bitterlemons, The Convention Does
Not Formally Apply (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/
bl200904ed35.html. Ball, for instance, rests his conclusion not only upon Jordan's lack
of legitimate claim to the West Bank, but also on the theory that the Palestinian Authority
is a non-state actor that cannot avail itself of the Convention's provisions. Ball, supra, at
1014-16.
327. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 2.
328. For example, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its judgment on the
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declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them. 3 29 In other words, the application of the
Convention simply depends upon whether both Jordan and Israel are
signatories, not whether the West Bank was legally the territory of
Jordan. Further, Article 6 provides that certain articles of the
Convention, including Article 49, bind occupying powers "for the
duration of the occupation, to the extent that such power exercises the
functions of government in such territory. 33°
b. Defining the nature of state involvement
Aside from this basic prerequisite for the application of Article
49(6), both the nature of state involvement, which can trigger the
paragraph's prohibition, and, whatever the definition of that trigger, its
application to the Israeli settlements are moot questions. With respect to
the more abstract question-what character and degree of state
involvement trigger Article 49(6)-one can envision a spectrum, with a
variety of legal opinions as to how most points within that spectrum
relate to Article 49(6). At one end of the spectrum are voluntary
movements of the occupying power's nationals to the occupied territory,
without any inducements of any nature and with or without its
permission. At the other end of the spectrum lies an occupant's forcible
transfer of its own population into occupied territory.
Closely related to, and arguably influencing, the degree and
character of state involvement is the question of purpose both underlying
Article 49(6) and the transfer effectuated by the occupying power. One
might conceive of the purpose of Article 49 as to protect civilians who
are transferred, the population of the territory to which the civilians are
transferred, or both. Correlatively, the occupying power may aim to
change the ethnic or racial composition of its own population (by
cleansing its own territory of an undesirable ethnicity), to alter the
Israeli security fence, see infra note 426 and accompanying text, stated:
The object of the second paragraph of Article 2 is not to restrict the scope of
application of the Convention, as defined by the first paragraph, by excluding
therefrom territories not falling under the sovereignty of one of the contracting
parties. It is directed simply to making it clear that, even if occupation effected
during the conflict met no armed resistance, the Convention is still applicable.
This interpretation reflects the intention of the drafters of the Fourth Geneva
Convention to protect civilians who find themselves, in whatever way, in the
hands of the occupying Power.
Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 175 (July 9).
329. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 2.
330. Id. art. 6.
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population in the occupied territory (by replacing all or parts of that
population with the occupying power's own nationals), or to accomplish
some other less transparent purpose.
Unfortunately, neither the language nor the history of Article 49(6)
conclusively resolves the issue of the extent and character of state
involvement necessary for a violation. Neither do they unambiguously
identify the persons the prohibition intends to protect. Further, the only
"authoritative" judicial interpretation interpreting Article 49(6), by the
High Court of Justice, was given in the context of an advisory opinion
concerning Israel's security fence,33 ' leaving open the question of
whether its interpretation will apply apolitically to disputes involving
other nations in similar contexts.
c. The limits of "plain meaning"
Article 49, in its entirety, 332 deals with transfers of persons, largely
civilians, 333 from and to occupied territories, except for their transfer to a
power not a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is the subject
of Article 45.334 Key to an understanding of arguments based solely
upon paragraph 6's language is Article 49(1), which reads, "Individual or
mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of
any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their
motive. 335  To settlement opponents, "transfer" in Article 49(6)-
especially because the adjective "forcible," found preceding "transfers"
in Article 49(1), is absent-connotes that any transfer of the occupying
power's civilian population is prohibited.336
This literalist interpretation only succeeds, however, if other
"literalisms" are disregarded. If the settlers have willingly moved to the
West Bank, and arguably forced the government to acquiesce to their
settlement,337 it is questionable to claim that Israel, as an "occupying
331. See infra, notes 426-32 and accompanying text.
332. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 49.
333. Article 49 relates to two groups of persons, "protected persons," in Article 49(1-
5), and an occupying power's own civilian population in Article 49(6). See infra note
356 and accompanying text (defining "protected persons").
334. Id. art. 45.
335. Id. art. 49.
336. See Lein, supra note 35, at 38.
337. Even B'Tselem concedes the part of the settlement enterprise that resulted in the
largest number of settlers and settlements close to Palestinian population areas, on the
central mountain range of the West Bank, was forced by Gush Emunim, meaning, the
Block of the Faithful. "The principal method adopted by the movement was to settle a
given site without government permission-and sometimes contrary to its policy-in an
effort to force the government later to recognize the settlement as an accomplished fact."
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power," transferred them. If it is alternatively argued the Israeli
government has encouraged the settlers to settle in the West Bank,
through tax subsidies and other benefits, thus constructively employing a
"transfer," 338 the interpretation of Article 49(6) has transcended the
language's "plain meaning." A literalist interpretation would also be
self-contradictory in rejecting Rostow's view that Article 49, like other
provisions dealing with occupation in the Geneva Convention, only
applies to "acts by one signatory 'carried out on the territory of
another,' ' 339 a predicate quite problematic given Jordan's very
questionable rights to the West Bank. Settlement opponents rightly
emphasize that the Geneva Convention, unlike the Hague Regulations,
was designed primarily as humanitarian law to protect people, not to
protect dispossessed sovereign states, and therefore the applicability of
the Geneva Convention's occupation provisions should not depend upon
such a technicality. 340 That is fair enough, but the "plain meaning" of
words or provisions can be a two-way street. Superficially noting the
"plain meaning" of a term like "transfer" unmodified by "forceful"
without accepting the plain meaning of "occupying power" or taking into
account Rostow's argument about the Convention's applicability hardly
suffices to derive meaning.
An enlightening textual approach might inquire why the term
"forcible" was used in Article 49(1) but not Article 49(6). Settlement
opponents, of course, answer that force is a prerequisite to a violation of
Article 49(1), but not necessary for a violation of Article 49(6). 34' But
other answers are equally plausible. Not infrequently, when similar
language is used in several different paragraphs of the same provision,
legislators drop modifying language because it is understood.
3 42
Id. at 13.
338. Id. at 39. "State" involvement includes the Ministerial Committee for
Settlement, composed of ministers from relevant government ministries and members of
the World Zionist Organization (WZO), which decides on the establishment of a new
settlement, and the Ministry of Construction and Housing and the Settlement Division of
the WZO, which are involved in the actual physical and economic structure of the
settlement. See Lein, supra note 35, at 20-22. State encouragement includes certain
benefits and financial incentives, which are generally available to development towns in
Israel as well, but exceed on a per capita basis the subsidies actually received by residents
of settlement towns within the pre-1967 borders of Israel, primarily because of the role
played by the Settlement Division of the WZO. Id. at 73-84.
339. Rostow, supra note 114, at 719.
340. Roberts, supra note 208.
341. See, e.g., David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of
International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 91 (2005) ("As [Article 49(1)]
refers expressly to forcible transfers, it seems fair to conclude that the term 'transfer' in
[Article 49(6)] means both forcible and nonforcible transfers.").
342. This is essentially the point that Ruth Lapidoth makes specifically in relation to
Article 49. See Ruth Lapidoth, The Advisory Opinion and the Jewish Settlements, 38 ISR.
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Alternatively, while Article 49(1) is phrased in the passive voice, Article
49(6) is phrased in the active. Force may be inherent and therefore
understood in government action, that is, the act of an "occupying
power" deporting or transferring parts of its own population, whereas
"transfers" without any identified transferor may occur at the instance of
actors (including, conceivably, the transferees themselves) in addition to
the occupying power and therefore not necessarily imply coercion
exercised by one party upon another. To understand the phraseology
used in Article 49(1), "individual or mass forcible transfers," as well as
one plausible meaning of Article 49(6), it appears necessary to transcend
a dictionary definition of words to take account of context, background
and purpose.
d. Context, background, and purpose
Although an earlier effort to draft and have states adopt an
international convention for the protection of civilians preceded World
War II,343 the Fourth Geneva Convention, a product of the Geneva
Conference held in the summer of 1949, was drafted in the aftermath and
took into account the experiences of World War 11,344 especially the Nazi
atrocities that occurred both before and during the war. Throughout,
"[t]he discussions were dominated.., by a common horror of the evils
caused by the recent World War and a determination to lessen the
sufferings of war victims. ' 345 The various nations' delegates at the 1949
Geneva Diplomatic Conference considered a draft of the convention
produced at a preliminary conference held in Stockholm the prior year,
1948.346 The Stockholm Draft was an amended version of the draft
L. REV. 292, 294-95 (2005) ("According to a well known principle of interpretation, a
term which appears several times in a treaty, should usually be given the same meaning
in each provision. This applies a plus forte raison to a term that appears several times in
one and the same article. A look at the other paragraphs of Article 49 shows, that the
terms deportation and transfer refer to non-voluntary movement of people.").
343. See Fifteenth International Conference of the Red Cross, Tokyo, Japan, Oct. 20-
29, 1934, Draft International Convention on the Condition and Protection of Civilians of
Enemy Nationality Who Are on Territory Belonging to or Occupied by a Belligerent, in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS &
OTHER DOCUMENTS 445 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th rev. ed., Brill
Academic Publishers 2004) (1973) [hereinafter Tokyo Draft].
344. In the words of George Best, "This was a long-standing Red Cross project to
which the experiences of 1939-45 gave urgency and direction." BEST, supra note 171, at
115; see id. at 80-179 (describing ideas and drafts leading to Fourth Geneva Convention,
including political stances of various governments as they, in some cases belatedly,
realized dimensions of convention).
345. 4 COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 8 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY
IV].
346. See Seventeenth International Conference of the Red Cross, Stockholm, Sweed.,
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presented to the Stockholm Conference, 347 which in turn was based upon,
but replaced, an earlier draft considered by the Conference of
Government Experts held in Geneva in the spring of 1947 .348 Final
Article 49 was the renumbered and partially redrafted successor to
Article 45 of the Stockholm Draft,349 which in turn amended Article 45
of the draft presented to the Stockholm Conference by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 350  Article 45 of that draft
Aug. 20-30, 1948, Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, in 1 FINAL RECORD, supra note 169, at 113 [hereinafter Stockholm Draft].
347. See Seventeenth International Conference of the Red Cross, Stockholm, Sweed.,
Aug. 20-30, 1948, Draft Revised or New Conventions for the Protection of War Victims
[hereinafter Revised Draft].
348. See Conference of Government Experts, Geneva, Switz., April 14-26, 1947,
Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims [hereinafter Experts Draft]. The
Conference of Experts was itself preceded by a Preliminary Conference of National Red
Cross Societies held in the summer of 1946, which, although dominated by the most
recent horrors of World War II, initially considered the question of whether the protection
of civilians should be integrated into the convention protecting prisoners of war or
required a separate convention. See id.
349. Article 45 read as follows:
Deportations or transfers against their will of protected persons out of
occupied territory are prohibited, whether such deportations or transfers are
individual or collective, and regardless of their motive.
The occupying Power shall not undertake total or partial evacuation of a
given area, unless the security of the population or imperative military
considerations demand. Such evacuations may not involve displacements
outside the bounds of the occupied territory, except in cases of physical
necessity.
The occupying power shall not carry out such transfers and evacuations
unless it has ensured proper accommodation to receive the protected persons.
Such removals shall be effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene,
healthfulness, security and nutrition. Members of the same family shall not be
separated.
The Protecting power shall be informed of any proposed transfers and
evacuations. It may supervise the preparations and the conditions in which
such operations are carried out.
The occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civil
population into the territory it occupies.
Stockholm Draft, supra note 346, art. 45.
350. Article 45 provided:
Deportations or transfers of protected persons out of occupied territory,
whether individual or collective, and whatever their motive, are prohibited.
The occupying Power shall carry out no evacuation, total or partial, of a
given area, unless the security of the population or imperative military
considerations require. Such evacuations may only take place within the
occupied territory, except in cases of material impossibility.
The occupying Power shall undertake such transfers and evacuations only
after ensuring to the protected persons proper accommodation to receive them.
Such removals shall be effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, salubrity,
security and nutrition. Members of the same family shall not be separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any proposed transfers and
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succeeded Article 27 of the draft considered at the Conference of
Experts. 351  However, Article 27 lacked any analogue to the paragraph
that became Article 49(6), which a subcommittee at the Stockholm
Conference inserted.352 The new paragraph became Article 45(5) of the
Stockholm Draft considered at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference.
When the Stockholm Draft was presented to the Conference of
Delegates in 1949, Article 45(1) read: "Deportations or transfers against
evacuations. It may supervise the preparations and the conditions in which
they are carried out.
Revised Draft, supra note 347, art. 45. Each article of the Revised Draft was
accompanied by remarks of the committee that revised the Experts Draft or ICRC staff.
The Legal Commission of the ICRC consisted of Director Jean S. Pictet, ICRC Honorary
President M. Max Huber, and M. Bossier. See ICRC, Report on General Activities: July
1, 1947 - December 31, 1948, at 12 (1949). The remarks following Article 45 stated:
This Article corresponds to Article 27 of the Draft of the Government
Experts. It draws a very clear distinction between deportation of protected
persons outside the borders of occupied territory (which is strictly forbidden),
and the evacuation of particular areas, which is permitted in two cases, named
by way of I imitations: (1) if the security of the populations requires; (2) if
imperative military considerations demand. It should be noted that the
Protecting Power may exercise the right of supervision which is granted to it,
without exception, even when, for example, populations are removed outside
the boundaries of the occupied territory and transferred to the national territory
of the Power in occupation. The Protecting Power may exercise its right of
supervision in respect both of the transfers themselves and of the conditions in
which they are carried out.
Revised Draft, supra note 347, art. 45.
351. Article 27 provided:
Individual or collective deportations or transfers, carried out under physical
or moral constraint, to places outside occupied territories, and for whatever
motives, are prohibited.
This prohibition applies to all persons in the said territories. It shall not
constitute an obstacle to the general evacuation of an area by the occupying
Power, if military operations make it necessary. Such evacuation shall not
involve the transfer of the population beyond the occupied territory, unless it
cannot possibly be effected within the limits thereof.
Collective transfers within an occupied territory shall only be enforced to
meet the security requirements of the occupying Power.
The occupying Power shall carry out such transfers and removals with all
due regard to the rules of hygiene, salubrity, security and nutrition, not only
during the transfer, but also in the area in which the evacuees will be
accommodated.
The conditions under which transfers and removals are carried out shall be
verified by the Protecting power, or by the competent international body.
In no case shall the above removals and transfers constitute a disguised
form of internment or assigned residence.
Id. art. 27. Article 27 was drafted to account for the horrors of World War II and replace
Article 19(b) of the Tokyo Draft, which read, "Deportations outside the territory of the
occupied State are forbidden, unless they are evacuations intended, on account of the
extension of military operations, to ensure the security of the inhabitants." Tokyo Draft,
supra note 343, art. 19(b).
352. See infra notes 393-97 and accompanying text.
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their will of protected persons out of occupied territory are prohibited,
whether such deportations or transfers are individual or collective, and
regardless of their motive., 353  Delegates from various nations, most
notably the Soviet Union,354 thought "against their will" in Article 45(1)
was too weak on the theory that persons could be coerced to consent to
expulsions.355 Whether the text read as in its original guise, "against
their will," or as redrafted to read, "individual or mass forcible transfers,"
the sentence remained in the passive tense rather than the active voice,
such as, "The occupying power may not deport or forcibly transfer. .. "
The drafters probably kept the language in passive voice because the
Nazi atrocities to which Article 45(1) primarily referred were often
carried out not by the Nazis themselves, but the nationals or partisans of
the occupied country, for example, Poles or Lithuanians, who rounded up
Jews, either for killing in mass pits or for transfer to concentration
camps. Hence, the phraseology of Article 45(1) prohibited the kind of
events that occurred in Poland, Lithuania, and other occupied countries,
regardless of whether an occupying power, such as the Nazis, or its
surrogates committed the atrocities.
Final Article 49(6) (Article 45(5) of Stockholm Draft) on which the
alleged illegality of Israeli settlements is based, remained the same from
the Stockholm Draft through the adoption of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. In order to view Article 49's attempt to fully cover the
heinous practices that occurred before and during World War II and its
plausible meaning, reference must be made to the definition of
"protected persons," the parties protected by the initial paragraphs of
Article 49, in contrast to the occupying power's own "civilians" referred
to in Article 49(6). Article 4 provides that "[p]ersons protected by the
Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are
not nationals. 3 56 In other words, although the Geneva Convention was
primarily designed to protect individuals rather than sovereigns, it did
353. Stockholm Draft, supra note 346, art. 45.
354. See 2A FINAL RECORD, supra note 169, at 664 (quoting P. Morosov of Soviet
Union: "The Soviet Delegation further proposed deletion of the words 'against their will',
because in occupied territory no one had the right to express an opinion. There was a risk
of abuses arising out of the words 'against their will'.").
355. See id. at 759 (quoting Reporter Colonel Du Pasquier).
356. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 4. Article 4 excludes "Nationals
of a State which is not bound by the Convention," "Nationals of a neutral State who find
themselves in the territory of a belligerent State," and "Nationals of a co-belligerent
State" from the category of protected persons. Id. It also excludes persons, such as
prisoners of war, who are protected under the other three Geneva Conventions. Id.
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exhibit some deference to the concept of sovereignty.357  Most of its
provisions did not apply to a belligerent power's own nationals or
civilians, 358 and therefore the draft prepared for the Stockholm
Conference left at least two Nazi practices uncovered: (1) deporting
Germany's own Jews and other undesirables to slave and extermination
camps in Poland and other occupied countries; and (2) transplanting
Germans (Reichsdeutsche) and people of German descent
(Volksdeutsche) to occupied countries to displace all or parts of the
native populations. The language of Article 49(6) covers these
omissions, as the restrictive definition of "protected persons" protected
by Article 49(1) does not include the occupying power's own "civilians."
Besides the question of whether "against their will"359 in Article
45(1) was strong enough, many of the comments by conference delegates
and the drafting committee members related to whether protected
persons could be temporarily transferred from the occupied territory to
the territory of another power.36° With the exception of beneficial
transfers,36' substantially all references by delegates concerning
"transfers" connoted an involuntary movement of people, regardless of
whether the Convention employed the term "forcible transfers., 362 In the
third committee at the Geneva Conference, charged with the final
drafting of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Adolpho Maresca of Italy
"said that in the last war the flower of Italian youth had been sent to
Germany in cattle trucks. 363  Significantly, he added, "Such forced
transfers must at all events be prohibited in the future. The term
'deportation' in the last paragraph of the Article had better not be used,
357. Article 4 provides an exception for the provisions of Part II, "General Protection
of Populations Against Certain Consequences of War," but they are not relevant to
present issues. David Ball similarly stresses the extent to which, behind the humanitarian
fagade of the Convention, lay the concept of state sovereignty. See Ball, supra note 326,
at 990-92.
358. See supra note 356 (listing other civilians excluded from class of "protected
persons").
359. The language was inserted into Article 45 by a legal subcommittee at the
Stockholm Conference and became part of Article 45 in the Stockholm Draft presented to
the Geneva Diplomatic Conference the following year. Its proponent was Albert J.
Clattenburg of the United States. See sources cited infra note 394.
360. See, e.g., 1 FINAL RECORD, supra note 169, at 347 (comments by Anna Kara of
Hungarian People's Republic).
361. See infra notes 372-75 and accompanying text.
362. See source cited infra note 375 and accompanying text. Article 45(1) could be
interpreted, not as indicating a difference between the conduct condemned by redrafted
Article 49(1) and (6), but as substantiating the conclusion that the line of division
between prohibited and permitted conduct corresponded to the difference between
forceful versus voluntary transfers.
363. Id. at 664.
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as 'deportation' was something quite different."364 Maresca was clearly
making reference to the text of present Article 49(6), and making the
same distinction between "deportations," which some participants saw as
legitimate during war time,365 and "transfers," which they condemned as
inherently forced and condemned. Representatives of the Soviet
Union 366 and the Netherlands 367 similarly saw transfers as forced rather
than voluntary, without any comment that its use in Article 45(5)
differed.
Colonel Du Pasquier of Switzerland, the reporter for the committee
considering the civilian convention, introduced the final draft of Article
45 to the third committee with these words: "[T]he text proposed by the
Drafting Committee... set forth a principle on which all the members of
that Committee had had no difficulty in agreeing, namely, the need to
prohibit, once and for all, the abominable transfers of population which
had taken place during the last war., 368 Addressing a Belgian fear that a
majority vote to include "deportation" on the same footing as "transfers"
in a draft of Article 41 (Article 45 in the final draft, which applies to
transfers to a non-signatory power) would "seriously prejudice the
sovereign rights of the States concerned, 3 69 Colonel Du Pasquier replied
that "the provisions of the Convention might be evaded, 'transfers'
taking place under the guise of 'deportations.,, 370  The reporter's
comment reinforced the usage, adopted throughout the discussions, that
"transfers" were even more culpable than "deportations"; hence,
inclusion of both terms in Article 49(6) can hardly connote the use of
"transfer" as a voluntary act in contradistinction to "deport" as a forced
act. Nowhere did this discussion reference Article 49(6)'s use of the
word "transfer" as involving or including voluntary movement. Nor, in
these sparse references, is there any indication that the conference
delegates understood the purpose underlying the prohibition of an
occupying power transferring its own civilians in Article 49(6) as
364. Id.
365. See, e.g., id. at 809 (quoting Maurice Mineur of Belgium).
366. See id. at 664 (quoting P. Morosov). From context, his motion to insert "by
force" in Article 45(i) was to emphasize this usage, rather than depart from what
speakers understood the to be in the text's meaning: "The insertion of the words 'by
force' would ensure a formal prohibition of the deplorable practices carried out by certain
European countries, where men had been loaded into trucks like cattle, and sent to distant
countries to do forced labour." 2A FINAL RECORD, supra note 169, at 664 (emphasis
added).
367. Mas Slamet of the Netherlands "agreed with the principles underlying Article 45.
In Indonesia, during the last war, numbers of women and children had been transferred to
unhealthy climates and forced to build roads, and had died as a result." Id.
368. 1d at 759.
369. Id. at 809.
370. Id.
[Vol. 25:1
THE UNEXPLORED OPTION
anything other than to protect those civilians who were "transferred."
In fact, the one usage of "transfer" in Article 45 that could be
construed to import a lack of compulsion reinforces the conclusion that
"transfer" in Article 49(6) implied a lack of volition on the part of the
transferred population. Because of the blanket prohibition on transfers
and deportations in Article 45(1), it might be considered unlawful to
transfer protected persons out of harm's way during warfare for their
own benefit. Thus, while Article 45(2) of the Stockholm Draft did bar an
occupying power from "undertak[ing] total or partial evacuation of a
given area,371 this prohibition was succeeded by the clause "unless the
security of the population or imperative military considerations
demand., 372 Without any change of meaning, the final draft of Article
49(2) was rephrased to read: "[T]he Occupying power may undertake
total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population
or imperative military reasons so demand., 373 With minor modifications,
the third and fourth paragraphs then dealt with the necessity of ensuring
that, where civilians had to be evacuated for their own benefit, proper
accommodations would be provided, their health safeguarded, family
members would not be separated, and the party in control of the territory
to which the civilians were being evacuated would be so informed. In
reference to these provisions, the Final Report of the Committee drafting
the text for consideration by the plenary meeting of the delegates referred
to the function of Article 45(2) in relation to Article 45(1):
Although there was general unanimity in condemning such
deportations as took place during the recent war, the phrase at the
beginning of Article 45 caused some trouble in view of the difficulty
in reconciling exactly the ideas expressed with the various terms in
French, English and Russian. In the end the Committee have decided
on a wording which prohibits individual or mass forcible removals as
well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to
any other country, but which permits voluntary transfers.
The second paragraph deals with the problem of evacuations made
necessary in the interest of the security of the civilian population, or
for imperative military considerations .... This special case
constitutes an exception to the first paragraph.374
In other words, the transfers that were "voluntary" were those that were
permitted, i.e., evacuations for the benefit of the civilians. In that
371. 1 FINAL REcoRD, supra note 169, at 120.
372. Id.
373. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 49.
374. 2A FNAL REcoRD, supra note 169, at 827.
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context, the term "transfer" was used as a synonym for "evacuations." In
contrast, the transfers in Article 45(6) are of course prohibited, and there
is no suggestion anywhere that these prohibited transfers were viewed as
anything but involuntary. In this latter context, "transfer" and "deport"
were used synonymously.
375
Within the Fourth Geneva Convention, the two other primary uses
of the term "transfer" relate to protected persons, who are "transferred to
a Power... not a party to the Convention,, 376 and to "internees," whose
transfer must "be effected humanely. 377 Both contexts clearly indicate
that "transfer," again unmodified by "forcible" or a synonym, connotes
an act by the detaining power upon the protected persons or internees, as
the case may be, irrespective of their consent. Finally, the Fourth
Geneva Convention was considered at the same diplomatic conference
that considered and adopted the three other conventions. In the Third
Geneva Convention, relating to Prisoners of War, "transfer" is used
consistently, without any adjectives, to connote an act of the detaining
power upon prisoners of war, rather than a voluntary act by the
378prisoners.
Without more, then, a textual reading that takes into account the
term "occupying power," the term "transfer" reinforced by "deport," the
use of similar terminology elsewhere in the Fourth Geneva Convention,
375. STONE, supra note 124, at 180. The distinction between mass voluntary and
involuntary transfers is drawn by De Zayas. See De Zayas, supra note 39, at 208-09.
Certain post-1949 developments in international humanitarian law-particularly, the
1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and the Charter of the International
Criminal Court-were, in part, specifically and politically designed to bolster the
contentions and position of the Palestine Liberation Organization against Israel. See
Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva Conventions: Disturbing Background to the
ICC Debate, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 169, 198-203 (2003). The first Additional Protocol added
as a "grave breach" to the Conventions, the willful "transfer by the Occupying Power of
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" and noticeably omitted
"deport." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art.
85(4)(a), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391. Further, the Rome Conference
established "the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its
own civilian population into the territory it occupies" as a crime within the competence of
the International Criminal Court. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 8(2)(b)(viii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Rabkin has noted these linguistic
changes were intended "to imply that the issue was not forcible transfer but any
permission for Israeli citizens to take up residence in the territories won in 1967."
Rabkin, supra, at 198. Significantly and ironically, these linguistic alterations also
support the notion that the language of Article 49(6) does imply the use of force. Israel
has not signed or ratified either Protocol 1 or the Rome Statute.
376. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, at art. 45.
377. Id. art. 127.
378. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("Prisoners of war may only be
transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention ... ").
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the use of similar terminology in the Third Geneva Convention, the
comments of delegates to the Convention, and the overriding context
surrounding the drafting of the Geneva Convention support an
interpretation that voluntary movement of civilians is not prohibited by
Article 49(6). To Julius Stone, writing in reference to this paragraph,
"the word 'transfer' in itself implies that the movement is not voluntary
on the part of the persons concerned, but a magisterial act of the state
concerned., 379 Terming a contrary interpretation of Article 49(6) as "an
irony bordering on the absurd," he commented:
Ignoring the overall purpose of Article 49, which would inter alia
protect the population of the State of Israel from being removed
against their will into the occupied territory, it is now sought to be
interpreted so as to impose on the Israel government a duty to prevent
any Jewish individual from voluntarily taking up residence in that
380area.
Eugene Rostow concurred that "the provision was drafted to deal with
'individual or mass forcible transfers of population,' like those in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary before and after the Second World
War.",381 In contrast, Rostow characterized Jewish settlers in the West
Bank as "most emphatically volunteers, 382 and concluded that Jews had
every right to settle on the West Bank "equivalent in every way to the
right of the existing population to live there. 383
e. Commentary IV and its sources
There is "more," however, and that additional input casts some
doubt on the meaning and purpose of Article 49(6). Under the general
editorship of Jean S. Pictet, Director Delegate of the ICRC, the
379. SToNE, supra note 124, at 180.
380. Id.
381. Rostow, supra note 182, at 160.
382. Rostow, supra note 114, at 719. Gorenberg details the extent to which
settlement groups coaxed or even coerced the Israeli government to permit settlement
activities during the first ten years of Israel's control over the West Bank. See generally
GORENBERG, supra note 228. Although Gorenberg also relates how different Israeli
government officials at one time or another supported these activities-frequently below
the radar of the Israeli cabinet-it seems clear the dominant causal arrow ran from
settlers to government (i.e., settlers' "facts on the ground" or pressure leading to late
governmental recognition) rather than from government to settlers (i.e., governmental
pressure or incentives leading to settlement activity). See generally id. For example, in
describing the establishment of a Golan Heights settlement, which set the pattern for
settlements elsewhere, especially the West Bank, Gorenberg concludes: "This was one
more variation on creating facts: from the bottom up, the activists pulling in sympathetic
officers and officials, intent on dragging the government after them. They would set
policy, and draw the map of the country themselves." Id. at 71.
383. Rostow, supra note 114, at 720.
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sponsoring organization of the Geneva Conference and the organization
under whose auspices the Convention was drafted, several members and
former members of the ICRC wrote a commentary on the Convention,
published in its original French version approximately seven years after
the conference. 385  Like "official comments" of a statute subsequently
written by non-legislators who participated in drafting the legislation,
there is serious question of what weight to attach to commentary of an
international treaty published well after the conference where the drafts
were discussed, the final draft adopted, and the Convention signed by the
delegates and ratified by various governments. 386  Nonetheless,
Commentary IV has been given authoritative weight,387 and therefore
must be considered.
384. See COMMENTARY IV, supra note 345. The actual authors are identified as Oscar
M. Uhler, Frederic Siordet, Roger Boppe, Henri Coursier, Claude Pilloud, Rene-Jean
Wilhelm, and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer. Of these parties, Pictet, Siordet, Pilloud, and
Wilhelm attended the diplomatic conference as "experts."
385. See COMMENTAIRE: IV LA CONVENTION DE GENEVE RELATIVE A LA PROTECTION
DES PERSONNES CrVTLES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE (Jean S. Pictet ed., Comite International de
la Croix-Rouge Geneve 1956).
386. Israel signed the Convention on December 8, 1949, and the Knesset ratified the
Convention on July 6, 1951.
387. See, e.g., Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 194, at 246 & n.68, 252 & n.95, 581 &
n. 180; Imseis, supra note 110, at 103. Interestingly, both authors whitewash the language
in Commentary IV, Imseis by omission and Ben-Naftali, by rephrasing. Commentary
IV's expression of concern for the "separate existence [of the native population] as a
race," COMMENTARY IV, supra note 345, at 283, becomes, in Ben-Naftali, an "intent...
to maintain a general demographic status quo in occupied territories." Ben-Naftali et al.,
supra note 194, at 581. Not surprisingly, in light of the focus on Nazi behavior during
World War II, the notion of racial separateness ran contrary to the delegates' views at the
1949 Diplomatic Conference. See infra notes 403-04 and accompanying text. Kretzmer
also relies heavily on Commentary IV in criticizing the Israeli Supreme Court's
interpretation of Article 49. See KRETZMER, supra note 212, at 49-50. Significantly,
Kretzmer's preference for Pictet over Stone's view (which the court has relied upon)
proceeds not only from Pictet's status as the editor-in-chief of Commentary IV, but also
because Commentary IV "was written before 1967, was not related to any specific
conflict and is therefore obviously an objective view of the Convention." Id. However,
Kretzmer does not mention that Commentry IV was written well after the delegates at the
Geneva Diplomatic Conference discussed, approved and signed the Convention and,
likewise, after its ratification by governments. Its forward explicitly states it "is the
personal work of its authors," Forward to COMMENTARY IV, supra note 345, at 1, and
"emphasize[s] that only the participant States are qualified, through consultation between
themselves, to give an official and, as it were, authentic interpretation of an
intergovernmental treaty." Id. As Rabkin has pointed out, "[n]othing in the conventions
indicates that the ICRC has any authoritative role as interpreter of the conventions, much
less any authority to enforce compliance." Rabkin, supra note 375, at 179; see also Jason
Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1025,
1041-46 (2004) (disputing, on basis of Final Record, view expressed in Commentary IV
that all unlawful combatants are protected by Fourth Geneva Convention and
characterizing ICRC's activities at Geneva Convention as "more akin to a special interest
group than to a neutral, dispassionate observer").
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Referring to the theme of Article 49 as a whole, Commentary IV
states: "It will suffice to mention that millions of human beings were
torn from their homes, separated from their families and deported from
their country, usually under inhumane conditions." 388 But the authors
were less certain of the role of Article 49(6) and commented:
It is intended to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World
War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own
population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in
order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers
worsened the economic situation of the native population and
endangered their separate existence as a race.
389
Moreover, in addition to the above, the authors posited:
It would therefore appear to have been more logical-and this was
pointed out at the Diplomatic Conference-to have made the clause
in question into a separate provision distinct from Article 49, so that
the concepts of "deportations" and "transfers" in that Article could
have kept throughout the meaning given them in paragraph [one], i.e.
the compulsory movement of protected persons from occupied
territory.
In other words, Commentary IV suggests two things that might give
pause with respect to the prior conclusion that Article 49(6) was intended
to protect the civilians of the occupying power's own country (e.g.,
Germany) from their forcible transfer to the occupied territory (e.g.,
Auschwitz or other concentration camps in Poland). First, the purpose of
Article 49(6) was the protection of two parties: (1) the occupied power's
civilians transported against their will into occupied territory; and (2) the
native people of the occupied territory. Second, it suggests the terms
"transfer" and "deport" were not used with the same connotation of
involuntariness or compulsion that these terms connoted in Article 49(1).
To the extent its purpose was to protect the racial purity or
economic situation of the native population, could it not be argued that
Article 49(6) should be interpreted most liberally and broadly against any
actions of an occupying power that sponsor or promote the movement of
an occupant's population into the occupied territory?391 Indeed,
Palestinians and settlement opponents argue quite vigorously that the
settlement enterprise intended to change the demographic composition of
the West Bank. Moreover, does not the suggestion of a different
388. COMMENTARY IV, supra note 345, at 278.
389. Id. at 283 (emphasis added); see Imseis, supra note 110, at 103 (citing without
further inquiry into sources relied upon in text).
390. COMMENTARY IV, supra note 345, at 283 (footnote omitted).
391. See Kretzmer, supra note 341, at 91.
2006]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
meaning or usage of "transfer" and "deport" in Article 49(6) support the
notion that Israel's actions-allegedly a combination of subsidies, tax,
and infrastructure improvements for the use of settlements and
confiscation of Arab lands 392-have violated Article 49(6)'s prohibition?
But, while the historical record does provide support for the first notion
(that the beneficiaries of Article 49(6)'s prohibition included the native
population of the occupied territory), it does not confirm the latter (that
"transfer" as used in Article 49(6), unlike its usage in Article 49(1), did
not connote compulsion).
As support for the idea that the prohibition had as one, if not
primary, purpose to. protect the native population of the occupied
territory, Commentary IV cites several pages in a type-written report that
tersely summarized discussions in a sub-committee of the Legal
Commission at the Stockholm Conference (interestingly, this is the only
citation to this source in Commentary IV/). 3 93 The reference seems to
392. For example, Roberts opined, "[E]ven if voluntary settlement of nationals on an
individual basis were permissible under Article 49, the ambitious settlements program of
the 1980s, which was planned, encouraged and financed at the governmental level, does
not meet that description." Roberts, supra note 208, at 85. He concludes, "The
settlements program is quite simply contrary to international law," id., but cites no
authority except UN General Assembly Resolutions. Elsewhere, Roberts admits that UN
General Assembly resolutions can be the product of bias against Israel, including the
infamous 1975 resolution equating Zionism (the notion that Jews have a right to
statehood) with racism. Id. at 100.
393. See COMMENTARY V, supra note 345, at 283 (citing ICRC, LEGAL COMMISSION
SUMMARY OF THE DEBATES OF THE SuB-COMMISSIONS (1948) [hereinafter ICRC,
SUMMARY OF SuB-COMMISSION DEBATES]). Because this summary is unavailable either
in the United States or on the internet, the notes kept from the meeting are presented
below with the scant recorded introduction of the proposal at a first meeting, its tabling
until a second meeting, its contraction, and the ambiguous references of various
participants. Discussion of Article 45 at first meeting:
M. Cohn (Danemark, Gvt.) propose d'ajouter un nouvel alina ainsi conqu:
"La Puissance occupante ne pourra pas procder b la d~portation ou au
transfert d'une partie de sa propre population ou de la population d'un autre
territoire qu'elle occupe dans le territoire occupg par elle, " ceci afin de
prot~ger la population d'un Etat occup6 contre une invasion de personnes.
M Pilloud (CICR), croit qu 'il s 'agit l6 plut6t des devoirs de la Puissance
occupante, ce qui n'est pas entirement du ressort de la Croix-Rouge
internationale. Nous devons chercher 6 prot~ger plut6t les ressortissants d'un
pays.
M Castnerg (Norvge, Gvt.) appuie la proposition de M Cohn car il estime
que ce nouvel alin~a prot~gerait les nationaux d'un pays occupJ contre un
envahissement de personnes venant d'autre territoires et qu 'il faudrait nourrir,
etc.
La Commission, sur proposition de MM. Holmgren (Subde, CR.) et Abut
(Turquie, CR.), decide de diffirer sa dcision sur cet article et d'attendre que
la proposition de M. Cohn ait 9M distribue.
M Clattenburg (YSA, Gvt.) demande qu'au premier alinea de l'article 45 on
ajoute "contre leur gr '" apr~s "les dportations ou transferts. " Cette
proposition est adoptde. L 'article 45 avec ou sans addition de la proposition
[Vol. 25:1
THE UNEXPLORED OPTION
have been directed primarily to the remarks of Dr. Georg Cohn of
Denmark, who is reported to have initially introduced the provision with
reference to "protecting the inhabitants of an occupied State against an
invasion of people. 394 Cohn's initial provision would have prohibited
an occupying power from deporting or transferring a "part of its own
inhabitants or the inhabitants of another territory which it occupies into
the occupied territory. '395 Claude Pilloud, Chief of the ICRC Legal
Division, reacted seemingly with some skepticism and with ambiguous
references to aspects of Cohn's proposal directed "at the duties of the
occupying power, which is not entirely within the competence of the
International Red Cross." Pilloud concluded, "We should therefore try to
protect a country's nationals." It is unclear from the abbreviated
summary whether Pilloud's reference to "a country's nationals" referred
to the transferred population of the occupying power or the inhabitants of
the occupied territory.396
The proposal to add the provision was first shelved to allow
interested parties to consider it. Cohn reintroduced his text at the next
subcommittee meeting, without reference to the intended beneficiaries of
the prohibition.397 Other participants at the subcommittee committee, led
de M Cohn sera mis aux voix lors de la prochaine sdance.
ICRC, SUMMARY OF SuB-COMMISSION DEBATES, supra, at 61-62. Discussion of Article
45 at next meeting:
M Cohn (Danemark, Gvt.) propose l'addition suivante e6 l'article 45: "La
Puissance occupante ne pourra pas procider 9 la dportation ou au transfert
d'une partie de sa propre population ou de la population d'un autre territoire
qu 'elle occupe dans le territoire occupg par elle. "
Apris une discussion ci laquelle ont pris part M Clattenburg (USA, Gvt.) qui
estime que cet alinea a un sens beaucoup trop 9tendu, M Wershof (Canada,
Gvt.) et M Pilloud (CICR), la sous-commission adopte cet alinja modifi
comme suit: "La Puissance occupante ne pourra proc~der 6 la diportation ou
au transfert d'une partie de sa proper population civile dans le territoire
occupg par elle. "
M Wershof (Canada, Gvt.) signale qu 'il s 'est abstenu de voter, non qu'il
r~prouve les sentiments exprims dans cet alinga, mais il estime que cette
conftrence n 'est pas habilitge pour examiner dans cet alinja des questions de
ce genre et trouve que la Convention n 'a pas pour but de montrer 6 des
Nations comment elles doivent faire la guerre.
Id. at 77-78.
394. Id. at 61-62. It should be emphasized that, apart from the exact language
included in the sentence Cohn proposed for inclusion, the quoted language is part of the
summary of the discussions and does not pretend to represent Cohn's exact language.
395. ICRC, SUMMARY OF SUB-COMMISSION DEBATES, supra note 393, at 61-62.
396. In French, Cohn used the phrase "la population d'un Etat occupe," id., while
Pilloud used "les ressortissants d'un pays." Jd.
397. Id. at 77-78. Cohn's original text would have prohibited the Occupying Power
from deporting or transferring not only its own inhabitants, but also those of another
occupied territory into its occupied territory. Arguably, although reference to inhabitants
of another territory does not relate to whether the primary purpose of the provision was to
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by Albert J. Clattenburg, Jr. of the United States, thought the provision
was too broad. After discussion, the language "or the inhabitants of
another territory which it occupies" was deleted, and the word "civil"
was added prior to "inhabitants" in the French text.
Shortly after the 1949 Geneva Conference, Hersh Lauterpacht
published a new edition of Oppenheim's International Law in which he
opined that Article 49(6)'s "prohibition [was] intended to cover cases of
the occupant bringing in its nationals for the purpose of displacing the
population of the occupied territory. 398  Lauterpacht, the very
distinguished English law professor and member of the ICJ, was a legal
expert to the Stockholm Draft at a committee of experts in December of
1948, but that meeting apparently concerned certain "grave breach"
provisions common to all four of the Geneva Conventions and occurred
subsequently to the Stockholm Conference where the language of Article
45(5) was introduced and fixed.399 In the preface to his edition of
Oppenheim's text, Lauterpacht thanks Pilloud of the ICRC "for
information concerning the Geneva Conventions of 1949. ' 4°° Pilloud,
who, as mentioned above, was chief of the Legal Division of the ICRC
and a participant at the legal subcommittee meeting at the Stockholm
Conference, is also listed as one of the authors of Commentary IV,
although not the principal one. It is a reasonable assumption that
protect transferred parties or the native population of occupied territories, it suggests that
"transfer" refers to forced movements of people by the Occupying Power rather than
voluntary movements. The phrase "or the inhabitants of another territory which it
occupies" was deleted at the suggestion of Albert E. Clattenburg, Jr., a representative of
the United States, who thought the paragraph "too extensive." Clattenburg Was the First
Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon and former Chief of Special War Problems
Division of Department of State during World War II. In the latter capacity, he
apparently resisted an attempt to save Jews from the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp
by exchanging them for interned Germans in South America. See Max Paul Friedman,
The U.S. State Department and the Failure to Rescue: New Evidence on the Missed
Opportunity at Bergen-Belsen, 19 HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUD. 26, 40 (2005).
Clattenburg also participated in a program of interning Japanese Peruvians during World
War 11. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border: The Interdependence of Foreign
Policy and Racial Justice in the United States, 1 YALE HuM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 53, 69-70
& n.79 (1999). In addition, Cohn's proposal at the two meetings had no adjective prior to
the word "inhabitants." As adopted by the Committee, the French word for "civil" was
inserted prior to inhabitants. ICRC, SUMMARY OF SUB-COMMISSION DEBATES, supra note
393, at 78.
398. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 169, at 452. This would seem to be the same meaning
suggested by one modem text of international humanitarian law, written without any
reference to Israel and the West Bank: "Once occupation is established, individual or
mass forcible transfers or deportation are prohibited, apart from the evacuations dictated
by imperative military necessity.... In no circumstances may evacuated areas be
repopulated by nationals transferred from the home territories of the occupying power."
MCCOUBREY, supra note 324, at 199 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
399. BEST, supra note 171, at 93-94.
400. See 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 169, at vii-viii.
[Vol. 25:1
THE UNEXPLORED OPTION
Lauterpacht divined the meaning of the paragraph from Pilloud.
Commentary IV notes that "[a]fter passing through these various
stages, the draft texts were taken as the only working documents for the
Diplomatic Conference. ' '401 From this text, it appears the delegates did
not have the summaries of the committee discussions before them, and
those delegates who spoke with respect to Article 45 did not include the
members of the legal subcommittee that added Article 45(5). In any
event, while it may be unclear who the Geneva delegates understood to
be the intended beneficiaries of the prohibition in Article 45(5), all
explicit references by delegates to "transfers"--whether of protected
persons, internees, the occupying power's civilian population, or
others-seemed to focus either upon the need to protect the transferred
population or, in transfers for the benefit of transferees, the necessity of
notification to, and having regard for the needs of, the "protecting
power."
Certainly, the theme of racial or ethnic purity expressed in
Commentary IV cannot be found in either the remarks of the legal
subcommittee that inserted the provision into Article 45 or elsewhere in
the Fourth Geneva Convention-quite the contrary. Article 13, the first
provision of Part II ("General Protection of Populations against Certain
Consequences of War"), which applies even if the parties affected are not
"protected parties" under the Geneva Convention, states that the
provisions of Part II "cover the whole of the population of the countries
in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race,
nationality, religion or political opinion. ' A4 2  Part III ("Status and
Treatment of Protected Persons") provides that "all protected persons
shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in
whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in
particular, on race, religion or political opinion. 4 °3 Further, of course,
modern trends in international human rights law, including negative
views of immigration restrictions based upon color or ethnicity and
positive views of granting political asylum, 404 show no respect for a
notion of preserving the racial composition or ethnic integrity of the
country of immigration, although they do evince support for self-
determination.
In less racial terms,405 whatever the intent of the settlement
401. COMMENTARY IV, supra note 345, at 6.
402. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 13.
403. Id. art. 27.
404. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, art.
14(1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("Everyone
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.").
405. See supra note 35 (discussing populations).
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promoters, the negative one imputed to Israel by its opponents-to
displace the Palestinian population with Israeli Jews-or a positive
one-facilitating the rights of Jews to live on the West Bank without
prejudice to the rights of Palestinians,4 °6 it is difficult to argue that
Jewish settlements have materially altered the ethnic balance of the West
Bank.4 °7  Excluding disputed neighborhoods in Jerusalem and
settlements contiguous to the pre-1967 armistice lines, Jews at most
constitute no more than eight percent of the West Bank's population, less
than four percent of a future Palestinian state that would include Gaza,
and an even smaller percentage of the population if at least some
Palestinian refugees return to live in either the West Bank or Gaza.4 °8
Moreover, while the 1967 War, like the 1948 War, produced some
refugees, there is no evidence that there was any nexus between Arab
refugees in 1967 and plans to construct and populate Jewish settlements.
Thus, this situation differs substantially from efforts by the Soviet Union
to alter the ethnic makeup of the Baltic States by initially deporting
hundreds of thousands of people and encouraging Russian
immigration,40 9 and China to alter the ethnic makeup of Tibet by forcibly
406. See Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 184 ("[T]he movement of
individuals to the territory is entirely voluntary, while the settlements themselves are not
intended to displace Arab inhabitants, nor do they do so in practice."). Further,
Menachem Begin, while a believer in a Greater Israel including the West Bank, rejected
the notion of denying equal rights to Palestinians and "believed that both Jews and Arabs
would live in peace and harmony in the State of Israel." Arye Naor, "Behold, Rachel,
Behold": The Six Day War as a Biblical Experience and Its Impact on Israel's Political
Mentality, 24 J. ISR. HIST. 229, 243-44 (2005).
407. Further, the Palestinian economic situation improved appreciably from 1967 to
1995 (the approximate date that the Palestinian Authority assumed control over most of
the West Bank). Life expectancy increased, infant mortality fell, and medium to strong
economic growth occurred. See Zimmerman et al., supra note 35. On the other hand, it
can also be argued Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy had a negative effect
that presently requires substantial recovery.
408. During the first decade of Israeli control over the West Bank, the number of
settlers, approximately 2,000, and their percentage of the population, approximately 0.5
percent, were even smaller, but, at that point, there was no movement from Arabs to
make peace. See GERSON, supra note 168, at 174. Certainly, during the first decade
when the Labor party still dominated the Israeli government, "in the perspective of
contemporary international law, Israel's land acquisition and settlement policy was not
unlawful as it neither aimed for, nor neared, a stage involving displacement of the
existing population as a prelude to future annexation." Id. at 173.
409. See THOMAS A. ARMS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COLD WAR 43 (1994). While the
deportations began under Stalin in 1945 prior to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the
movement of Russians in to the Baltic States continued even under Khruschev and
Brezhnev "so that by 1980 of 1.5 million citizens in Estonia, only 900,000 were ethnic
Estonians." Id. The forced deportations of hundreds of thousands of natives continued
throughout the Baltic States and through the Russification of Estonia, Latvia, and to a
lesser extent Lithuania. See WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR., BALTIC INDEPENDENCE AND
RUSSIAN EMPIRE 56-57 (1991); JOHN HIDEN & PATRICK SALMON, THE BALTIC NATIONS
AND EUROPE: ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANAI IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 131 (rev. ed.
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scattering its native population and moving Chinese into Tibetan territory
in their stead. 1
With respect to Commentary IV's support for an interpretation of
"transfer" different from the rest of Article 49, footnote three refers
solely to the Final Record of the Geneva Conference, which contains the
remarks of delegates Morosov of the Soviet Union, Slamet of the
Netherlands, and Maresca from Italy (discussed previously), none of
whom suggested the removal of Article 49(6) to a separate article, and all
of whom referred to "transfers" in the negative sense as involving force
and compulsion.41' At the close of the sixteenth committee meeting
considering the civilians' convention, Mr. Georges Cahen-Salvador of
France, chair of the committee, was reported to have summed up the
discussion concerning the whole of Article 49 in the following way:
The Chairman, before declaring the discussion on Article 45 closed,
noted that the Committee was unanimous in condemnation of the
abominable practice of deportations. The sole purpose of every
speaker had been to strengthen the interdictory provisions of the
Article. He suggested that deportations should, in the same way as
the taking of hostages, be solemnly prohibited in the Preamble.
4 12
The delegates, meeting as a committee before the draft was presented to
the plenary session for approval, proceeded to discuss succeeding
articles. No one argues that Israel forcibly moved settlers into the West
Bank; however, as part of the Gaza disengagement, Israel did forcibly
remove settlers from four settlements in the Northern West Bank and has
since begun to evacuate, with force, illegal outposts having some
permanent residents.
f. Other considerations: Avoiding absurdity and circularity and
accounting for the element of time
Several other considerations-most notably, avoiding absurd
1994) ("By 1979 ethnic Latvians constituted only 38.3 percent of their own capital,
Riga."); ROMUALD J. MISIUNAS & REIN TAAGEPERA, THE BALTIC STATES: YEARS OF
DEPENDENCE, 1940-1990, at 102, 112 (1993) (one-tenth of Latvian and Estonian farmers
were deported, and "[t]he Latvians' share of their country's population was probably
around [eighty-three] percent in 1945, but dropped to about [sixty] percent by 1953, due
to immigration and deportations").
410. See John S. Hall, Chinese Population Transfer in Tibet, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 173 (2001). The reticence of the international community actively and
vociferously to criticize China's human rights record in this regard is explored by Philip
Baker. See Philip Baker, Human Rights, Europe and the People 's Republic of China, 169
P.R.C. Q. 45 (2002).
411. See supra notes 359-67 and accompanying text.
412. 2A FINAL RECORD, supra note 169, at 664.
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conclusions, avoiding circularity of meaning and taking account of the
element of time--counsel against the conclusion that Israeli settlements
violate Article 49(6), especially on the basis of preserving any alleged
racial or ethnic purity of Palestinians. While Julius Stone considered
Israeli settlements in compliance with both of the themes that, at least in
his reading of Commentary IV, inhered in Article 49(6) (protecting the
occupying power's civilians from transfer against their will and
protecting nationals of the occupied territory from a mass influx that
historically had often accompanied forcible transfer of nationals out of
occupied territory), he said the following about Israel's obligation to
keep Israeli volunteers from settling on the West Bank:
[W]e would have to say that the effect of Article 49(6) is to impose
an obligation on the [S]tate of Israel to ensure (by force if necessary)
that these areas, despite their millennial association with Jewish life,
shall be forever judenrein. Irony would thus be pushed to the
absurdity of claiming that Article 49(6), designed to prevent
repetition of Nazi-type genocidal policies of rendering Nazi
metropolitan territoriesjudenrein, has now come to mean that.., the
West Bank... must be madejudenrein and must be so maintained, if
necessary by the use of force by the government of Israel against its
own inhabitants.
Common sense as well as correct historical and functional context
exclude so tyrannical a reading of Article 49(6). 4 3
Stone's observation invites a hypothetical: suppose a group of
Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel requested permission to
establish a community on the West Bank. Further, assume, without loss
of their citizenship, Israel facilitated the community's establishment on
land purchased from other Palestinian Arabs (not citizens of Israel) or on
state land. Would establishment of this settlement violate Article 49(6)?
If not, how can one distinguish the hypothetical from Jewish settlements?
Those who most vigorously allege that Jewish settlements violate
Article 49(6) generally do not differentiate between settlements
established prior or subsequent to actions by the Israeli government that,
for a time, are said to have promoted settlement activity. To these
opponents, the military government's permission to establish a
settlement itself would be prohibited. The argument that only Jewish
settlements established without any state involvement satisfy Article 49,
therefore, leads to another absurdity: only Jewish settlements
unauthorized by the military commander, and thus illegal under Israeli
413. STONE, supra note 124, at 180.
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law,414 are lawful under Article 49. Only occupants of these illegal
outposts would truly qualify as "volunteers" not related to Israeli
government action in any way.
Circularity of interpretation should also be avoided. Concluding
Israeli settlements violate Article 49(6) overlooks the Jewish
communities that formerly existed in areas occupied by today's Israeli
settlements, for example, in Hebron and the Etzion Bloc. 415  These
Jewish communities were destroyed by Arab armies, militias, and rioters,
and, as in the case of Hebron, the community's population was
slaughtered. Is it sensible to interpret Article 49 to bar the reconstitution
of Jewish communities that were destroyed through aggression and
slaughter? If so, the international law of occupation runs the risk of
freezing one occupier's conduct in place, no matter how unlawful.
Further, under what theory can one distinguish between settlements and
the reconstruction and repopulation of the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem's
old city, which was also destroyed by the Jordanians in its 1948
occupation of the West Bank?416 To claim these acts of Arab aggression
against Jewish communities preceded the Geneva Convention, whereas
the establishment of Jewish settlements on the West Bank succeeds it,
would be a "technicality" hardly consistent with the view that the
applicability provision of Article 2 is a "technicality" not to be relied
upon or the view that "occupying power" and "transfers" should be
interpreted most broadly to accord with the Convention's humanitarian
purposes.
Suppose that, irrespective of any textual, contextual, historical, or
purposive analysis and the voluntary movements of Jews,to civilian
settlements on the West Bank, one still wishes to assert that the initial
establishment of Israeli civilian settlements on the West Bank violated
Article 49(6). Substantially, all legal systems take account of the
element of time, which bears on both the relevance of legal doctrine as
well as the equities of parties involved.417 International law is no
414. See Sason, supra note 8.
415. See Lein, supra note 35, at 11 ("As early as September 1967, KfarEzyon became
the first settlement to be established in the West Bank. It was established because of the
pressure of a group of settlers, some of whom were relatives of the residents of the
original community of Kfar Ezyon, which was abandoned and destroyed during the 1948
war.") (emphasis added).
416. To its "credit" on grounds of consistency, B'Tselem does not do so,
characterizing the Jewish quarter in the Old City as a "settlement." Id. at 103. Most
people would presumably recoil at this characterization, as the property in this area has
been owned and populated by Jews for centuries (if not millennia), the synagogues were
destroyed during Jordanian occupation, and Judaism's holiest site, the Western Wall, lies
at the edge of the area.
417. A domestic example might be the doctrine of adverse possession, where open
use of another's property after a certain number of years results in title passing to the
2006]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
exception. For example, after substantial time has passed, should the
remedy under international law for dispossession of property be a right to
repossession or compensation? Generally, the international practice has
been, at best, to grant compensation rather than a right to repossession
based upon dated claims. And, even then, compensation has been based
upon what Benvenisti and Zamir call "adequate compensation" rather
than "fair value.''418 No one disputes that the Hague Regulations were
designed to regulate short-term occupations.41 9 While it is argued that
the Geneva Convention, because of its greater focus on the protection of
people rather than sovereign states, does not necessarily presuppose that
only short-term occupations are meant to be regulated by its provisions,
no one contends its drafters or signatories contemplated a lawful
belligerent occupation lasting close to forty years. 420  As George Best
comments:
The makers of the Civilian Conventions can never have envisaged a
military occupation as unprecedentedly prolonged as this, or
circumstances as intractable as those which tangle together the new
State of Israel, the neighboring Arab States (most of them in some
sense new too), and the dis?2ossessed Palestinian people bearing the
aspect of a State-in-waiting.
In its original guise, the Geneva Convention included a one-year
provision after which only certain provisions would continue to be
binding on signatory states.422 Surely, there is a difference between a
lawful occupation that lasts five to ten years (relatively "long" in terms
of the Hague Regulations),423 and one that lasts forty years or more. At
occupier from the original owner.
418. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 40, at 328-31.
419. See BENVENISTI, supra note 159, at 27.
420. See Roberts, supra note 208, at 71 ("[T]he Fourth [Geneva] Convention was
designed to protect the civilian population under an essentially temporary occupation.").
However, Roberts states elsewhere, "The proposition that the basic rules codified in the
law on occupations must continue to be observed for as long as the occupation lasts is a
usefil compass bearing to guide one through this difficult subject." Id. at 54.
421. See BEST, supra note 171, at 316.
422. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 6; see Roberts, supra note 208,
at 55. Although Israel has not ratified Protocol 1, it has never relied on Article 6 to
advance its position that the Geneva Convention is inapplicable to its control over the
West Bank; Israel does insist it conforms to the Convention's humanitarian provisions.
See Roberts, supra note 208, at 55 ("Israeli authorities have never invoked it as a means
of reducing their obligations.") (footnote omitted). In any event, the one-year provision
specifically does not apply to Article 49. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note
158, art. 6.
423. Roberts defines a "prolonged occupation" as one "that lasts more than [five]
years and extends into a period when hostilities are sharply reduced-i.e., a period at
least approximating peacetime." Roberts, supra note 208, at 47. Roberts, who is critical
of Israeli settlements, wrote in 1990 at a period when Israel's control over the West Bank
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some point it becomes absurd to argue that an occupying power cannot
permit its own citizens to settle on disputed land, 4  which is not
privately owned, especially in areas once occupied by Jews, simply
because they belong to the dominant ethnic group of the occupying
power. The contrary conclusion could well be reached if, consistent with
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, Arab states had negotiated and
arrived at peace treaties with Israel, or if Palestinians had accepted a
negotiated settlement of all claims with Israel in 2000, that is, if the
occupation had persisted not because of Israel's legitimate security
concerns, but because of Israel's refusal to settle claims with the
Palestinians. It can even be argued that, at some point, uprooting the
settlers becomes a wrong comparable to those at which Article 49 is
directed. In short, even if one adopts an interpretation of the Geneva
Convention that would dictate the initial illegality of Israeli settlements,
both time and culpability for failing to resolve the conflict should be
accorded some weight in adjudging their present legality.
g. Judicial interpretation
The only instance of the ICJ applying or interpreting Article 49(6)
was its advisory opinion in 2004, which responded to a request from an
emergency session of the UN General Assembly to evaluate the legality
of Israel's security fence.425 Israel appeared only to contest the court's
jurisdiction. For the most part, the fence follows the route of the Green
Line, but is in many instances constructed to its east, that is, in the West
Bank. Writing for the ICJ, its President, Shi Jiuyong of China, reiterated
the commonly accepted position that the Fourth Geneva Convention does
apply to Israel's control over the West Bank. In his opinion, he also
opined that Israeli settlements violate Article 49(6), which he interpreted
as "prohibit[ing] not only deportations or forced transfers of population
such as those carried out during the Second World War, but also any
measures taken by an occupying Power in order to organize or encourage
,'426transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied territory. As
support, the opinion cited three resolutions adopted by the Security
was approaching twenty-five years-a far cry from the forty years that is now imminent.
Moreover, while the consideration of time might be analyzed differently if the failure to
end the hostilities and the resultant occupation primarily lay at Israel's feet, but the
weight of authority is to the contrary. See supra notes 187-206 and accompanying text.
424. In this regard, one of the strongest grounds given by an opponent of Israeli
settlements-that settlements were established on indisputably sovereign territories-
does not apply to the West Bank. See Roberts, supra note 208, at 64-65.
425. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). The opinion was sought by the Tenth
Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly.
426. Id. at 183.
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Council in 1979 and 1980,427 but the court did not otherwise buttress its
interpretation with any reference to the drafting history of Article 49(6),
the understandings at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference, the Nazi
behaviors to which Article 49 was directed, or contrary views.
From the court's perspective, its opinion regarding Article 49(6)
was hardly dictum, however. In addition to protecting the lives of
soldiers and Israeli civilians living within the Green Line, protecting
Israeli settlers on the West Bank would also explain the positioning of
the fence, at least at the time of the court's opinion.428 Implicit in the
court's opinion, therefore, was the notion that such a purpose could not
serve as justification for constructing a fence on occupied territory. On
the other hand, since the court held that any part of the fence lying within
the West Bank was unlawful, and not simply parts designed to protect
settlers, its view of the scope of Article 49(6) was actually irrelevant to
its broad decision with respect to the fence. 429 The vote of the court was
fourteen to one. While six justices who joined the majority wrote
separate opinions, none expressed a difference of opinion with respect to
Article 49(6). Justice Thomas Buergenthal wrote the lone dissent and
thought the court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction in light of
the fact that it "did not have ... the requisite factual bases for its
sweeping findings., 430 Nonetheless, he agreed that Article 49 "applies to
the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and that their existence
violates ... [Article 49(6)].,,431 He concluded "that the segments of the
wall being built by Israel to protect the settlements are ipso facto in
violation of international humanitarian law."A
32
In Elon Moreh, the 1979 Israeli Supreme Court decision that greatly
impacted where subsequent Israeli settlements could be established,
Justice Witkon, unlike his other colleagues, was prepared to apply the
427. Id. at 184 (citing S.C. Res. 446, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979); S.C. Res.
452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/452 (July 20, 1979); S.C. Res. 465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1,
1980)). Resolution 465 describes "Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its
population and new immigrants in [the occupied] territories [as] a flagrant violation of
the Fourth Geneva Convention." S.C. Res. 465, supra, 5.
428. The court stated: "it is apparent from an examination of the map mentioned in
paragraph [eighty] above that the wall's sinuous route has been traced in such a way as to
include within that area the great majority of the Israeli settlements in the occupied
Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem)." Consequences of Wall in Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.C.J. at 183. However, the positioning of the security fence has shifted a
number of times since, sometimes at the instance of questioning by the Israeli Supreme
Court. See infra notes 436-38 and accompanying text.
429. See Lapidoth, supra note 342, at 293 ("[D]iscussion of the legality of the
settlements was not necessary, and thus is only an obiter dictum.") (footnote omitted).
430. Consequences of Wall in Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. at 240 (Buergenthal,
J., dissenting).
431. Id. at 244.
432. Id.
[Vol. 25:1
THE UNEXPLORED OPTION
Fourth Geneva Convention to Israel's control over the West Bank.
However, he noted in his concurring opinion, "[T]he question whether
voluntary settlement falls under the prohibition of 'transferring sections
of the population' within the meaning of Article 49(b) of the Geneva
Convention is not an easy one and.., no answer has yet been found in
international jurisprudence. ' 433 The view expressed by Justice Witkon
concerning the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to Israel's
control over the West Bank presaged a subtle shift on the part of the
Israeli Supreme Court. In later cases, the court measured Israeli actions
against the standards of the Convention's humanitarian provisions, in
part because the government of Israel, despite its official stance
regarding the Convention's non-applicability, claimed its actions
conformed to the Convention.434 Despite disagreeing with the ICJ as to
433. 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note 227, at 438 (quoting
HCJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. Israel (Elon Moreh) [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1 (Witkon, J.,
concurring)). Justice Witkon thought the Geneva Convention applied to Israel's hold on
the West Bank, unlike the view expressed by Justice Landau that the Geneva Convention
"belongs to conventional international law which does not legally bind an Israeli court."
Id. at 419.
434. Most recently, this "construct" was articulated in Mara 'abe v. Prime Minister of
Israel:
The Judea and Samaria areas are held by the State of Israel in belligerent
occupation. The long arm of the state in the area is the military commander.
He is not the sovereign in the territory held in belligerent occupation. His
power is granted him by public international law regarding belligerent
occupation. The legal meaning of this view is twofold: [F]irst, Israeli law does
not apply in these areas. They have not been "annexed" to Israel. Second, the
legal regime which applies in these areas is determined by public international
law regarding belligerent occupation. In the center of this public international
law stand the [Hague] Regulations .... These regulations are a reflection of
customary international law. The law of belligerent occupation is also laid out
in [the Fourth] Geneva Convention.... The State of Israel has declared that it
practices the humanitarian parts of this convention. In light of that declaration
on the part of the government of Israel, we see no need to reexamine the
government's position. We are aware that the Advisory Opinion of the [ICJ]
determined that [t]he Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the Judea and
Samaria area, and that its application is not conditional upon the willingness of
the State of Israel to uphold its provisions. As mentioned, seeing as the
government of Israel accepts that the humanitarian aspects of [t]he Fourth
Geneva Convention apply in the area, we are not of the opinion that we must
take a stand on that issue in the petition before us. In addition to those two
sources of international law, there is a third source of law which applies to the
State of Israel's belligerent occupation. That third source is the basic principles
of Israeli administrative law, which is law regarding the use of a public
official's governing power. These principles include, inter alia, rules of
substantive and procedural fairness, the duty to act reasonably, and rules of
proportionality.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, at *8-9, (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf (emphasis and
internal citations omitted).
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whether an occupying power could legally construct a security fence in
occupied territory in order to protect its own citizens from terrorism,
even if those citizens were settlers, 435 the court has required the
government to change the shape and scope of the fence to take greater
account of the interests of Palestinians.436 In these and other more recent
435. Id. The Mara'abe case dealt with a petition by residents of several Palestinian
villages that were separated from the remainder of the West Bank by the placement of
Israel's security fence to protect Alfei Menashe, an Israeli settlement in the West Bank
four kilometers beyond the Green Line. The court's opinion, by President Justice Aharon
Barak, was written in the aftermath of the ICJ's advisory opinion about the security
fence, see supra notes 425-32 and accompanying text, and was as much a response to the
ICJ opinion as it was an adjudication of the rights of the villages affected. The Israel
Supreme Court did order the military, "within a reasonable period, to reconsider the
various alternatives for the separation fence route at Alfei Menashe, while examining
security alternatives which injure the fabric of life of the residents of the villages of the
enclave to a lesser extent." Mara'abe, at 63 (emphasis added).
436. See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2005] IsrSC 58(5) 807.
Beit Sourik occurred prior to the ICJ opinion, while Mara'abe was decided subsequently.
Writing for the court in Beit Sourik, President Barak laid out the test of proportionality
that, according to the court, inheres in both international humanitarian law and Israeli
municipal law:
According to the principle of proportionality, the decision of an
administrative body is legal only if the means used to realize the governmental
objective is of proper proportion. The principle of proportionality focuses,
therefore, on the relationship between the objective whose achievement is
being attempted, and the means used to achieve it.
Id. at 24. Barak then laid out the subtests, all of which must be satisfied, if
proportionality is to be satisfied:
The first subtest is that the objective must be related to the means....
According to the second subtest, the means used by the administrative body
must injure the individual to the least extent possible. In the spectrum of means
which can be used to achieve the objective, the least injurious means must be
used. This is the 'least injurious means' test. The third test requires that the
damage caused to the individual by the means used by the administrative body
in order to achieve its objectives must be of proper proportion to the gain
brought about by that means.
Id. In Beit Sourik, the court was convinced the first two subtests of proportionality were
satisfied, but disagreed that the requirements of the third subtest had been met in a
majority of the instances to which the decision related. Thus, the court ordered the
government and military to change the placement of the fence in the objectionable areas.
Similarly, in Mara'abe, although the court disagreed with the ICJ-both as to whether
the safety of Israel's own citizens could be taken into account with respect to the
placement of the fence, Mara'abe, at 13, and whether international law forbade the
construction of the fence in occupied territory-it did determine that particular segments
of the fence failed the proportionality test, particularly the third subtest. Id. at 63. This
trend has continued. In another recent case, the court also required the Israeli
government to reconfigure the security fence on grounds of hardship to Palestinian
residents or of separation of Palestinians from agricultural lands. See, e.g., Yuval Yoaz,
High Court: State Must Explain Why It Won't Move Separation Fence in Bil'in,
HAARETZ, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?
itemNo=678112. In another case, the court enjoined building .the security fence around
illegal outposts. See Yuval Yoaz, High Court Forbids Building Fence Round Illegal
Avnei Hefetz Outpost, HAARETZ, Jan. 2, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
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opinions, the court has seemed less certain that its basis for adjudging
Israeli actions on the West Bank according to the Fourth Geneva
Convention depends solely upon the government's own claim of
adherence to the Convention's humanitarian provisions.437 As David
Kretzmer, a prominent critic of settlements, acknowledged, "In the last
few years the [c]ourt has also handed down a number of courageous
decisions, supportive of human rights. ''438  Yet, despite this record of
attentiveness to Palestinian interests and decisions that have actually
restricted governmental and military actions vis-A-vis the Palestinians,439
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=664913. In general, the Israeli Supreme Court is regarded as one of
the most impartial judiciaries in the world and seen as highly protective of Palestinian
rights. See DERSHOWITZ, Is Israel the Prime Human Rights Violator in the World?, in
THE CASE FOR ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 181, 183-87; Dorit Beinisch, The Role of the
Supreme Court of Israel in Times of Emergency, GLOBES, Nov. 21, 2002, available at
http://archive.globes.co.il/english/. Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court, particularly under
President Justice Aharon Barak, has been criticized precisely for its judgments allegedly
adverse to Israeli settlers and security. See Caroline Glick, Column One: Israel's
Judicial Tyranny, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/
Satellite?cid=l 132053877195&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
437. For example, in Mara'abe, President Justice Barak's opinion termed the basic
normative foundation of both the ICJ opinion on the security fence and its own to be "a
common one." Specifically, in regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention, he articulated
that commonalty of normative foundation in the following subtle way:
The ICJ held that in an occupied territory, the occupier state must act according
to [t]he Hague Regulations and [t]he Fourth Geneva Convention. That too was
the assumption of the Court in [Beit Sourik], although the question of the force
of [t]he Fourth Geneva Convention was not decided, in light of the State's
declaration that it shall act in accordance with the humanitarian part of that
convention. The ICJ determined that in addition to the humanitarian law, the
conventions on human rights apply in the occupied territory. This question did
not arise in [Beit Sourik]. For the purposes of our judgment in this case, we
assume that these conventions indeed apply.
Mara 'abe, at 36.
438. KRETZMER, supra note 212, at 14.
439. Kretzmer, writing approximately five years ago, noted:
In the last few years the Court has.., handed down a number of courageous
decisions, supportive of human rights. Foremost among these are decisions
forbidding the security services from using any form of physical force in
interrogation of terrorist suspects, denying the authorities the power to use the
law on administrative detention to hold detainees as 'bargaining chips,' and
deeming unlawful restrictions on Arabs purchasing houses in a communal
settlement established on state land by the Jewish Agency.
Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted). A recent example is a case in which the Israeli Supreme
Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, rebuked the municipality of Jerusalem for
having not created enough classrooms for the Arabs of East Jerusalem. The court
ordered the Jerusalem municipality and Israel's Department of Education to draft a plan
to do so within five months. See Ksenia Svetlova, HCJ Rebukes Municipality, Education
Ministry over Education in E. Jerusalem, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 25, 2005,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 1132475619858&pagename=JPcst%2FJPArti
cle%2FShowFull; see also Yuval Yoaz, High Court Bans IDF 's 'Early- Warning'
Practice, HAARETZ, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
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the court has never held that Israeli settlements, per se, violate
international law.44°
In accord with the ICJ's opinion and the Security Council
resolutions mentioned therein, the General Assembly has repeatedly
passed resolutions stating that Israeli settlements violate Article 49(6).44 1
The Security Council issued three such resolutions during 1979 and
1980.442 However, finding references to the application of Article 49(6)
to nations other than Israel is like looking for "needles in a haystack." A
number of indictments and decisions by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that have considered acts of
genocide and forced deportations, primarily those committed by Serbs
against Bosnian Muslims,443 and a decision on a motion for acquittal by
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda4" deal with, or are based
upon, a violation of Article 49, along with other provisions from the four
Geneva Conventions. However, all references with respect to the Article
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=632657. Although acknowledging and applauding this activism,
Kretzmer seems to partially agree with the view that the Supreme Court has legitimated
the actions of Israel on the West Bank "[b]y clothing acts of military authorities in a
cloak of legality." KRETZMER, supra note 212, at 2. On the other hand, he concedes that
questioning and pressure by the court have caused the military and government to back
down from decisions or acts under consideration. See id. at 190 ("[W]hen the overall
picture is considered, the conclusion is far less clear [that the court's legitimating
function has dominated], since the [c]ourt's shadow has played a significant role in
restraining the authorities.").
440. David Kretzmer suggests that the doctrine of "justiciability" still plays a role.
See id. at 21. He opines the court accepts the justiciability of individual claims brought
by Palestinians on the basis of their property or other rights, but deems the general policy
of settlements not justiciable. See id. at 22; see, e.g., HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Israel [ 1992]
IsrSC 47(4) 210. In other words, the Court's silence on this issue does not necessarily
mean that it concurs with the government that the settlements do not violate international
law. Further, in Mara'abe, the court avoided deciding whether the settlements violate
international law because it determined, under the Hague Regulations, the Israeli military
administration was responsible not only to provide safety and security for Palestinians on
the West Bank but Israeli civilians as well. See id. at 13-14. In other words, the duty of
protection did not depend upon the legality of the presence of the settlers.
441. See supra note 17.
442. See S.C. Res. 452, supra note 427; S.C. Res. 465, supra note 427; S.C. Res. 478,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980). The date of these resolutions, which were
adopted during the Carter administration, is significant. While the U.S. State Department
during the Carter and George H.W. Bush administrations considered the settlements
illegal, it subsequently declined to reiterate that position. The Reagan, Clinton, and
George W. Bush administrations have adopted the more frequent formulation that the
settlements simply are an obstacle to peace.
443. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment (Jan. 17,
2005); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment (July 29, 2004); see also
TONY JUDT, POSTWAR, A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 665-83 (2005) (describing
horrific events on account of which these prosecutions were brought).
444. See Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Joint Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Decision on
Defence Motions for Acquittal (Dec. 16, 2004).
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49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention seem to pertain to Article 49(1) and
(2) rather than Article 49(6). Finally, occasionally one finds a non-
governmental reference to Article 49 applying to the conduct of a nation
other than Israel. For example, in 1994, a non-governmental
organization alleged that Article 49(6) was violated in the Chinese
transfer of its population into Tibet in order to alter the ethnic
composition of Tibet.445
Caution in facilely concluding that Israeli settlements violate Article
49(6) comes from respect for, rather than disregard of, international
humanitarian law. Although elementary, it merits repetition that what
distinguishes a system of "law" from arbitrary systems of control is that
similar situations are handled alike. No legal system is one-hundred
percent pure, of course, but the incompletely achieved goal remains that
legal principles are applied based upon the circumstances regardless of
the political position or identity of the parties. The loose use of
international law, disproportionately applied to Israel's attempts to
protect its citizens, undermines the notion that this is "law" entitled to
authoritative weight in the first place.446 Where are the legal proceedings
and UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions condemning
the forced displacement of Tibetans by Chinese, the movement of
Russians into the Baltic States, or other post-1949 transfers in Africa,
Asia and Central Europe for violations of Article 49(6)?
445. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Int'l Ass'n of Educ. for World
Peace, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any
Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries
and Territories, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/NGO/29 (Feb. 10, 1994). The International
Commission of Jurists wrote two reports dealing with Tibet in 1959 and 1960 reporting
"genocide," but neither was based upon Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
See INT'L COMM. JURISTS, THE QUESTION OF TIBET AND THE RULE OF LAW (1959),
available at http://www.tibet.com/Resolution/icj59.html (excerpt); INT'L COMM. JURISTS,
TIBET AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1960), available at http://www.tibet.com/
Resolution/icj60.html (excerpt). As Gerson noted, "The General Assembly limited its
response to mild censure and the Security Council was never convened." GERSON, supra
note 168, at 19. After the Republic of China assumed the UN post formerly held by the
Republic of China (Taiwan), no subsequent resolutions were ever passed.
446. This point is made most emphatically by Michla Pomerance:
Since advisory opinions are inherently nonbinding-and do not gain in
legal force when endorsed by the General Assembly or even the Security
Council-their authoritativeness depends, naturally, on the persuasiveness of
their reasoning. To rise above the level of political discourse and be considered
judicial utterances worthy of respect in state practice, they must be seen as
thorough and balanced in the presentation of facts and law, fair to the
contending interests involved, and internally consistent. Mere ipse dixits
obviously cannot substitute for careful judicial explication of the process by
which conclusions were reached.
Michla Pomerance, The ICJ's Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the
Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT. L. 26, 36 (2005) (footnote omitted).
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Where warranted, of course, Israel should not be immune from the
charge that it has violated the Fourth Geneva Convention. However,
others have cited the irony of applying the Geneva Convention, drafted
and adopted in the aftermath of World War II with the Holocaust
specifically in mind, uniquely to the state a significant percentage of
whose population consists either of Holocaust survivors, offspring, or
other relatives of Holocaust victims.447 To some, the implied equation of
Israeli actions with those of the Nazis forms part of a strategy to
demonize and deny legitimacy to Israel, not simply its settlements on the
West Bank or particular Israeli policies." 8 As one legal commentator
noted:
In three recent emergency special sessions of the UN General
Assembly, Israeli settlement was cited as a violation of the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention. These international humanitarian
instruments, forged in the ashes of the Holocaust to prevent future
genocidal brutality and oppression, were never invoked in [fifty]
years until the case of condominium construction in Jerusalem during
1998. 449
Similarly, would it not be ironic if the only application of the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause was against African-Americans
when the amendment, like the Thirteenth Amendment, was passed in the
aftermath of, and directed towards, the end of slavery and its
consequences in America?
4. Some Concluding Remarks about the Applicability and
Weight to Be Assigned to the Condition of Legality under International
Law
In sum, the question of whether, as a general matter, Israeli
settlements violate either the various provisions of the Hague
447. See Curtis, supra note 116, at 486 ("It is ironic that this charge [that Israel has
violated the Geneva Convention] should be made in reference to a convention the
purpose of which was to prevent the recurrence of a Nazi-like occupation with its
brutality, disregard of human rights, physical and mental coercion, taking of hostages,
and imposition of foreign law.") (footnote omitted).
448. See Bradley Burston, What Makes Islam So Easy to Hate?, HAARETZ, Jan. 31,
2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=676507 ("The code is
clear, and it is communicated to a billion Muslims the world over-these Jews, these are
the Nazis now."); Francis A. Boyle, Israel's Crimes Against Palestinians: War Crimes,
Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, MEDIA MONITORS NETwORK, Aug. 28, 2001,
http://www.mediamonitors.net/francis7.html. Boyle served as Legal Adviser to the PLO
from 1991 to 1993.
449. See Jeffrey Hehreich, Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of the Settlement Issue,
JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 19, 2003, available at http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief2-
16.htm.
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Regulations or Article 49(6) of the Geneva Convention is reasonably
moot. One should be cautious not to overstate the position of either
settlement proponents or opponents.
Many of those who allege a violation of international law
acknowledge, indeed try to point out, a distinction between settlements
established from the late 1960s until at least 1977, when the Labor led
government basically followed the Allon plan, and those established in
subsequent years under Likud led governments.45 ° Many if not most of
the settlements established under the Allon plan were placed in the
Jordan Valley, away from Palestinian population centers, and, wherever
placed, were justified by military defense. These settlements, then, at
least initially qualified under the "military necessity" standard of the
Hague Regulations and hardly affected the Palestinian civilian
population.45' Under later Likud led governments, many if not most
settlements were demanded if not forced upon the government by Gush
Emunim and similar settlement groups. As to the great bulk of these
settlements, there is little doubt that almost all settlers were enthusiastic
volunteers, who, irrespective of any Israeli tax incentives or other help,
would nonetheless have established settlements. As B'Tselem has
stated, "The principal method adopted by the [Gush Emunim] movement
was to settle a given site without government permission-and
sometimes contrary to its policy-in an effort to force the government
later to recognize the settlement as an accomplished fact., 452 Hence, the
argument that Israel, as an "occupying power," had "transferred" the the
settlers in violation of Article 49(6) becomes very weak. Similarly, since
most Israeli settlements have been established on state rather than private
land, the charge that all settlements have been established on "Arab" land
should meet with substantial skepticism unless material errors either in
the substance or procedure of designating land as "state" land are
established.
On the other hand, one should also exercise caution about
overstating Israel's position. When the Hague Regulations and Fourth
Geneva Convention are viewed together, there is a sense that Israeli
arguments justifying West Bank settlements under one body of law
weaken its arguments under the other body. The more one justifies
settlements in the West Bank under a doctrine of "military necessity" as
a reason to depart from the status quo ante prior to June 1967, the more
that justification is incongruous with seemingly permanent civilian
450. Lein, supra note 35, at 11-15.
451. Even B'Tselem concedes that, at least when initially established as military
bases, the settlements did not violate international law. See id. at 40.
452. Id. at 13.
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settlements. Stated inversely, the more one emphasizes that settlers
voluntarily moved to the West Bank rather than at the instance of the
Israeli government or its military (to answer an alleged Article 49(6)
violation), the more difficult it is to support the justification of "military
necessity" under the Hague Regulations for alterations in the West Bank
allegedly prejudicial to the native population. Similarly, even if the
settlers are legally present because of military necessity, they would not
have the right to remain in a Palestinian state any more than Israel's
soldiers present on the West Bank. While, elsewhere, this article
presents possible answers to these difficulties-including, inter alia, the
opinion of Blum, Rostow, and Stone that Israel's status on the West
Bank cannot be defined solely as an occupying power, the removal of
seemingly "permanent" settlements from the Gaza Strip (demonstrating
that even the notion of permanence is ephemeral), the fact that the
international law of occupation was never formulated with reference to
control over a territory for this length of time without final peace
agreements, and the absurdity of interpreting international law so as to
bar Jews from voluntarily living in an area-just like the frequently
reiterated statement that Israeli settlements clearly violate international
law, the question of legality is not a "slam dunk" on Israel's part.
Nonetheless, international law should not be used solely as an
instrument of politics. To the extent that it is so used, its legitimacy as a
source of law materially suffers, as illustrated by the pointed critiques
that followed the ICJ's advisory opinion on the security fence.453 Given
453. See, e.g., Caplen, supra note 326; Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli
Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005);
Pomerance, supra note 446; Gerald M. Steinberg, The UN, the ICJ and the Separation
Barrier: War by Other Means, 38 ISR. L. REV. 331 (2005); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ
Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self Defence, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 52 (2005). Wedgwood even reports that "following the rendering of the
[c]ourt's judgment, foreign ministry legal advisers from varied countries privately
conveyed dismay at the opinion." Wedgwood, supra, at 57. The one-sided nature of the
facts accepted as the basis for the ICJ's decision, the cursory nature of its handling of
legal materials, and its problematic position that military necessity does not include
protection against terrorism emanating from occupied territory, contrast unfavorably with
the measured way that the Israeli Supreme Court decided the same questions by applying
its proportionality test in Beit Sourik and Mara "abe. See supra note 436. Even Kretzmer
criticized the superficial analysis offered by the ICJ:
International mechanisms for ensuring compliance with norms of
[international humanitarian law] have always been extremely weak. It is
essential that they be strengthened. A major step in this direction has been
taken with the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Nevertheless,
while this step has been welcomed by many, some experts and a few states,
foremost among which are the United States and Israel, remain skeptical. Their
skepticism is mainly grounded in the fear that the ICC's decisions will be
dictated by politics rather than by law. In this atmosphere the credibility of
international judicial organs involved in assessing compliance with
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the paradoxes in applying the international law of occupation, especially
Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which has uniquely and
increasingly been the thrust of the charge against the settlements, to
Jewish settlements on the West Bank, which have existed for millennia
prior to the twentieth century and were rightfully established by the
Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, it is questionable at best
to conclude that Jewish settlements in general violate international law.
By stating the condition negatively -- that Israeli settlements are not
demonstrably illegal -- the condition appears to be satisfied. This
conclusion, of course, may not hold as to particular civilian settlements
that, without military necessity, have been established on requisitioned
land, civilian settlements established on private Palestinian land
subsequent to Elon Moreh, or settlements established on land
fraudulently purchased or fraudulently designated as state land. While
international law cannot be the ultimate arbiter of whether settlements
remain, it can influence the decision with respect to particular
settlements.
The Oslo Accords,454 signed between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization in September 1993, specifically left the subject
of Israeli settlements, like the subjects of Jerusalem and refugees, to the
[international humanitarian law] becomes more important than ever. This
credibility rests largely on the professionalism of such organs and the
soundness in law of their opinions. When looked at from this point of view, an
opinion whose findings "are not legally well-founded" is hard to applaud.
Kretzmer, supra note 341, at 102 (footnote omitted). While several international law
scholars applauded the ICJ opinion, particularly Richard Falk, see Richard A. Falk,
Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel's Security Wall, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
42 (2005), at least Falk's reaction could be anticipated in light of his unrelenting
opposition to Israel and substantially all of its policies over the last decades. See, e.g.,
ECOSOC, Hum. Rts. Comm., Report on the Question of the Violation of Human Rights
in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, 35-44, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/121 (relating Falk's position that Israel could not exercise rights of
occupation bellico on theory that conflict in West Bank was not international conflict);
Richard A. Falk & Bums H. Weston, The Relevance ofInternational Law to Palestinian
Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J.
129 (1991) (defending intifada with one-sided view of Israeli policies on West Bank). In
contrast, other scholars generally supportive of the ICJ opinion, especially its conclusion
that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to Israel's control over the West Bank, wrote
more nuanced reviews of the decision. Geoffrey R. Watson, The "Wall" Decision in
Legal and Political Context, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 6 (2005) [hereinafter Watson, The "Wall"
Decision]. Watson's view with respect to the applicability of the Fourth Geneva
Convention accords with his earlier writing. See GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO
ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 136-
42 (2000). However, he characterized the ICJ opinion as "primarily retrospective and
relatively unconcerned with practical implementation." Watson, The "Wall" Decision,
supra, at 25.
454. OSLO ACCORDS, supra note 13.
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political process of negotiation.4" The 1995 Interim Agreement between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority similarly designated settlements and
borders as subjects to be negotiated in final status negotiations between
the parties.456 It is the predominantly and transparently political, social,
and security considerations-namely, that continuance of Jewish
settlements is both practical and consistent with the creation of a viable
Palestinian state-that will and should determine their fate in general.
B. The Condition that Israeli Jewish Settlements Do Not Prevent the
Creation of an Independent Palestinian State Necessary for a Two-
State Solution
Except for partisans who tend to use legal arguments to score
political points, legitimate political issues dominate over legal issues
when speaking about Jewish settlements. It is to these political issues
that we now turn. The first, heard repeatedly, is that Israeli settlements
prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. The political argument
would seem to have two dimensions, one geographical and the other
directed towards peoplehood or citizenship.
The most frequent version of this political argument is geographical.
In its strongest form, it claims that Israeli settlements prevent a
contiguous Palestinian state.4 7  A more moderate form of the
geographical argument claims that regardless of the state's contiguity, its
borders would be extraordinarily convoluted. A correlative claim argues
the settlements, in any event, occupy too much of the land that
Palestinians would need for their state.
It is difficult to understand the strong form version because, even if
Israel were to retain sovereignty over every existing Jewish settlement on
the West Bank, it would be Israel not Palestine that would lack
455. Id. Article V provides that negotiations cover the remaining issues, including
"Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and
cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest." Id. art. V(3).
Annex II ("Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho
Area") provides a specific exception for "external security, settlements, Israelis, [and]
foreign relations," id. Annex II, 3(b), from "[s]tructure, powers and responsibilities of
the Palestinian authority." Id. The Agreed Minutes to the Oslo Accords provides that the
jurisdiction of the Palestinian council to be created "will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip
territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations:
Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis." OSLO AccoRDs, supra note 13,
Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, pt. B, art. IV(I).
456. See Interim Agreement, supra note 202, art. XXXI, 5.
457. See Editorial, Bush, Abbas Intentions, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2005, at A16
("Palestinians perceive continued thickening of settlements as proof that Israel has no
intention of allowing a viable Palestinian state on land that is not divided into multiple
separate enclaves.").
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contiguity. Further, as previously discussed, while the moderate version
has some validity in the abstract, much of its force is undermined by the
reality that the land west of the Jordan River must be allocated between
two independent states. However, both of these geographical concerns
ironically do not apply to the argument made in the article. Acceptance
of Israeli Jewish settlements within a Palestinian state would only serve
to increase the contiguity and geographical wholeness of that state.458
Connected to both the strong and moderate geographical arguments
is the assumption, held by the popular press and much of the public, that
Israeli settlements constitute a substantial percentage of the land mass of
the West Bank. Ironically, Peace Now and B'Tselem, both of which
oppose the settlements, estimate the settlements presently occupy 1.36
percent and 1.7 percent of the West Bank, respectively. 459 To the extent
that population clusters of Arabs and Jews should and will influence the
borders between Israel and a state of Palestine, at least some of the
settlements will be integrated into Israel, probably in exchange for land
in the Negev that would broaden the width of Gaza. Moreover, if some
settlements are integrated into Israel, the remaining settlements would
constitute an even smaller percentage of land on the West Bank, arguably
well below one percent. These percentages may rise appreciably to
somewhere between three and six percent of the West Bank considering
connecting roads and the like. 460 However, once again, the percentages
can only drop if the issue under consideration is not whether the
settlements will stay, but under whose jurisdiction they will remain.
The heart of the matter concerns the presence of a population within
Palestine that identifies as Israeli Jews. In contrast to the nearly 20
percent of Israel's, population that is Palestinian Arab, the 50,000 to
100,000 Jewish settlers that will be most affected by continued Jewish
settlements would constitute less than 3 percent of Palestine's
population, based upon a present population of approximately 2.3 to 2.5
million Palestinian Arabs within the West Bank and Gaza,461 and
substantially less than 2 percent of such a state if one assumes some
influx of Palestinian refugees. Whereas, in the words of Ephraim Karsh,
"it is certainly true... that the influx of these [Palestinian] refugees into
458. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
459. See Hehnreich, supra note 449.
460. This was reflected in Washington's proposal between July and December of
2000 that Israel withdraw from ninety-five percent of the West Bank. See Morris, supra
note 65, at 44.
461. See Arnon Regular, 1.lm Palestinians Live in Local Councils Controlled by
Hamas, HAARETZ, Dec. 18, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=658955. If the Palestinian Authority's own population figures were
used, the Jewish percentage of the total West Bank population would be de minimus.
See supra note 35.
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the Jewish State would irrevocably transform its demographic
composition, ''462 the existence of Jewish communities within a Palestine
would not pose any demographic risk to Palestine's remaining an
overwhelmingly Arab state.
As with Israel's Arab population, the presence of Israeli Jews in a
Palestinian state would pose issues of citizenship (will they be citizens of
that state or only residents?), loyalty (will the settlers, regardless of
whether they gain Palestinian citizenship, remain citizens of Israel?), and
legal autonomy in particular spheres. These are serious issues, but it is
unclear why they pose more serious problems than those concerning the
Arab population in Israel.463  Israel's Arabs, whether Muslim or
Christian, exercise legal autonomy in personal affairs. 464 A recent Israeli
survey on patriotism in Israel and its bearing on national security found
that "[m]ost of the Israeli Arabs are not proud of their citizenship ([fifty-
six] percent), and are not ready to fight to defend the state ([seventy-
three] percent). 465 Moreover, the survey found differences "between the
462. KARSH, Right of Return, supra note 43, at 166.
463. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 493-
96 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2d ed. 2000) (providing brief review of legal
status of various minority populations within Israel) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT]. Nor is the question of autonomy for religious and ethnic minorities
unique to Israel or to a future state of Palestine if Jewish settlements remain. See id. at
491-93. With respect to loyalty, anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem of "dual
loyalty" may be equally as applicable to Israeli Arabs as it would be for Palestinian Jews.
See, e.g., Jack Khoury & Nir Hasson, Two Israeli Arabs Dentist Indicted on Suspicion of
Joining Hamas, HAARETZ, Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=637317. Haaretz reports that "Arab MKs over the years have
become more resolved and effective expressing Palestinian identity and the national
Palestinian struggle." Dan Rabinowitz, The Peretz Challenge to Arab Politics, HAARETZ,
Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=652261; see Zvi
Bar'el, Absentee Journalism, HAARETZ, Dec. 11, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=656078 ("Hebrew Jewish society.., is almost completely
missing from the Arab press. ... Even worse, the leaders of Arab society take no interest
in the way Israeli society is covered--or not covered-in the Arab press."). An
interesting illustration was the recent suggestion by United Arab List MK Ibrahim Sarsur
"that he is willing to accept granting Israeli settlers in the West Bank citizenship of a
future state of Palestine as part of a final status peace treaty." Jack Khory, Arab MK: I
Would Agree to Grant Settlers Palestinian Citizenship, HAARETZ, May 12, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=715018. With respect to the
question of state loyalty, even more remarkable than the substance of the message was
the fact that a member of the Israeli Knesset was articulating the policy of a future
Palestinian state.
464. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 463.
465. Uzi Arad & Gal Alon, Patriotism and Israel's National Security-Herzliya
Patriotism Survey 2006 (Jan., 19 2006), http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=28218.
One commentator has addressed the nuances in this survey, including the fact that
seventy-seven percent of Arabs view Israel as better than other countries. See Alexander
Yacobson, On Israeli-Arab Patriotism, HAARETZ, Jan. 30, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=67622 1.
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type and expression of patriotism among Jewish citizens... and...
Arab citizens. ' 466 It reported that "[a]mong the latter, patriotic feeling is
subdued. When patriotic sentiment is given expression, twice as many
Arabs define themselves as Palestinian patriots than as Israeli
patriots. ' '467 After the creation of an independent Palestinian state, would
not at least some of Israel's Arab citizens wish to become citizens of that
state as well as citizens of Israel?
468
Moreover, just as conceptions of sovereignty continue to evolve and
change, 469 it is clear that citizenship, a concept related to one's degree of
inclusiveness within a given sovereignty, bears different and evolving
meanings. Summarizing a wealth of social scientific learning, Paul
Schiff Berman demonstrates, "people can hold multiple, sometimes
nonterritorial, community affiliations. '47° Traditional and allied notions
of citizenship, sovereignty and the "nation-state" are eroding fast, with
flexible and contingent forms of these notions replacing the more
absolutist, formalistic notions associated with Europe after the Middle
Ages. Significantly, under the Oslo Accords, Palestinians in East
Jerusalem were allowed to vote in the Palestinian elections, although
Israel claims all of Jerusalem as its capital under its jurisdiction.471
Millions of Americans, to consider another example, hold dual
citizenship, retaining their American citizenship even as they live in
Ireland, Poland, Israel, Mexico, or elsewhere and also exercise
citizenship or attributes of citizenship in these other places. Why would
dual citizenship necessarily be more problematic in the context of two
466. Arad & Alon, supra note 465.
467. Id.
468. This is a very different question than the one Arad discusses. See Arad, supra
note 70, at 16-18. In discussing and supporting land swaps, Arad admits only one-third
of Israeli Palestinians support a land swap that would make them residents and,
presumably, citizens of Palestine rather than Israel (parenthetically, he also argues that
this percentage would rise for a variety of reasons). Id. at 17. But whether Palestinians
who are citizens of Israel would like to give up their Israeli citizenship and become
citizens of Palestine is a very different question from whether they would like to enjoy
dual citizenship.
469. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
(2001); NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Amos
Shapira & Mala Tabory eds., 1999); SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION (Neil Walker ed.,
2004); Lapidoth, supra note 193, at 318.
470. See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005); see
also Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 472-
90 (2002). Although Berman directs his attention to jurisdictional questions, his analysis
is applicable to juridical questions more broadly.
471. See Aluf Benn, State Seeks Solution for E. J'lem Voters in PLC Elections,
HAARETZ, Dec. 28, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=663125 (discussing difficulties Israel faced in reconciling vote by
Jerusalem's Palestinian population with reality that Hamas was on ballot).
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contiguous states? Further, what if the Jewish population, or large
numbers of it, chose not to become citizens of Palestine? Again, by way
of analogy, approximately 6.6 percent of legal residents in the United
States are not citizens.472 Provided they legally reside within the United
States, these residents enjoy many of the same rights as American
citizens, the most notable exception being the right to vote. Arguably, it
is optimal to have all persons that permanently reside within a given
territory experience all the rights and obligations of others, but this
utopian ideal rarely characterizes the situation of any country, especially
multi-ethnic nations that also attract immigrants.
Moreover, substantially all peace plans proposed that incorporate a
two-state solution, with an Israel that can realistically be denominated
and remain both a democratic and predominantly Jewish state, also posit
that any Palestinian state would be demilitarized.473 Without an army,
some of the complications that Israel experiences with its Arab
population disappear.474 Issues of taxation, juridical status for purposes
of legal proceedings, and voting are no more intractable in a peace
agreement and accompanying treaties than the comparable issues with
respect to Palestinians residing within Israel as citizens or entering Israel
for employment on a daily basis.
C. The Condition that Continuance Is Practical: Whether Jews and
Arabs Can Co-Exist Safely within a Predominantly Arab Palestine
The argument that Jewish settlements obstruct peace frequently
devolves to questions related to the ability of Jews and Arabs to safely
co-exist in a Palestinian state. Sometimes this view is expressed in terms
of "pragmatism, ' '475 that is, although Jews should as a matter of principle
be allowed to establish communities on the West Bank, pursuing the
continuance option is not a pragmatic solution. The recent victory of
Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections has, if anything,
heightened such concerns, although many pundits and academics have
attributed the Palestinian vote more to the Palestinian Authority's
472. CensusScope, U.S. Nativity and Citizenship: 1990-2000,
http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart-nativity.html (year 2000 estimate based upon total
population of 281.4 million and non-naturalized foreign population of 18.6 million).
473. The usual phrase used in the negotiations was "nonmilitarized state." See Ross,
supra note 55, at 720.
474. Generally, Israeli Palestinian Arabs do not serve in the Israeli Army, while
Israeli Druze and Bedouin do. Israel justifies this by the unseemliness of requiring
Palestinians to fight Arab brethren. Whether or not this justification is convincing, the
exclusion of Palestinian Arabs from military service has been criticized because a number
of government benefits are based upon military service.
475. See DERSHOW1TZ, Is Settlement in the West Bank and Gaza a Major Barrier to
Peace?, in THE CASE FOR ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 176, 176.
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incompetence and inefficiency than to Hamas' militant stance towards
Israel and Jews.4 76
Both Arabs and Jews have legitimate security and safety concerns.
Palestinians have witnessed the destructive, anarchic acts of some Jewish
settlers, who, originally armed for their self-protection, have stolen
additional munitions from the Israeli military and turned their wrath both
against the Israeli military and Palestinians. In several cases, they have
killed Palestinians and in other cases beaten them, torched residences,
and stolen their olive crops.477
478Jewish settlers also have good reason to fear for their safety.
476. See, e.g., Fotini Christia & Sreemati Mitter, Hamas at the Helm, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2006, at A23; Karby Liggett & Neil King, Jr., Hamas Victory Roils Middle East
Peace Process, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2006, at Al.
477. Amira Hass, Jonathan Liss & Nadav Shragai, Shin Bet: IDF Did Nothing to Stop
Settlers Uprooting Olive Trees, HAARETZ, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=668510 (several human rights organizations allege twenty-
nine "harvest incidents" occurred between March 2005 and January 8, 2006, and 773
olive trees were uprooted during the last three years; Yesha Council of settlements
alleges many incidents resulted from Palestinians pruning or intentionally damaging trees
to receive compensation from Israeli military). The recurrence of these incidents,
however, indicates the great bulk of damage was caused by settlers. See, e.g., Gideon
Alon, Shin Bet Gives IDF, Police 'Harvest Incident' Suspects, HAARETZ, Jan. 11, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=668680 (describing allegation
Jewish youths cut down olive trees in Hebron area and reporting seventeen "harvest
incidents" in 2005, including physical attacks on Palestinian harvesters, theft of harvested
olives, and trespassing); David Forman, Settlers, Hands off the Olive Trees, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 27, 2005, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=
1134309653390&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull; Amos Harel, IDF Says
May Impose Closure on Jewish Areas in Hebron, HAARETZ, Jan. 15, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemiNo=670191 (Israeli settlers,
reacting violently to orders issued by Israeli military to evacuate shops in Hebron, rioted,
including torching home belonging to Palestinians); Amos Hare], Security Forces
Demolish Amona Homes Amid Violent Clashes, HAARETZ, Feb. 2, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=676627 (describing beatings
of Arabs and torching of cars, as well as violence by settlers against Israeli Army in
anticipation of forced evacuation of illegal settlement on West Bank); Arnon Regular &
Eli Ashkenazi, Palestinians: Settlers Cut Down 200 Olive Trees near Nablus, HAARETZ,
Nov. 27, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=650475; Ze'ev
Schiff, Anarchy on the Hilltops, HAARETZ, Nov. 18, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=647209. Even more recently, settlers in the illegal
outpost of Maon Farm have reportedly attacked Palestinian children walking to school,
necessitating a military escort. See Michal Greenberg, IDF Jeeps, Soldiers Escort 15
Palestinian Children Home from School Past Illegal Maon Farm Outpost, HAARETZ,
May 14, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=715421.
478. See Raphael Israeli, The New Muslim Anti-Semitism: Exploring Novel Avenues
of Hatred, JEWISH POL. STUD. REV., Fall 2005, at 97, available at http://www.jcpa.org/
phas/phas-israeli-fD5.htm; Glenn Kessler, Palestinian Leader is Urged to Confront
Militant Groups, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005, at A14; Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Abbas
Must Act, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 2005, www.usnews.com/usnews/
opinion/articles/051031/31 edit.htm.
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Sectarian hatred is a common phenomenon in the Middle East.479 Even
Christian Palestinian Arabs have increasingly faced discrimination and
physical violence from Muslims. 48°  Jews face even greater hostility.
Sermons and speeches, broadcast on the official Palestinian Authority
radio station, continually desecrate Jews and Judaism, calling them the
children of pigs and monkeys, and implore Arab Muslims to kill all Jews
and drive them from Palestine (a term that includes all of even pre-1967
Israel).48' Indeed, during Ramadan the past several years, serial dramas
based upon the Czarist produced forgery, Protocols of the Elders of Zion,
have been broadcast on Arab television, including on stations under the
control of the Palestinian Authority and stations in Egypt (with whom
Israel has a peace treaty) and Syria.482  Very recently, Mahmoud
479. Witness the horrendous violence exhibited by Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq. See
Sabrina Tavernise, Sectarian Hatred Pulls Apart Iraq's Mixed Towns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2005, § 1, at 1.
480. See generally WEINER, supra note 90. Weiner ascribes this to the emergence of
Islam as a political force, pointing out the draft constitution of the Palestinian Authority
declares Islam to be the official religion and includes Sharia Law. Specifically, Weiner
details the social and economic discrimination against Christians, the boycott and
extortion of Christian businesses, violation of real property rights, crime against Christian
Arab women, Palestinian Authority incitement against Christians, and failure of the
Palestinian security forces to protect Christians. He concludes, "The reversion to
traditional Muslim religious attitudes necessarily includes the treatment of Christians as
second-class citizens or dhimmi." Id, at 22 (emphasis omitted). In other words,
Christians, as non-Muslims, face the same second class status that characterized minority
communities in the Islamic Middle East for centuries, especially its Jewish communities.
481. See generally Itamar Marcus & Barbara Crook, Kill a Jew-Go to Heaven: The
Perception of the Jew in Palestinian Society, JEWISH POL. STUD. REV., Fall 2005, at 119,
available at http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-marcus-crook-f05.htm. The authors write:
The Palestinian religious, academic, and political elites teach an ideology of
virulent hatred of Jews. The killing of Jews is presented both as a religious
obligation and as necessary self-defense for all humankind.
Palestinian Authority elites have built a three-stage case against Jewish
existence, much as a prosecutor might build a case demanding a death sentence.
As their expert witness, they bring Allah Himself, Who is said to have sent a
message through the Prophet Muhammad that killing Jews is a necessary step
to bring Resurrection. Stage 1 is characterized by collective labeling of Jews as
the enemies of Allah, possessing an inherently evil nature. Stage 2 teaches that
because of their immutable traits, Jews represent an existential danger to all
humanity. Stage 3 presents the necessary solution predetermined by Allah: the
annihilation of Jews as legitimate self-defense and a service to God and man.
Id; see Justus Reid Weiner & Michael Sussman, Will the Next Generation of
Palestinians Make Peace with Israel?, JERUSALEM VIEWPOINTS, Dec. 1, 2005, available
at http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp537.htin ("The idea of the shahid (martyr) has become so
ingrained in Palestinian culture that it is a major theme in formal education, family
values, religious practices, television broadcasting, posters, pre-suicide eulogies, trading
cards, family celebrations, movies, music, games, and summer camps.").
482. See Palestinian Media Watch, Bulletins Prepared and Edited by Itamar Marcus,
http://www.pmw.org.il/Protocols.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2006); see also Middle E.
Media Research Inst., Ramadan TV Special: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Dec. 6,
2001), available at http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP3090 1.
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Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, pronounced that "Israel must be
wiped off the map. 483 Iran sponsors both Hezbollah, which fights Israel
from Southern Lebanon, and Islamic Jihad, which, operating both out of
Gaza and the West Bank, engages in terrorism against Israeli civilians,
both within the 1948 borders and on the West Bank; neither of these
groups accept the legitimacy of Israel.a84 Moreover, even after the Israeli
withdrawal from Gaza, scores of terrorist incidents have been attempted,
and a few have succeeded.485 In the immediate aftermath of the
Palestinian elections, the Hamas leadership seemingly remains
committed to its retention of guns and the legitimacy of specifically
targeting civilians.486
Yet important voices of moderation do exist, accepting the
legitimacy of Jews living within the midst of a greater Arab
population.487 Undoubtedly, guarantees of safety, free travel, and the like
would have to be extended to Jewish communities before they would feel
safe and agree to stay in an Arab Palestine. The world has rushed to
create a Palestinian state on the assumption that it would decrease the
level of Islamist terror that Israel and Western countries, both the United
States and in Europe, have experienced. Whether, in fact, the creation of
483. See Martin Indyk, Iran's Bluster Isn't a Bluff, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-indykl nov01,0,2800045.story?
coll=la-news-comment-opinions. Indyk, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy at the Brookings Institution, is a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and Assistant
Secretary of State for Near East Affairs.
484. See id.
485. For example, on October 26, 2005, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed five
Israelis in the town of Hadera. See Greg Myre & Dina Kraft, Palestinian Suicide
Bomber Kills 5 in an Israeli Town, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at A3.
486. See Steven Erlanger, After the Elections: The Leadership; Hamas Leader Sees
No Change Toward Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 1, at 1; Nidal al-Mughrabi,
Hamas Says It Won't Arrest Militants Who Attack Israel, REUTERS, Mar. 23, 2006,
available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=697914;
Editorial, Meshal: Hamas Ready to Merge Armed Factions to Form PA Army, HAARETZ,
Jan. 28, 2006, http://www.haaretz.comlhasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=675793;
Interview by Bernard Gwertzman with Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow, Wash. Inst. for
Near E. Policy (Mar. 20, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10189/levitt.html; see
also Jonathan Adiri, From Mahmoud Abbas to Mahmoud Hamas, YNET NEWS, Feb. 19,
2006, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3218458,00.html.
487. See, e.g., Walid Salem, Address the 'Jewish Question' Without Resorting to
Propaganda, DAILY STAR, Nov. 8, 2005, available at www.dailystar.com.lb/
article.asp?edition-id=10&categid=5&article id=19863#. Salem is the director of the
East Jerusalem office of Panorama, the Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and
Community Development. Sari Nusseibah, President of Al Quds University in East
Jerusalem, is another key voice of moderation. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, End to Boycott of
Israeli Universities is Urged, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A8; David Horovitz, Op-Ed.,
A Glimmer of Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at A27. Salem and Nusseibah differ
from others, whose calls to integrate Jews into Arab society are part of a strategy to
advocate one multi-ethnic state, with Arabs in the majority, rather than two states.
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a Palestinian state would decrease Islamic terrorism against the West
generally is beyond the realm of this paper, but the nexus between a
Palestinian state and Palestinian acceptance of Israel or a decrease in
terrorism directed towards Israel increasingly appears to be wishful
thinking.488
Indeed, the mere creation of a Palestinian state, without more,
would not be a panacea. There are preconditions to such a state, not as a
matter of theory or wishful thinking, but as a matter of reality. These
conditions include the dismantling of terrorist organizations,4 s9 the
monopoly of force by a Palestinian police force, demilitarization,490 and
economic viability.49' It is not simply a matter of acceding to Israel's
interest or that of Jews who may be living in a Palestinian state. As even
Adam Roberts, who is sympathetic to the Palestinian view of Israeli
settlements, has observed:
[O]n the Palestinian side, the belief that self-determination is an
internationally recognized right still sometimes involves a corollary
reluctance.., to accept that there might be any obligation on
Palestinians to demonstrate (to Arab states as much as to Israel) that a
future Palestinian state would be a stable and responsible member of
international society, accepting frontiers, regimes and rules of
coexistence.
492
A recent suggestion by Amnon Rubinstein, the founder of Shinui, one of
488. See Ze'ev Schiff, The Hope That Turned False, HAARETZ, Dec. 9, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=655822 ("In recent months,
Israel has shown an openness that it has not displayed in the past: the disengagement
from Gaza and evacuation of the settlements, the opening of the Rafah passage between
Gaza and Egypt, and the agreement allowing European Union monitors at the
passage.... The response by the Palestinian gangs was to step up the Qassam rocket fire
from northern Gaza.... And who's among the shooters? Not only Islamic Jihad
members, but also those belonging to Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of Fatah, Abu Mazen's
organization.").
489. See Press Statement, Middle East Quartet, Statement on Palestinian Legislative
Council Elections (Dec. 28, 2005), http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/middle east/
quartet-28dec2005.htm ("[T]hose who want to be part of the political process should not
engage in armed group or militia activities, for there is a fundamental contradiction
between such activities and the building of a democratic state.").
490. See Uzi Arad, No Free Rides: Tangible Israeli Gains Required if Palestinian
State is Established, Oct. 11, 2005, YNET NEWS, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
0,7340,L-315393 1,00.html; Mazal Mualem, Kadima PlaOform Calls for Jewish Majority,
Territorial Concessions, HAARETZ, Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=651003.
491. This undoubtedly explains why the World Bank and various donor countries are
presently pumping almost a billion dollars into Gaza after Israel's disengagement. See
Agence France Presse, Aidjor Gaza Aimed to Jump Start Economy, DAILY STAR, Oct. 12,
2005, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?editionid= 0&categid=
3&article id=19231; see also infra notes 501-08 and accompanying text.
492. Roberts, supra note 208, at 78-79.
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Israel's most liberal parties, and dean of an Israeli law school, is, in the
absence of a control of the violence, to establish a new mandate for the
West Bank under the trusteeship of either the European Union or Jordan
(with Egypt having the trusteeship for the mandate over Gaza), with
Palestinian sovereignty held in abeyance.493
The military, political and economic conditions interrelate. Apart
from the Arab-Jewish question, the lack of a monopoly of force in the
governing authority threatens the very existence of governing authority
and the population it governs.494 A failure to rid the territory that
becomes the Palestinian state of various forces "contributes to the
anarchy in Palestinian society, to gangland rule, ' ' 9 5 that is, it makes the
creation of a civil state nearly impossible.496 As the London Telegraph
recently editorialized:
Mahmoud Abbas's chronic inability to contain Palestinian
violence.., has serious implications both for democracy in the areas
under Palestinian authority and for relations with Israel. A man...
unable to keep his side of the bargain in the peace talks is failing
those he governs ....497
Private investment necessary for economic revival will be difficult in the
context of a general state of lawlessness.498 Of course, a corollary of
493. See Amnon Rubinstein, Op-Ed., Mandate for Palestine, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
26, 2005, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1134309653376&pagename=Jpost
%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
494. See, e.g., Khaled Abu Toameh, Two Suspected Collaborators Killed in Gaza
Hospital, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 3, 2004, at 1; Ibrahim Barzak, Fatah Gunmen Clash
with Palestinian Police, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2006, at Al 0.
495. Ze'ev Schiff, The Hope That Turned False, HAARETZ, Dec. 9, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=655822.
496. See, e.g., Barry Rubin, Palestinian Politics, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Nov. 25,
2005, www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=29289 (describing "anarchy
and the continuing cult of violence" that prevents political progress). Aaron Miller, an
advisor to six presidents on the quest for Middle East peace, concurs:
Armed struggle as a tactic has been a disaster.... [T]he gun has also wreaked
havoc on the Palestinian society and image. Suicide terrorism has not only
alienated Israel and America but also pushed them closer together. And
without Israel and America, a Palestinian state will be stillborn.
Aaron David Miller, The Palestinians' Crisis of Leadership, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/0 1/23/AR200601230
1256.html.
497. Editorial, Democracy in Palestine, supra note 123.
498. The lack of investment in Gaza since the withdrawal of Israeli settlers and
soldiers has been ascribed to lawlessness, perceived corruption in the Palestinian
Authority, and the lack of border outlets for exports. See Steven Erlanger, With Sharon
Ill, Palestinians Face Own Travails, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8. 2006, § 1, at 1 ("The
combination of the security chaos in Gaza and in large parts of the West Bank... is
likely to drive off foreign investors.... Yet it is only investment and job creation that
can offer enough jobs for the growing population of young men."); Harvey Morris,
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centralization of force and police-keeping in a Palestinian central
government is that Jews also must be barred from militia-like activity
and, for that matter, bearing unauthorized arms. To some settlers, this
might be anathema, 499 but that would be a condition to remaining within
a Palestinian state.
Additionally, a Palestinian state must be economically viable.
Otherwise, there can be little doubt that rather than constituting an
answer to the scourge of terrorism, the state would become another and
important base for it. For the foreseeable future, there is little doubt that
to be economically viable, large numbers of Palestinians, arguably in
excess of 100,000,500 would have to come into Israel to work every day,
as they did prior to the first and second intifadas.50 1 The most recent
World Bank report calculates unemployment in the West Bank at twenty-
eight percent, with approximately fifty-seven percent of workers
receiving wages below the poverty line.50 2  An extraordinarily high
Palestinians Grow Frustrated Waiting for the Expected Economic Recovery, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/262b211O-607d-1 lda-a3a6-0000779e
2340.html.
499. Ze'ev Schiff has described certain settlers as "right wing anarchists," originally
armed for their self-protection, who "have been involved in an entire slew of illegal and
violent activities against the Palestinians in recent years, among them beatings and
stealing their olive crops." See Schiff, supra note 477.
500. See Long-Term Policy Options for the Palestinian Economy, WEST BANK &
GAZA UPDATE (World Bank Group, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2002, at 1, available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/08/
14/00160016_20030814165921/Rendered/PDF/263360PAPEROGZONewsOUpdateO.pdf.
501. The World Bank estimates the number at almost 150,000 in mid-2000 prior to
the recent intifada. See WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 135, at 6; Associated Press,
Israeli Aircraft Fire on Gaza Rocket Labs, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/
Intemational/wireStory?id=l 370965&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312 ("The entry of
Palestinian laborers into Israel has been severely restricted over the past five years in
response to violence, dealing a crushing blow to the Palestinian economy."); Associated
Press, UN Report: Poverty Rising in Palestinian Areas, Despite Cease-Fire, HAARETZ,
Dec. 8, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=655553
("[Jioblessness is three times higher than what it was before fighting broke out in late
2000... [caused by] continued Israeli closures and other travel restrictions as drags on
the economy. During spikes in violence, Israel restricts Palestinian movement to stop
militants from launching attacks."); Akiva Eldar, US. to Israel: Gaza Convoys Must Start
This Week, HAARETZ, Dec. 11, 2005, http://www.haaretz.comihasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=656089 ("[A] new report prepared by the World Bank... attributed
most of the PA's economic problems to various movement restrictions imposed by Israel,
including limitations on the number of Palestinians working in Israel .... ). While
Hamas leaders, at least prior to forming the new government, have stated they want an
economy independent of Israel, see Orly Halpem & Associated Press, Hamas Plans
Independent Economy, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 9, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/
Satellite?apage= 1 &cid=l 139395371192&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull,
accomplishing that goal presently seems remote and more reflective of their anti-Israel
political stance than objective economic reality.
502. Akiva Elder, UN Report: Joblessness and Poverty on the Rise in Territories,
HAARETZ, Dec. 13, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
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unemployment rate raises serious questions about whether a state at
peace with its neighbors can be created, especially one that lacks the oil
resources of some other Arab nations. One analyst at the World Bank,
researching policy options for the West Bank as well as Gaza, cited the
fact that "Palestinians earn [ninety-one percent] more in Israel than in
[the West Bank and Gaza]," and concluded that "it is paramount for [the
West Bank and Gaza] to maintain access to Israel's labor market,
irrespective of the trade policy between Israel and [the West Bank and
Gaza]. 5 °3 Recent economic studies of the Arab Middle East reveal very
high unemployment rates throughout the Arab Middle East, 50 4 making it
unlikely that Palestinian excess labor could be absorbed by other Arab
states, even assuming a willingness to do so.
Aside from employment within Israel, open or relatively open
borders are necessary for the export of goods from those industries
within a Palestinian state.5 °5 As the World Bank reports, "All Palestinian
trade flows to or through Israel: for the small trade-dependent Palestinian
economy, therefore, the smooth operation of the bilateral passages
between Gaza, the West Bank and Israel is essential., 50 6  It may be
possible to separate Israel and the Palestinians politically, but an
economic separation will take many, many years.0 7
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=657006.
503. Maurice Schiff, Trade Policy and Labor Services, Final Status Options for the
West Bank and Gaza 26 (World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research
Working Paper 2824, 2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/
defaultiWDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/05/14/0000949460205010411325/Rendered/
PDF/multi0page.pdf. While another World Bank Report has argued in favor of greater
economic separation "aimed at diversifying the Palestinian economy away from Israeli
dependence in favor of greater integration with global markets," Long-Term Policy
Options for the Palestinian Economy, supra note 500, at 5, even this report acknowledges
that "this scenario is associated with significant unemployment." Id. at 6.
504. See Nirod Raphaeli, Unemployment in the Middle East--Causes and
Consequences (Feb. 10, 2006), http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=
ia&ID=IA26506 (while International Labour Organisation reports unemployment rate of
13.2 percent for Middle East and North Africa-even higher than Sub-Saharan Africa,
the poorest region in the world-Arab League Economic Unity Council estimates even
higher rate among its members).
505. Analogously, when Israel, based upon its stated security concerns, closed the
entrances to Gaza, James Wolfensohn scolded Israel for strangling Gaza's economy.
Wolfensohn, former president of the World Bank, presently serves as an emissary of the
United States, Russia, UN, and EU to oversee the use of donor funds in the economic
development of Gaza. See Greg Myre, Envoy in Mideast Peace Effort Says Israel Is
Keeping Too Tight a Lid on Palestinians in Gaza, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 2005 at A8.
506. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 135, at 11.
507. This is essentially the point that David Brooks makes with respect to a general
Israeli policy of "disengaging" from the Palestinians. Disengagement, according to
Brooks, is "not an option because while Israelis may no longer be dependent on the
Palestinians, the Palestinians remain dependent on them." David Brooks, Op-Ed., What
Palestinians?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005, at A3 1.
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In what way do these economic data and analyses bear on the
question of whether it would be pragmatic to pursue the continuance
option? The only circumstances under which it would safe for Israel to
accept huge numbers of Palestinians for employment and exports from
industries within Palestine, without fear of terror, are the same
circumstances under which it should be safe for Jews to live in a
Palestinian state. The exact nature of the guarantees of safety and rights
need not be spelled out here, but the presence of Israeli armed forces
ready and willing to protect endangered Israeli Jews can be a spur to a
truly open and civil Palestinian society. Further, if this kind of society is
not what the Palestinians desire and, if permitted, design as their state,
there is little reason to allow its independence. As two observers of
Palestinian society have written, "A peace agreement can only
successfully end a conflict if it enjoys underlying, wide-ranging support
from its respective populations.
'
"
50 8
Moreover, the question of whether Jews are allowed to stay in their
communities in land considered Eretz Yisrael, even if not Medinat
Yisrael, should be answered by the communities. Under the right
circumstances, just as Israeli Jews live in New York, Los Angeles, and
Boston, these same Jews might well decide, for religious and other
reasons, to remain. It should be their choice.
V. Conclusion
Two narratives indeed compete. 509  According to one, the
Palestinian Arabs were "there" first, the Jews came and, as imperialists
or colonists, "took" the Arab land and displaced the native population.510
But blind acceptance of this narrative, intentionally in the case of some
commentators,51' completely obliterates even the affirmative elements of
508. Weiner & Sussman, supra note 481.
509. Compare, e.g., Charles Moore, Op-Ed., How Did We Forget That Israel's Story
Is the Story of the West?, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 26, 2005,
http://www.opinion.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2005/11/26/do260
2.xml&sSheet=-/opinion/2005/11/26/ixopinion.html, with Scott Wilson, A Dig Into
Jerusalem's Past Fuels Present-Day Debates, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at Al
("Whether [King] David was a tribal chieftain or visionary monarch matters deeply to the
Jewish historical narrative .... Palestinian leaders ... dismiss the ancient story as
politically useful fiction."). An official organ of the Palestinian Authority terms a Jewish
nexus to Jerusalem as a "fabricated heritage." See Press Release, Palestinian Nat'l Auth.
State Info. Serv., Israel Funds Construction Acts Beneath Al Aqsa Mosque at the Cost of
68 Million (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.ipc.gov.ps/ipc_new/english/
details.asp?name= 12400.
510. See supra notes 91-97 & 104-111 and accompanying text (describing several
different versions of narrative).
511. See, e.g., Justin Keating, Justin Keating on Israel, DUBLINER, Nov. 2005
("Zionists have absolutely no right in what they call Israel.... [T]hey have built their
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the Jewish narrative that relate the several millennia connection between
the land that Jews refer to as Eretz Yisrael and the Romans renamed
Palaestina in an effort to sever that connection. According to Ephraim
Karsh, "So successful has this misrepresentation of the historical truth
[(the narrative that portrays 'Israel as an artificial neo-crusading entity
created by Western imperialism')] been that what began as propaganda
has become conventional wisdom, with aggressors portrayed as hapless
victims and victims as aggressors.
' 512
The Palestinian narrative has now become dominant,513 and it is
state not beside but on top of the Palestinian people, and... there can be peace as long as
contemporary Israel retains its present form.").
512. KARSH, Preface to RETHINKING THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 42, at xii.
513. See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 110; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt,
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. Gov't,
Working Paper No. RWP06-011, 2006), available at http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/
Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011/$File/rwp_06 011 walt.pdf (suggesting
narrative's acceptance in other academic disciplines). To buttress their case that an
"Israel Lobby" controls United States' foreign policy in the Middle East, Mearsheimer
and Walt first belittle the "moral case" for Israel. Id. at 8-14. Reactions to the paper
have come fast and furious, including an extended refutation by Benny Morris, see Benny
Morris, And Now For Some Facts: The Ignorance at the Heart of an Innuendo, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 8, 2006, at 23, on whose scholarship Mearsheimer and Walt repeatedly
rely. See, e.g., Mearsheimer & Walt, supra, at 48 n.24, 50 nn.34-35. In Morris' words,
"Like many pro-Arab propagandists at work today, Mearsheimer and Walt often cite my
own books.... Yet their work is a travesty of the history that I have studied and written
for the past two decades. Their work is riddled with shoddiness and defiled by
mendacity." Morris, supra, at 23. The dominance extends beyond academia. Walter
Reich has observed how the popular media have accepted the Palestinian narrative:
With regard to the "narrative" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following
the establishment of Israel in 1948, until a few decades ago the American and
European narrative was, in the main, one that was favorable toward Israel. This
"narrative," or story, was that of a justifiable, necessary and heroic return by
Jews to their homeland.
The public's understanding of the conflict and its background has changed in
recent decades, and in some ways radically. More and more, the Palestinian
"narrative" has affected the way in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
presented in the media-in newspapers, television and film-and has, as a
result, affected the way in which the public understands it.
Postings of Walter Reich to Rosner's Guest, supra note 107. For example, Paradise
Now, a film about Palestinian suicide bombers, won the 2005 Golden Globe award for
Best Foreign Film. See Suicide Bomb Film Scoops US Prize, BBC NEWS, Jan. 17, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4620160.stm. While the film is not supportive of
suicide bombing, it adopts the Palestinian narrative and, in the words of the filmmaker,
"trie[s] ... to explain why two seemingly simple garage mechanics would be willing to
kill themselves and others." Palestinian Film on Suicide Bombers Wins Golden Globe,
REUTERS, Jan. 17, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=671378; see Gerald M. Steinberg, Funding NGOs Is No Solution,
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 11, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=
1139395389604&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFulI (describing how NGOs
"repeat the Palestinian version of history that labels Israel as 'colonialist').
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probably that narrative's unquestioned and uncritical acceptance, rather
than particular arguments or claims made and addressed above, that most
accounts for the near universal acceptance of the proposition that, in any
final peace deal between Israel and a Palestinian political authority
(whether the Palestinian Authority, or not), all Jewish settlements would
have to be abandoned. Indeed, if one adopts all aspects of the narrative,
then acceptance of the Jewish State of Israel is simply a concession to a
present geo-political reality rather than an acknowledgement that Jews,
too, have rights. Conscious awareness and rejection of those parts of the
Palestinian narrative that deny any nexus between Jews and the land
would allow for a more critical examination of the assumption that the
territory included in a Palestinian state must be completely free of Israeli
Jewish settlements. The challenge is to move beyond political narratives
to deal with the reality and desirability of these settlements. To what
degree should the presence of Jewish settlements affect the final
boundaries of Israel vis-i-vis a nascent Palestinian entity? Must the
Palestinian state be free of Jews?
The presence and location of Jewish settlements surely should and
will influence the ultimate boundary between Israel and a Palestinian
state. If the raison d'6tra of Israel is that it is a Jewish albeit democratic
state, its Jewish majority should not be threatened by an Arab minority
that has a realistic chance of becoming a majority. Israel as a haven for
Jews around the world will disappear. The approximately twenty percent
of Israel's present population that is Arab does not threaten Israel's
Jewish character. Similarly, if the raison d'tra of a future Palestinian
state is to provide a political sovereignty for Arabs who identify
themselves as Palestinians, whether or not they reside in that state,
Palestine's Arab identity should not be threatened by a Jewish minority
that could become a majority. Two conclusions flow from this construct.
First, indeed, some Jewish settlements like Ma'ale Adumim that are
contiguous or substantially contiguous to the 1967 borders of Israel will
surely remain part of Israel in any final settlement,51 4 with land swaps
most likely in the area of the Negev that would broaden the waist of
Gaza. This was basically Prime Minister Ehud Barak's offer at the 2000
summit at Camp David with Chairman Yasir Arafat and in the
negotiations that followed. Further, even some of the most pro-
Palestinian Israeli politicians, like former Foreign Minister Yossi Beilen,
514. While it seems clear that Jewish settlements in the Hebron area, if they are to
remain, would become part of Palestine, and a settlement such as Ma 'ale Adumim, on the
outskirts of Jerusalem would be incorporated within Israel, the fate of many settlements
seems not straightforward. See Matthew Gutman, Beit Arieh Won't Be Abandoned-
Sharon, Nov. 9, 2005, JERUSALEM POST, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/
Satellite?cid=l 131367050883&pagename=JPost%2F.PArticle%2FShowFull.
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now a head of the Meretz party, acknowledge the need for border
adjustments to integrate into Israel those settlements that border or
substantially border the Green Line and house close to 80 percent of the
approximately 250,000 settlers on the West Bank.
Second, the remainder of the settlements and the Jewish settlers
there, including those in the Hebron area, need not be the obstacle to a
peace settlement that is commonly portrayed. Even if 100,000 settlers
remain (a rather high estimate, if major settlement blocs contiguous to
the Green Line are incorporated into Israel in exchange for other Israeli
land), that number would probably constitute no more than 2 percent of
the population of a Palestinian state and probably less. Further, the land
area of those settlements would constitute considerably less than two
percent of the land under Palestinian sovereignty.
Let us return to the African-American analogy tendered at the
beginning of this article. Most Americans, especially liberal Americans,
would never think that the solution to conflict within a predominantly
white-ethnic neighborhood, whether Irish, Italian, or other, would be to
remove African-American families. Rather, substantial resources would
be devoted to insuring that the neighbors respect the new inhabitants.
Instead of reiterations of the assumption that the settlements are an
obstacle to peace, thought and resources should be devoted to a serious
discussion of the context and conditions under which Jews might
continue to live on the West Bank. While both reason and justice
support the creation and co-existence of two states west of the Jordan
River, neither justice nor other reason is served by requiring that one of
these states be free of Jews.
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